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Abstract

Analysis And Classification Of Software Fault-Proneness And Vulnerabilities

Mohammad Jamil Mohammad Ahmad
Software bugs are expensive to fix and can lead to catastrophic consequences.
Therefore, their analysis and the use of machine learning for prediction are
of the utmost importance. Many prediction models have been proposed and
different factors affecting the prediction performance have been extensively
studied. This work addresses four topics in two areas in software engineering:
software fault-proneness prediction and analysis and classification of securityrelated bug reports. The first topic focuses on the effect of the learning
approach (i.e., the way software fault-proneness prediction models are trained
and tested) on the performance of software fault-proneness prediction which
lacks extensive research in this field. The second topic focuses on the effect of
imbalance datasets and choice of datasets on the prediction performance. The
third part focuses on the empirical analysis of and characteristics of securityrelated bug reports in open source operating systems. And the final topic is
focused on classification of security-related bug reports in open source projects.
In the first part we explore the effect of two learning approaches useAllPredictAll and usePrePredictPost on the performance of software fault-proneness
prediction, both within-release and across-releases at the file level. The
empirical results are based on datasets extracted from 64 releases of twelve
different Apache Open Source Software projects. Using nested design of
experiment with two factors and testing that statistical significance, our
results show that the prediction performance is highly affected by the choice
of the learning approach, implying that the learning approach must be
clearly identified and explicitly considered when reporting and comparing the
software fault-proneness prediction results.
In the second part, we explore the use of the Group Lasso Regression
machine learning algorithm (G-Lasso) and six other machine learning
algorithms, and the effects of two factors on the software fault-proneness prediction performance: the imbalance treatment using the Synthetic Minority
Over-sampling Technique (SMOTE), and the datasets used in building the
prediction models. Our empirical results are based on 22 datasets extracted
from open source projects. The main findings include: (1) SMOTE improved
the performance of all learners, but it did not have statistically significant
effect on G-Lasso’s Recall and G-Score. Random Forest was in the top
performing group of learners for all performance metrics, while Naive Bayes

performed the worst of all learners. (2) The choice of the dataset had no
effect on the performance of most learners, including G-Lasso. Naive Bayes
was the most affected, especially when balanced datasets were used.
The third topic focuses on the characteristics of security-related bug
reports and the differences between security-related and non-security-related
bug reports in three widely-used operating systems. This part serves as a
replicated study which explores several research questions previously explored
by several related works. Our analysis shows that most security-related bug
reports (1) appeared only in 7% - 34% of the source code packages (2) were
somewhat similar in the studied projects (i.e., shared the same eight top
dominant vulnerability classes, and 76% - 92% of the CWEs belonged to only
five CWE classes), (3) had medium severity and priority levels and (4) had
shorter initial response time and were fixed faster than non-security-related
bug reports.
The final topic of this dissertation is focused on the classification of bug
reports to security-related or not-security-related, a field that gained a lot
of attention recently, motivated by the increasing number of security threats
and attacks. We proposed a hybrid multimodal machine learning approach
that uses feature-level and decision-level fusion strategies to integrate the bug
reports’ text and bug tracking system modalities for the classification of the
bug reports. The proposed approach improved the classification performance
significantly for RHL and Ubuntu, and slightly for Fedora. Specifically, it
improved the classification performance’s F-Score and G-Score by 71.3% and
37.9% respectively for RHL, and by 9.3% and 11.1% respectively for Ubuntu.
The improvement was least significant for Fedora, with F-Score and G-Score
being improved by 3.0% and 2.5% respectively.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Software development and maintenance are tedious tasks, that use a big
chunk the industry’s time, money, and resources. It has been reported that
software evolution consumes 90% of development costs [2], [3]. A software bug
(i.e., fault) is “an accidental condition, which if encountered, may cause the
software system or components to fail or perform as required” [4]. Software
bugs can lead to different types of failures, but some of the most serious failures
are those which could lead to private information leakage, unprivileged access,
or financial loss. Those are known as software vulnerabilities. A software
vulnerability is a subset of software bugs [5], “which could be viciously used to
harm security of software system” [6], and “can be exploited by an attacker to
obtain some privileges in the system” [7]. Moreover, a software vulnerability
is the root cause of computer security problems [8] and is a security flaw
or weakness in the software which can lead to gaps in the systems’ security
and potentially be exploited by an attacker [9]. Software vulnerabilities are
“specific flaws of oversight in a piece of software that allow attackers to do
something malicious, expose or alter sensitive information, disrupt, or destroy
a system, or take control of a computer system” [10].
This dissertation addresses four topics which contribute to two major areas
of software engineering (1) software fault-proneness prediction and (2) analysis
and classification bug reports in open source operating systems. In the first
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area we focus on the classification of source units (i.e., classes and files) to
defective (i.e., fault-prone) or not defective (i.e., not fault-prone) by exploring
factors that affect the performance of the prediction models. Namely, we explore the effect of the learning approach, the imbalance treatment, and choice
of dataset on the performance of software fault-proneness prediction models.
In the second area we focus on software vulnerabilities. Specifically, we analyze
the security-related bug reports collected from open source operating systems,
and propose a novel approach to classify bug reports to security-related and
non security-related bug reports.
The four topics are divided as follows. The first topic addresses the effect
of the learning approach on the performance of software fault proneness prediction models. The second topic explores the effect of imbalance treatment
and datasets used on the performance of software fault-proneness prediction
models. The third topic is a conceptual replication of several different studies
of software security-related bug report characteristics. The fourth topic four
addresses the classification of software security-related bug reports.
In the first part, we explore the effect of the learning approach on the
performance of software fault proneness prediction models within-release and
across-releases in open source projects. This effect of the learning approach on
the performance of the software fault-proneness prediction has not yet been
explored, except for the initial work [11]. Our methodology is based on a design of experiment using two learning approaches (i.e., useAllPredictAll and
usePrePredictPost) to build several software fault-proneness prediction models using data collected from eleven open source projects. Specifically, we
focus on classifying whether the software files are fault-prone (i.e., defective)
or not fault-prone, within-release and across-releases. When using the useAllPredictAll learning approach, the prediction models are trained on data
collected during the entire development phase of a release to classify whether
a file has bug fixes which occurred during the same period. Whereas when the
usePrePredictPost learning approach is used, the prediction models are trained
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on data collected prior to the release date to classify files with bugs occurring
after the release date (i.e., post-release bugs). Our results show that the choice
of the learning approach heavily affects the prediction performance. Precisely,
the models which used the useAllPredictAll learning approach outperformed
model which used the usePrePredictPost learning approach within-release and
across-releases.
Secondly, we present the results of a collaborative work on using the Group
Lasso Regression machine learning algorithm (G-Lasso) for software faultproneness prediction in building software fault-proneness prediction.In this
part we analyze the effect of the imbalance treatment (i.e., SMOTE) and the
choice of the datasets on the prediction’s performance. Our main findings
show that G-Lasso: (1) is more robust when using imbalanced datasets (2)
is preferable when Recall and G-Score are of interest, and (3) is among the
top performing algorithms in terms of Precision and FPR. Additionally, our
analysis shows that applying imbalance treatment enhances the prediction’s
performance for all algorithms, however, the choice of the datasets when only
change metrics are used have no effect on the performance of the prediction
models.
The third part is focused on the empirical analysis of software securityrelated bug reports. This part provides comparative analysis of the characteristics of security-related bugs with non-security-related bugs. This work is a
conceptual replication of several related studies, each of which addressed different characteristics of security-related bugs [1, 12–27]. These characteristics
include: (1) the software vulnerability profiles which relate to the assigned
Common Weakness Enumeration (i.e., CWE) describing the software vulnerability type, and (2) several aspects related to the process of bug fixing. Specifically, we compare the main differences between the security-related bugs and
non-security-related-bugs in terms of time to fix, developers’ initial response
time to each of the bugs, number of comments used in fixing bugs, and the
distinct number of developers involved in fixing the bugs. Replicated works
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are necessary in any research fields to verify and generalize the findings across
different projects and domains.
Lastly, we focused on the classification of bug reports to security-related
and not-security-related. In this part we propose a hybrid multimodal machine
learning approach which uses feature-level and decision-level fusion strategies
to integrate text and bug tracking system modalities of the bug reports. Using
hybrid multimodal fusion strategies classify security-related bug reports has
not been explored before. Our results showed that the proposed approach
outperformed all other models when using each of the modalities individually,
and when using feature-level fusion of text and bug tracking system modalities.
The classification performance and improvements of the proposed approach
differed across datasets. When compared to the best performing baselines, the
proposed multimodal approach had 0.997 F-Score and G-Score (i.e., 3.0% and
2.5% improvement respectively) for Fedora, 0.821 F-Score, and 0.869 G-Score
(i.e., 71.8% and 37.9% improvement respectively) for RHL, and 0.820 mean
F-Score and 0.877 G-Score (i.e., 9.3% and 11.1% improvement respectively).
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: Related works are presented in Chapter 2. The effect of the learning approaches on the classification
of software fault-proneness prediction is presented in Chapter 3. Chapter 4
presents the analysis of the effect of the imbalance treatment and datasets on
the performance of the software fault-proneness prediction. Chapter 5 presents
the replicated study of the security-related bug reports characteristics. Chapter 6 presents the work on the classification of security-related bug reports
using multimodal machine learning. Chapter 7 presents the conclusions and
the future work. And Chapter 8 presents the appendices.

5

Chapter 2
Related Work
2.1

Related work on software fault-proneness
prediction models

There are numerous published works on software fault-proneness prediction
[28–30]. Many overviews are provided in many literature in related surveys
given in [29–34] and referencing all of them cannot be done. Although the
related work in this section is not exhaustive and not inclusive of all works, but
this section explores the most relevant works. There are three main principles
that could be used to categorize supervised software fault proneness prediction
models; (a) the prediction type (i.e., classification or numerical regression),
(b) the granularity of software units of code used (i.e., class, file, package, or
components), and (c) the source of data used in training and testing these
models (i.e., same or different releases, projects, or companies).
Classification based models are built in order to classify software units as
fault prone or not-fault prone (e.g., [11, 35–45]) whereas numeric prediction
based models predict the number of fault prone software units (e.g., [46–52]).
Prediction at file level uses features collected from low level software source
code units such as files or classes (e.g., [53, 54]) or methods [55], where as
prediction at component level uses features aggregated from source code files
to draw more generalized trends such as packages, modules or components [56].
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Software fault proneness prediction models which are trained and tested on
data collected from the same software project are known as within-project
prediction models [53, 57–61], whereas models that use training data from a
given project and testing data from a different project are known by acrossprojects prediction models [61–67]. We focused here on classification based
software fault-proneness prediction models at the file level, with emphasis on
the works that considered different factors affecting the performance of these
models.
The systematic literature review on fault prediction performance [30] explored the effects of model context, independent variables, and the machine
learning technique on the performance of software fault-proneness prediction.
The authors examined 208 papers in the software fault-proneness prediction
field, 36 of which satisfied the criteria and were considered. The comparison
of the results showed that Naive Base and Logarithmic Regression seemed to
perform relatively well, whereas Support Vector Machine (SVM) seemed to
perform worse than other learners. Note that no statistical tests were used
to test the significance of the results. In later work the authors in [68] investigated the replication of the software fault-proneness prediction in [69] and
reported that only 13% of the 208 studies were replicated.
Many different machine learning algorithms have been used in building
software fault-proneness prediction models. For example, [37, 70] used Random Forrest (RF), the work done in [71] OneR, J48, and Naive Bayes (NB),
[11, 72, 73] used J48, and [60] used RF, NB, RPart, and SVM. With the big
recent development of Deep Neural Networks (DNN), many studies used deep
learning in the field of software fault-proneness prediction (e.g., [74–78]).
Software fault-proneness prediction models use feature vectors consisting
of software metrics to feed machine learning algorithms (learners). Such models use different metrics extracted from software source code, its development
history, and the associated bug tracking systems to predict the fault-prone
software units. In general, the extracted software metrics can be static code
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metrics, change metrics, or social metrics. Static code metrics are collected
solely from the software source code units [44, 60, 63, 71, 79–83]. Change metrics are collected from the projects’ development history (i.e., commit log) and
bug tracking systems [11, 84–86]. Social metrics are drawn from the communications among developers and users of each project [87, 88]. Some studies
used only static code metrics [71,89–91], others used only change metrics [11],
or only social metrics [87, 92, 93]. There are studies that used different combinations of metrics sets, such as [29, 55, 94–96].

2.2

Related works that used Design of Experiments approach for software fault proneness prediction

Several related works on software fault-proneness prediction adopted design
of experiment approach (e.g., [80, 97, 98]. A framework to compare the performances of software fault-proneness prediction models was proposed by [80].
Specifically, 22 machine learning algorithms were compared using 10 datasets
from the NASA Metrics Data repository. The results showed that no statistically significant difference in performance existed among the top 17 machine
learning algorithms. In other words, the choice of machine learning algorithm
in building software fault-proneness prediction models appeared to be not as
important as it was previously assumed. While a lot of studies do not use
statistical tests to draw conclusions, other work used some statistical tests
and analysis. For example, the authors in [90] used the Friedman Nemenyi’s
post-hoc statistical test, [91] used Wilcoxon, [11] used Kruskal-Wallis test, [99]
used t-test, [100] used ANOVA. Using a 3-way ANOVA (F test), the authors
in [97] investigated the use of feature selection techniques on the performance
of software fault-proneness prediction. Using static code metrics extracted
from a large legacy telecommunication company, feature selection and ranking
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Table 2.1: Studies that used design of experiments approach
Study

Dataset

Features

Factors explored

Perf.
metric

[80]

[97]

NASA MDP

AUC

Statistical
tests

Static

Machine learning

Friedman

code

algorithm

Legacy telecom-

Static

Machine learning

munication

code

algorithm

ANOVA

Feature selection

Nemenyi test

test
AUC

3-way

Feature ranking
[98]

NASA MDP

Static

Machine learning

Mathew

Four-way

Eclipse

code

algorithm

Correla-

ANOVA

Change

Dataset

Social

Metric family
Research group

tion

Levene’s test

Coefficient
(MCC)

and techniques experimented performed similarly, but their automatic hybrid
search algorithm performed best compared to other techniques.
Meta data from several software fault-proneness prediction models were
analyzed in [98] and four factors affecting the prediction performance were considered; the choice of the machine learning algorithm, datasets family, metrics
family, and researcher group. Using 4-way ANOVA the authors showed that
that the choice of the machine learning algorithm has little to no impact on
the performance of the software fault-proneness prediction models. Whereas
the effect of the researcher group is obvious and could be used to explain the
variance in performance.
The software fault-proneness prediction models use feature vectors consisting of software metrics to feed machine learning algorithms (learners) [80] [97].
Such models usually examine a set of measurements known as metrics extracted from software source code, its development history, and its associated
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bug tracking system to predict the faulty software units . Researchers have
used several sets of metrics to build software fault-proneness prediction models.
These metrics can be Static code metrics, Change metrics, and Social
metrics. Static code metrics are measurements collected solely from the
projects’ source code, change metrics are collected from the projects’ development history (commit log) and bug tracking systems. Social metrics are
drawn from the communications among developers and users of each project.
For example, [101], [102], [103] used only static code metrics, and [65], [95]
used only change metrics, whereas [87], [92], [93] studied social metrics only.
Other studies have used a combination of metrics, for instance [29], [104], [94],
and [105] used both static code and change metrics.
Many machine learning algorithms were used for software fp prediction
[106], [107], [70], and [108]. The systematic literature review on fault prediction
performance [30] explored the effects of model context, independent variables,
and the modeling technique on software fault-proneness prediction models.
The authors examined 208 papers in the software fault proneness prediction
field, 36 out of which satisfied the criteria and were considered.
Thought many techniques have evolved to enhance software and reduce the
number of software bugs and their impacts on users, one part remains the most
challenging, that is, detecting and preventing software vulnerabilities. A single
software vulnerability can affect many products [109] and may also endanger
users’ privacy and sensitive information. In this chapter we explore some of the
related work which focused on classifying software security-related bugs and
vulnerabilities, and the related work on the classification of security-related
bug report.
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Related work on classifying vulnerable
software units

In this section, we explore the related research on the classification of
software vulnerabilities.
It is crucial to draw the difference between the classification of software
units (e.g., classes, files, or packages) to those that are likely to have vulnerabilities (i.e., are vulnerability-prone) and those that are vulnerability free, and
the classification of the bug reports to security-related or not. This section
focuses on the former, that is the classification of software units to vulnerableprone or not. When classifying software units, the aim is to find whether
the software units are likely to cause security-causing failures in the current,
or future releases. The models designed to classify vulnerable software units
could use features collected from the software units (i.e., static code metrics),
the version control systems and source code repositories (i.e., change or social
metrics), or different combinations of those sources. In some works, features
from the bug report’s language used to describe those bugs were used to design
those classification models. These features are fed to classification models to
classify whether a unit is a software vulnerability or not. On the other hand,
the models designed used to classify bug reports classify the bug report itself to
different categories, including to security-related, without referring to whether
the software units fixed in those bug reports are software vulnerabilities. First,
we consider the works which classified software units, then we consider works
which focused on the classification of bug reports to security-related bug reports.
In their work [110] an approach is proposed to automatically classify
software security bugs into three categories, deterministic bugs, internal indeterministic bugs, and external in-deterministic bugs. They proposed a Compile Time Error . They studied three security bugs, buffer overflow, nullpointer reference, and divide-by-zero. They proposed a rule-based compile
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time approach in automatically classify security bugs into the three categories
mentioned above.

2.3.1

Using software metrics

The authors in [14] reported that a small set of source code units accounted for most of the reported post-release bugs in three telecommunication
datasets. Quantitative analysis of faults in complex software systems were
presented in [12, 16] and the usefulness of software metrics (e.g., lines of code
and complexity) were investigated as predictors of post-release bugs. The work
done in [13] reported a variety of times used to fix software bugs in ArgoUML
and PostgresSQL. The relationship between software bugs (i.e., pre-release
bugs) and vulnerabilities (i.e., post-release vulnerabilities) was studied and
empirically analyzed in [19]. Using 375,389 bugs from the Chromium browser,
it was reported that while there was a correlation between pre-release bugs
and post-release vulnerabilities, the association was rather weak. However,
the numbers of pre-release security-bugs were more closely associated with
post-release vulnerabilities. This section explores the related works which
used software metrics (e.g., static code, change, social) as means of classifying software units which had security vulnerabilities. These metrics have
been extensively used in the field of software fault-proneness prediction models and have shown their competences in predicting and classifying software
units which are fault-prone [111–115]. The classical way of using this technique is to use all metrics as data vectors and use them in prediction models
using machine learning algorithm. The technique that is typically followed is
supervised learning where the data is pre-labeled and split into training and
testing sets. One downside of this technique could characterize in the lack of
data and the imbalance between vulnerable and non-vulnerable labeled data.
The authors of [116] experimented bug classification using slicing metrics
for C++ and compared the performance of the prediction models with tradi-

Chapter 2. Related Work

12

tion source code metrics, while the results seemed promising, but they were
just as good as the source code metrics. The slicing metrics measure size,
complexity, coupling a cohesion property in the source code.
The authors in [111] investigated the use of developer’s activity to predict
software vulnerability in Open Source Red Hat Linux 4.0. A network of nodes
was created to quantity developers’ activities, and the metric of betweenness
was used to quantify the centrality of a node in a network. Using the bugs reports collected from Red Hat Bugzilla database, a manual method was followed
to label such bugs and their corresponding files. A bug report was labeled as
vulnerable if its source code file was patched with a post-release vulnerability
defined in the Bugzilla database, the NVD, or the Red-Hat Security Repository (RHSR). Using supervised learning, two modeling method were followed,
multivariate discriminant analysis and Bayesian networks.
The authors in [112] investigated the ability of using classical defect prediction metrics (e.g., complexity, code churn, and dependency measures) to predict vulnerable components. They implemented a large-scale empirical study
on Windows Vista and concluded that such metrics can be used to predict
vulnerable components with descent recall and relatively high precision. Additionally, the classical software metrics correlate with the number of software
vulnerabilities but the effect is small. And the study in [117] analyzed the relationship between software metrics and vulnerabilities using a static analysis
tool. They investigated the use of source code complexity metrics to identify
vulnerabilities in Open Source PHP applications using the Fortify tool [118].
Furthermore, [119] reported that using software metrics such as source code,
code churn and developer activity metrics can discriminate between vulnerable
and neutral files as well as predicting vulnerable source code locations in
FireFox and Red Hat Enterprise Linux Kernel.
Meneely and Williams [113] investigated whether metrics extracted from
developers’ activities are useful to predict software vulnerabilities in the PHP
programming language and Wireshark network protocol analyzer. The authors
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reported that software units which were fixed by at least six developers were
four times more likely to have security vulnerability. However, developers’
activity metrics did not account for all vulnerabilities found, meaning that
the other metrics which capture other aspects of the developed software are
needed to design better vulnerability detection models. Very similar findings
were reported by Meneely and Williams [111] in which the authors reported
that files changed by nine or more developers were 16 times more likely to
have vulnerabilities, compared to files changed by less than nine developers.
In that work, the developer’s activity was quantified into several metrics (e.g.,
numbers of commits, and developers, and
Moshtari, Sami and Azimi et. el. [114] evaluated the use of source code
complexity metrics as an effort to improve software security and reported that
feasibility of using such metrics in detecting vulnerable software units. Using complexity metrics extracted from Mozilla Firefox, their prediction model
was able to detect 92% of the files with security vulnerability within Mozilla.
However, the prediction models which used complexity metrics to detect vulnerable files across projects detected only about 70% of the vulnerable files
in Eclipse, Apache, Mozilla, Linux Kernel and OpenSCADA, with a slightly
higher False Positive rate (i.e., 26%).
Shin and Williams et. al. investigated the capacity of bug prediction
models to predict vulnerabilities in Mozilla Firefox [115]. Using complexity
and code churn metrics, bug prediction models were used to classify vulnerable
source files in Mozilla, with recall of 83%, precision of 11-12%, and high false
positive rate and low Precision.
Shin et. al. [119] investigated the usability of source code, code churn and
developer activity metrics in discriminating between vulnerable and neutral
files and predicting vulnerable source code locations. Three sets of metrics (i.e.,
complexity, code churn, and developer’s activity) were extracted from Mozilla
Firefox and Red Hat Enterprise Linux Using. Of the extracted metrics, 24 were
of discriminative of vulnerabilities. Using the three sets of metrics together,
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models predicted about 80% of the vulnerabilities, with less than 25% false
positive rate in both Mozilla and Red Hat Enterprise Linux kernel.

2.3.2

Using text mining

A study was introduced by [120] to compare the vulnerability detection
using software metrics and text mining. Two models were developed to detect vulnerabilities, one using Software source code metrics including LOC,
complexity, and Halstead’s metrics, and a second model using text mining the
source code. Text mining was implemented using the Bag-of-Words (BOW)
on the source code. The dataset used in this study was pre-labeled from
the vendors and both models were built using the classical Machine Learner
Random-Forrest. The results showed that using text mining is more promising
that solely depending on software metrics to predict vulnerabilities.

2.4

Analysis of software vulnerabilities

Although the types of software vulnerabilities are many, a smaller portion
appears more than others. For example, the information obtained from two
open-source software systems Linux kernel and OpenSSL was used to analyze
the characteristics of the software vulnerabilities in those systems, and only
nine CWEs were prevalent [20]. The authors in [22] presented an experience
report analyzing security vulnerabilities in six operating systems between the
years 2012 and 2015. They investigated the days-of-gray-risk which is the
time between a vulnerability is publicly released and a bug fix was patched.
Their work showed that weaknesses CWE-119, CWE-264 and CWE-20 were
dominant, and the average days-of-gray-risk of the most critical vulnerabilities was higher than the average for the least critical vulnerabilities. The
work in [23] analyzed the differences between security-related bugs and other
types of bugs (i.e., discovery and resolution) in three open source projects.
Security-related bugs in Firefox were resolved 33% faster than the other bugs.
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A framework to collect and analyze security vulnerabilities in four open source
systems was presented by the work in [24]. CWEs 264, 200, 399, 119, and 20
consisted of the top five most frequent vulnerabilities. Security-related bugs
and software vulnerabilities have different severity levels, and to help predicting the severity of software vulnerabilities, Han, Li, Xing et al., proposed a
deep learning approach to predict the severity levels of vulnerabilities using
the textual description (i.e., word embedding) of those vulnerabilities [21]. A
more recent replicated study was proposed by Sahin and Tosun to predict the
severity scores, rather than their levels [25]. Both reported that most securityrelated bugs (i.e., 54.6%) had Medium severity. An analysis of security-related
problems was presented in the study [26] to better understand the days-of-risk
(i.e., the time which shows how fast vendors issued vulnerabilities patches to fix
them) in several operating systems. Their analysis showed that the CWE-119
was the most common vulnerability in the studied systems which represented
24% of the reported vulnerabilities, followed by the CWE-264 which included
23% of the reported vulnerabilities.

2.5

Related work on classification of bug reports

There are many studies which explored and analyzed different types of
software bugs and their fixing process [12–17, 121].
An investigation and a classification model of the different types of software
bugs were presented in [17] for Mozilla, Apache, and Eclipse in which it was
shown that bug reports which refer to security problems are rather rare. Additionally, it was reported that security-related bugs have the smallest initial
response time. Other papers [18] compared security-bugs in security-related
bug reports with other types of bugs. Zaman, Adams, and Hassan compared
security-related and performance bugs for Firefox and reported that security-
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related bug reports took more time to fix on average, and they involved more
developers.
Analyzing bug reports to identify security-related and categorize other bug
reports threats is a challenging task and can cause potential delays in reaching
to a resolution to these bugs [122]. Many works focused the security-related
bug reports and vulnerabilities in software systems (e.g., [1, 18–27]).
Authors in [123] used bug reports for Cisco software to analyze whether
non-security faults and failures are associated with security faults. Their work
focused on using the non-security related data as an input to their classification and regression tree model to calculate the probability that a component
is vulnerable or not. They found that there is a high correlation of 0.4 between non-security and security related failures. In their later paper [124] an
approach of text mining was followed to fix the issue of mislabeling security
related bugs as non-security related bugs. A large data-set of bug reports for
Cisco software available on Bugzilla was used, and manually pre-labeled bug
reports were used to train the prediction model they developed. By designing
a classification model, their work aimed to classify weather a bug report is
security related or not. Bug report found in the bug tracking system were already labeled as security-related or non-security related. For each bug report
found in the bug tracking system, the SAS Text Miner tool [125] was used to
generate term-by-frequency (TF) matrix from the summary text field and description of each report. Multiple splitting techniques were used to train and
test the prediction model, and the results show that using natural-language
model was able to successfully identify 77% of security-related mislabeled bug
reports.
A case study on Firefox was implemented in [18] to better understand the
characteristics of security-related bug reports compared to performance bugs.
By studying Firefox web browser bug reports, their findings were summarized
as follows: security-related bug report are fixed much faster, reopened more
frequently, involve more developers, and impact more files than the rest of
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bugs. The targeted bug reports were labeled as performance bug by mining
their description for words related to performance such as ’perf’ or ’slow’. Such
heuristics were used to classify bug performance, and a statistical sampling was
used to ensure accuracy. Security bugs on the other hand were classified using the Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory (MFSA). For each of the bug
report groups, the textual descriptions were used to create a topic model to
reflect the theme of each. Then, the statistical topic model LDA was used
to automatically discover topics from the bug reports. And network analysis
to build their classification model. The bug reports found in the bug tracking
systems were used to build the network to develop the developer network centrality metrics, whereas the rest of metrics were generated directly from the
source code. A total number of 28 metrics were collected from Mozilla Firefox
web browser and Red Hat Enterprise Linux kernel to build their model. They
found that among the extracted metrics, 24 are discriminative of vulnerabilities. Bug reports were already labeled as vulnerable or non-vulnerable, and a
file was treated as vulnerable if it was fixed by a vulnerable developer activity.
In a study of Android Apps, the authors in [15] presented a comparison of
security-related bug report with the non-security-related bug reports in terms
of time needed to fix, developers’ contribution, and comment activity. They
reported that in Google Code-based apps, the security-related bugs needed
the same time median to fix compared non-security-related bugs. However,
security-related bug reports in Mozilla needed much less time to fix compared
to non-security-related bug reports.
An experience report of security-related bugs in NASA issues was introduced in the work [1]. The information provided in NASA issue tracking systems was used to explore the distribution and characteristics of security vulnerabilities, and to classify bug reports into security related / non-security related
vulnerabilities. Bug reports were first manually classified as security related
or not, and those that were related were also classified based on their security
type into their corresponding security CWE888 type. In a later work [126],
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the authors explored using the datasets to explore whether supervised and
non-supervised learning can be used to automatically classify security-related
issues. For each bug report, three types of text features were extracted from
the textual descriptions; Bag of Words (BOW), Term Frequency (TF), and
Term-Frequency Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) and used with several machine learning algorithms to explore their efficiency in classifying the
security-related bugs. Furthermore, unsupervised learning was explored by
measuring the cosine similarity between each of the each of the features and
the textual features extracted from the CWE textual description.
The recent relevant study by Canfora, Di Sorbo et el., investigated the fixing process of security-related bug reprots in open source projects [27]. Their
analysis showed that security-related bug-reports are indeed different from
other bug reports. Precisely, security-related bug reports involved more developers and contributors, had higher numbers of comments, and took much
more time to fix compared to non-security-related bugs. Authors in [123]
used bug reports for Cisco software to analyze whether non-security faults
and failures are associated with security faults. Their work focused on using
the non-security related data as an input to their classification and regression
tree model to calculate the probability that a component is vulnerable or not.
They found that there is a high correlation of 0.4 between non-security and
security related failures. In their later paper [124] an approach of text mining
was followed to fix the bug of mislabeling security-related bugs as non-security
related bugs. A large data-set of bug reports for Cisco software available on
Bugzilla was used, and manually pre-labeled bug reports were used to train the
prediction model they developed. By designing a classification model, their
work aimed to classify weather a bug report is security-related or not. Bug report found in the bug tracking system were already labeled as security-related
or non-security related. For each bug report found in the bug tracking system,
the SAS Text Miner tool [125] was used to generate term-by-frequency (TF)
matrix from the summary text field and description of each report. Multi-
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ple splitting techniques were used to train and test the prediction model, and
the results show that using natural-language model was able to successfully
identify 77% of security-related mislabeled bug reports.
The authors in [126] used supervised and unsupervised learning to identify
security-related bugs in three NASA ground missions. Using text features
extracted from the bug reports they showed the visibility of using text features
like Bag of Word (BOW), Term Frequency (TF), and Term Frequency Inverse
Document Frequency(TFIDF) in identifying security-related bugs. red to 0.90.
The work done in [127] used a K-fold stacking classifier to identify securityrelated bug reports in Open Source projects. The classifier was trained on word
embedding features (word2vec) extracted from the commits messages and bug
report and demonstrated encouraging results. Authors in [128] studied the
SEVERITY of a bug based on textual description of two Open Source projects,
Eclispe and CNOMIE.
Authors of [77] explored the use of Deep Learning by creating DeepTriage
which employed an attention based deep bidirectional recurrent neural network
(DBRNN-A) to assign bug reports in three open source systems to appropriate developers. Using bug reports collected from Google Chromium, Mozilla
Core, and Mozilla Firefox, their model was fed the textual summaries and
descriptions off bug reports, and then each was mapped to one of the available
developers. Their model was designed to learn the syntactic and semantic
features from the texts collected from bug reports in an unsupervised manner.
They compared the results with the commonly used Bag of Words (BOW)
features models and showed that using deep learning provided higher rank-10
average accuracy. According to [77], the use of BOW could lead to classifications and unreliable results as it (a) it loses the order of words in each string,
(b) ”the semantic similarity between synonymous words is also lost”. Using
BOW ignore the order and meaning of individual words [129].
In their work [130] a text-based approach was followed to investigate
whether the textual description of change request is useful to classify those
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requests into bug (related to corrective maintenance) or not bug (related to
other activities). A total number of 1,800 bug reports were collected from open
source projects (e.g., Mozilla, Eclipse, and JBoss) and were labeled manually
by experts using simple majority voting, and Decision Trees, Naive Based, Logestic Regression were used to build the models. Stemming was applied on the
textual fields of the collected requests, but stop words were not removed because removing such words might cause the loss of vital information. The Raw
Frequency of words were the features extracted from the collected text, and
feature selection techniques were applied. Their models resulted in dispersed
results of Precision between 64% - 98% and Recall between 33% - 97%.
An automated approach to classify software bugs was proposed by [131] in
which they reported that defect prediction models can be used to detect software vulnerabilities. Using the textual descriptions of bug reports extracted
from Open Source projects, TF-IDF features were extracted from each bug
report. A chi-square feature selection technique was implemented and then
fed to Naive Base classifier which reported a precision accuracy of 86%. A bug
mining tool to identify and analyze bugs was proposed to classify bug reports
into security-related and non-security-related in [132]. Bug reports were labeled by the bug tracking system, and a comparative analysis was conducted
to compare recall and success rate of two different classification models, a NB
based model, and a text mining based model. Using pre-labeled bug reports,
the NB model was trained on a BOW representation of bug reports. The text
mining text model was designed by generating TF-DIF representation of the
textual description of bug reports. The text mining based model outperformed
the NB model with an average precision of 0.93 compared to 0.83, and an average success rate of 0.93 compared to 0.90. The authors in [131] proposed
an automated approach to classify software bugs. The textual descriptions
of bug reports from Open Source projects, Eclipse and Firefox were collected
and pre-processed to generate TF-IDF features. A chi-square feature selection technique was implemented and then fed to Naive Base and a precision
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accuracy of 86% was achieved.
Security-related bugs and non-security-related bugs might use some common keywords, which may contribute to the mislabeling of those reports. Peters, Tun, Yu et. al. [133] proposed a framework (i.e., FASEC) to filter and
rank bug reports to reduce the presence of security-related keywords (i.e., cross
words) in non-security-related bug report. The security-related bug reports
from open source projects (e.g., Apache, Chromium, Derby, Ambrai, Camel,
and Wicket) were manually labeled and used to extract TF-IDF features. The
words with the highest 100 TF-IDF values were used to identify cross words
in the non-security related bug reports to be removed.
Nagwani and Verma proposed CLUBAS, an algorithm classify software
bugs Using Bug Attributes Similarity using text clustering, term frequency,
and taxonomic terms mapping techniques [134]. The Term Frequency of the
textual description of the bugs were extracted and clustered based on the
cosine similarity between the term frequency of the bugs’ text. The clusters
are labeled using label induction, then labels are mapped against the bug
taxonomic terms to identify appropriate bug clusters. Their objective was to
create groups of similar software bugs and then classify these groups using
discriminate terms from the bug repositories.
The authors in [135] explored classifying bugs in open source (i.e., Android, JBoss, Mozilla, and MySql) through mining the textual description of
the bug reports. They argued that an effective bug classification technique
needs proper taxonomic terms generated from the textual description of the
reported bugs in the bug tracking systems. The authors presented a methodology to generate Taxonomic Terms from the bug reports using Latent Dirichlet
Allocation. The similar bug reports were grouped into clusters, and then topics for those clusters were modeled to guarantee that each cluster has its own
topic terms for taxonomic terms. The Term Frequencies of each cluster were
extracted from the textual description of the bug reports in that cluster and
then used to create the category terms of each cluster.
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The authors in [136] combined text mining and data mining to classify
whether reported bug reports in open source projects were defects. First, each
report was assessed
The related works which classified bug report to security-related or not,
and used different types of features collected from the bug tracking system
only, or commits made by developers without considering software unite metrics are limited [127, 137]. The authors in [127] used features collected from
the developers commits (i.e., textual messages) and bug reports (i.e., title,
description, comments number, creation and last edit date, and attachment
numbers) for the identification of security-relayed issues. The extracted text
features (i.e., word2vec) were combined with the structural features and then
used with six stacked classifiers. The work in [137] combined bug reports text
features and bug tracking features extracted from open bug reports All features
were combined as unified feature vector before being fed to the classifiers.
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Chapter 3
Learning Approaches for
Software fault-proneness
Prediction
3.1

Introduction

A software bug (i.e., fault) is “an accidental condition, which if encountered, may cause the software system or components to fail or perform as
required” [4]. Software bugs can lead to different types of failures including
private information leakage, unprivileged access, or financial loss. Such failures could delay software development, waste resources, and hurt users. A
software unit (e.g., file, package, or component) is fault-prone if it has one or
more software bugs that may lead to failure(s). Units that do not have faults
are referred to as not fault-prone units. The prediction of fault-prone software
units helps software developers to prioritize their effort, reduces the overall
cost of development, and leads to better quality software products.Therefore,
prediction of software fault-proneness is one of the most active research areas
in software engineering. Over the years, researchers have built many software
fault-proneness prediction models to predict possible fault-prone and not faultprone software units [30].(Note that in addition to ‘fault-prone’ and ‘not fault-
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prone’ terms used in many studies [138,139],other studies used different terms,
such as ‘buggy’ and ‘clean’ [89], ‘bug-prone’ and ‘not bug-prone’ [55, 140, 141],
‘error-prone’ and ‘not error-prone’ [142, 143], and ‘defective’ and ‘defect-free’
(or ‘non-defective’) [71]).
Software fault-proneness prediction models either classify software units as
fault-prone and not fault-prone (e.g., [64,79,144] [11,96]) or predict the number
of faults in each software unit (e.g., [104,105]). Prediction at the file level uses
features collected from software source code units such as files [11, 72, 73, 86,
145], classes [79, 146, 147], or methods [55, 60, 148], whereas prediction at the
component level is based on features aggregated at the package, module, or
component level from features extracted at file, class, or method level [145,149].
Software fault-proneness prediction models that are trained and tested on
data collected from the same software project are known as within-project
prediction models [60, 71]. If the software projects used in building withinproject prediction modes have multiple releases, the fault-proneness prediction
can be done within-release and across-releases. Prediction within-release uses
training and testing data from the same release [11, 85, 93, 96, 150], whereas
across-releases prediction uses training data from one or more releases and
testing data from a different release [53, 150, 151]. Models that use training
data from one project and testing data from a different project are known as
across-projects prediction models [74, 82, 89, 144, 152]. It is worth mentioning
that some researchers use the term across-company prediction for cases when
the prediction models are trained on data collected from a project developed
by one company and tested on data collected from a project developed by a
different company [42, 153].
This chapter focuses only on classification based prediction models withinprojects (e.g., within-release and across-releases) at file level using Machine
Learning. Many works and literature reviews have explored different factors
that affect the performance of software fault-proneness prediction. These factors include: the choice of machine learning algorithms (i.e., learners) [11,80],
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the choice of software metrics (i.e., features used for prediction) [154, 155].
The feature selection technique used [156], the effect of different data balancing techniques [86, 157, 158], and datasets used in building and prediction
models [34, 159].
However, the way software fault-proneness prediction models were trained
and tested, (i.e., what data are they trained on, and what are they expected
to predict) often was not clearly described, but only implicitly specified in
the related works. In this work, we refer to the way software fault-proneness
prediction models are trained and tested as the learning approach.
Our objective is to understand the effect of the learning approach on the
performance of software fault-proneness prediction within-release and acrossreleases at the file level only. Specifically, we consider two different learning
approaches: useAllPredictAll and usePrePredictPost. Software fault-proneness
prediction models that use the useAllPredictAll learning approach use all data
collected from the entire period of release duration for training to predict all
bug-fixes during the same period. Prediction models that use the usePrePredictPost learning approach instead use pre-release data to predict post-releases
bugs (i.e., bugs detected after the release date of a given release).
This distinction between the learning approaches when building software
fault-proneness prediction models appears to have been little discussed and
explored in prior works. In addition, prior works on software fault-proneness
prediction typically did not identify the learning approach used for building
the models. An exception is the previous work [11], which used features extracted at the file level from seven releases of Eclipse Platform to build software fault-proneness prediction models within-release. In that work, the software fault-proneness prediction performance was compared using three different learning approaches useAllPredictAll, useAllPredictPost, and usePrePredictPost. In this work, we focus on useAllPredictAll and usePrePredictPost
learning approaches because (i) one or the other was used in most software
fault-proneness prediction works and (ii) they are more practically relevant
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than the useAllPredictPost learning approach.
In this chapter, we explore the following research questions:
RQ1: Does the learning approach affect the classification performance of the
software fault-proneness prediction within-release and across-releases?
What is the magnitude of the effect learning approaches have on the
performance of software fault-proneness prediction models?
RQ2: Given the learning approach, is there a difference in prediction performance between when within-release and when across-releases prediction
styles are used?
The main contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows:
• We classified the related works on software fault-proneness prediction
based on the learning approach used in each work. We examined the
dataset and the dependent and independent variables used in each related work to highlight the learning approach used. Providing the learning approach when modeling software fault-proneness predictions is essential and useful in understanding the varying trends and results reported by many studies. It brings the attention to a new factor that
affects the performance of software fault-proneness prediction models.
In some studies, the difference in performances was attributed to the
dataset, we argue that this was likely due to the different learning approaches used, as presented in this work.
• We explored the effect of the learning approach on the performance of
software fault-proneness prediction models. Specifically, we
– built software fault-proneness prediction models using the two
widely used learning approaches: useAllPredictAll and usePrePredictPost.
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– used both static code metrics and change metrics as features for
these models.
– predicted fault-proneness both within-release and across-releases.
– used design of experiment approach with statistical analysis to show
that prediction models which use the useAllPredictAll learning approach led to higher Recall, Precision, F-Score and G-Score compared to using usePrePredictPost learning approach.
• We discuss the implications of our findings and provide recommendations for designing, reporting, and comparing software fault-proneness
prediction studies.
The empirical results presented in this chapter are based on a dataset
we extracted from 64 releases of 12 Apache open source projects. Our results showed that using useAllPredictAll learning approach led to significantly
higher Recall, Precision, F-Score, G-Score and slightly lower 1 - False Positive Rate (1 - FPR) compared to using usePrePredictPost learning approach.
This is true for prediction models within-release and across-releases. The main
findings of this chapter are as follows:
• The prediction models which used the useAllPredictAll learning approach within-release using 10-fold cross validation, compared the same
models. which used usePrePredictPost, had 43% higher mean Recall,
47% higher Precision, 49% higher F-Score, and 25% higher G-Score.
However, they had 2% lower 1-FPR.
• The prediction models which used useAllPredictAll within-release using
50/50 split, compared the same models which used usePrePredictPost,
resulted in 70% higher mean Recall, 73% higher Precision, 75% higher
F-Score, and 40% higher G-Score. However, they had 2% lower 1-FPR.
• The prediction models which used useAllPredictAll across-releases, compared the same models which used usePrePredictPost, resulted in 57%
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higher mean Recall, 111% higher Precision, 97% higher F-Score, and
26% higher G-Score. However, they had 10% lower 1-FPR.
• The prediction models which used useAllPredictAll, had very similar
performances within-releases (i.e., using 10-folds and 50/50 split). And
both models significantly outperformed the across-release models which
used the same learning approach.
• Whereas the prediction models which used usePrePredictPost withinrelease using 10-folds cross validation outperformed the same models
which used 50/50 split. And both models significantly outperformed the
across-release models which used the same learning approach.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The research questions of this section are represented in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 presents the
classification of related works based on the learning approach they used. Section 3.3 represents the datasets included in this study, our data extraction process, and the feature vectors used by in building the software fault-proneness
prediction models. The machine learning approach and performance metrics
used for evaluation are presented in Section 3.5. Our results and analysis are
presented in Section 3.6 and the discussions of the results are presented in
section 3.7. Our recommendations are presented in Section 3.8, threats to
validity are presented in section 3.9, and the concluding remarks are given in
Section 3.10.
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3.2

Classification of related works by learning
approach used

To the best of our knowledge, the effect of the learning approach on the
software fault-proneness prediction models in the related works has never been
addressed, nor explicitly specified, except in the previous work [11]. In all the
related works, the learning approach used was predetermined, but not explicitly stated by the choice of dataset used in building the software fault-proneness
prediction models. As shown in Table 3.1, for each of included related studies
we provide: the dataset(s) used, the prediction style (e.g., within-release or
across-release), and the learning approach (e.g., useAllPredictAll or usePrePredictPost). We only considered classification based prediction models at file
level and within-project. The studies which used prediction within-project
with no releases were grouped with the studies which used prediction withinrelease because both are designed similarly. The studies focused on prediction
across-project or across-company are out of the scope of this work and were not
considered. Note that the studies which used multiple datasets (e.g., [60,160])
or multiple learning approaches [161] appear in more than one cell in Table
3.1.
We strongly believe that explicit classification based on the learning
approach clarifies the varying performances of the different software faultproneness prediction models. It also highlights the effect of a new factor that
has had almost no prior attention.
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Table 3.1: Related work studies classified by the learning approach
Dataset

useAllPredictAll
within-releases/

usePrePredictPost

across-releases

projects
NASA MDP

within-releases/

across-releases

projects

[41, 42, 44, 71, 79, 80,
90, 138, 139, 148, 153,
162–164], [158], [83],
[60]

Jurezcko and
Madeyski [165]
Jurezcko and

[60, 82, 99, 147, 167]

[53, 167, 168]

Spinellis [166]
Eclipse plugins
Eclipse platform

Open Source
Microsoft/
Windows
Telecommunication

[55, 140, 141]
[11, 160]

[60, 63, 84, 146, 161]
[170]
[172]

AEEEM

[151]

[64, 145, 150,

150, 161, 169]

161, 169]

[86, 161]

[64, 161]

[93, 171]

[64, 144]

[97], [29]

[29]

[161]

datasets [58]
Others

[146, 161]

[11, 72, 73, 86, 96, 145,

[42, 55, 153, 158, 160,
161]

[64]
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3.2.1

useAllPredictAll learning approach

In this subsection, we discuss related works that used the learning approach
useAllPredictAll. Software fault-proneness prediction models which use this
learning approach are trained on data collected from the entire development
duration of each release -or project-, to predict bug-fixes within the same
period. There is no distinguishing between pre-release and post-release bugs
in this case, as they are both grouped as one metric which is the bug-fix.
Based on our analysis of the related work, all studies which used NASA MDP
which are available on PROMISE 1 have followed the useAllPredictAll learning
approach. Static code metrics were extracted as snapshots of source code at a
given time, and no distinction between pre-release and post-release bugs was
present. The NASA datasets have no releases; each represents an independent
project.
Examples of studies which used NASA MDP within-project include but are
not limited to [41,42,44,60,71,79,80,83,90,138,139,148,153,158,162–164] The
authors in [79] used J48 to build a classification within-project fault-proneness
prediction and the authors in [71] used Naı̈ve Bayes, and both reported that
the metric extraction method is more important than which metrics are used.
Furthermore, [162] reported that the relationship between software metrics
and fault-proneness is complex, and [80] proposed a framework for software
fault-proneness prediction and argued the choice of the machine learning algorithm in building software fault-proneness prediction models is not as important as assumed previously. Several data transformation techniques for
fault-proneness prediction were explored in [138], and later work [163] reported
that efficiency of using static code metrics over to design metrics when building prediction modes. In later work, [139] reported better prediction performance using a combination of static code and design metrics. The work done
in [41] reported that SVM performed as well as, or better than other algo1

Several datasets of the related works were available on the PROMISE repository, which
is no longer available.
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rithms regarding Recall. The study in [164] suggested F-measure to evaluate
fault-proneness prediction performance and suggested using the development
history for fault-proneness prediction. Factors affecting the prediction’s performance were investigated in [148] such as dataset size, types of metrics, and
feature selection. A method based on the quality assurance cost to build software fault-proneness prediction models was introduced in [90], whereas [153]
designed several prediction models within-release and across-projects using
NASA, SOFTLAB, and Open Source datasets. In [173] it was concluded that
only a small number of highly defective dense components can be used to train
prediction models. The authors in [44] reported that machine learning algorithm do not necessarily have to use more data to achieve better performance.
The work presented in [80] was replicated by [83] using cleaner NASA data
and PROMISE datasets and reported that the classification performance is affected by the dataset. Additionally, some studies considered different sampling
techniques; the work in [158] used a dataset from NASA MDP and other Open
Source dataset available on PROMISE for within-project prediction with five
imbalance treatments.
Examples of studies which donated datasets to PROMISE are [165, 166];
they made many static code metrics available for Open Source projects.
Those datasets were used by many studies for prediction within-release
[60, 82, 99, 147, 167]. The work in [82] compared cross project prediction to
within-project, the work in [99] used static code metrics for within-release
prediction using Bayesian Networks, and the work in [147] suggested a new
over-sampling technique to build within-release prediction models using Open
Source datasets.
Datasets obtained from Eclipse are extensively used in software faultproneness prediction within-projects and releases; the datasets can be divided into two categories, Eclipse plugins [55, 140, 141] and Eclipse platform
datasets [11, 160]. The authors in [140] used different Eclipse plugins to build
fault-proneness prediction models using fine-grained source code changes and
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code churn, and they reported that source code changes are correlated with
bugs. And the authors in [141] used the Gini coefficient to investigate how
code changes are distributed among developers and the number of bugs in
source code.
Other open source projects have been used in software fault-proneness prediction models [60, 63, 84, 146, 161]. The work done in [63] studied within-release
and across projects prediction and showed it is possible to do across-project
prediction when both projects have similar characteristics. The authors in [84]
found that prediction models which used change complexity metrics were better than those which used prior modification and faults based models’ project.
And the work done in [146] used Open Source Android datasets and showed
promising and comparable results of across-releases and to within-release prediction. The authors in [170] used 4 snapshots of Microsoft products to extract
process metrics for within-project fault-proneness prediction and studied the
evolution of these products over time. Telecommunications datasets were used
to build prediction models in [60, 172]. And the authors in [172] highlighted
that getting clean and reliable datasets and metrics for fault-proneness prediction is very challenging.
Many works used multiple dataset sources. For example, the work in [160]
used several datasets obtained from Eclipse, Columba, and Scarab and other
open source programs and reported that noises in data do not significantly
affect prediction performance, unless it contains at least 20-30% of True Positives and False Negatives. The authors in [42] compared cross-company with
within-company prediction using NSA NDP and SOFTLAB Telecommunication datasets. The work done in [55] used Eclipse plugins with other Open
Source projects (i.e., Ant Code, Derby Engine, Xerces, and Lucene) and compared method-level to file-level prediction. And the work done in [60] used
NASA, Open Source, and Telecommunication datasets and concluded that
different classifiers detect and predict different defects, even when they have
similar performances. Some studies used NASA MDP and other Open Source
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datasets (SOFTLAB) for prediction within-project and cross projects such
as [153]
Examples of studies which used the useAllPredictAll learning approach
across-releases, include [53, 167, 168] which used PROMISE Open Source
datasets, [146, 161] used other Open Source projects and [151] used telecommunication datasets. The work in [53] reported that using Genetic Algorithm
to configure SVM enhances Recall and F-Measure, and [167] studied the effect
of using static code metrics with other process metrics for prediction withinrelease and across-releases. The work [168] concluded that a simplified set
of metrics is viable and practical in fault-proneness prediction within acrossreleases.

3.2.2

usePrePredictPost learning approach

In this subsection, we briefly discuss related works that used the learning approach usePrePredictPost. Software fault-proneness prediction models
which use this learning approach are trained on data collected during the
pre-release duration, including pre-release bugs, to predict post-release bugs.
Pre-release and post-release bugs are distinguished in this case, and a file is
fault-prone if it has a post-release bug. This learning approach was first used
by [145], in which software fault-proneness prediction models were built to
detect fault-prone files and packages in three Eclipse platform releases, within
and across-releases. The authors used complexity metrics (i.e., static code
metrics) collected from the were collected from each release. The pre-release
bugs were collected six months before the release date (i.e., during the development and testing phase), whereas the post-release bugs were collected six
months after the release date (i.e., after deploying the release to users).
Examples of studies which used Eclipse dataset with the usePrePredictPost learning approach within-projects and releases include, but not limited to [11, 72, 73, 86, 96, 145, 150, 161, 169]. Examples of studies which used
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Eclipse across-release prediction include [64,150,161,169] The authors in [145]
were among the pioneers who used pre-release and post-release bugs in faultproneness prediction within-release and across-releases. The work done in [72]
reported that models which used change metrics only outperformed models
which used only static code metrics within-release. Other work [150] used
static code and repository metrics for fault-proneness prediction within and
across-releases and reported that repository metrics can be used to lower the
false alarm rate. The work done in [73] used static code and change metrics
to predict post-release bugs in three versions of the Eclipse platform and compared file-level and package-level prediction. The work in [169] compared the
commonly used change metrics in [72] with new change metrics related to the
developers’ actions and showed that the new metrics can be used to improve
the prediction’s performance. The authors in [96] used several releases from
Eclipse and examined the prediction performance when using static code metrics, change metrics and a combination. Other studies used Microsoft products
for within-release and project prediction (e.g., [93,171]) and across-releases and
projects (e.g., [64, 144]). The authors in [93] used organizational metrics extracted from Windows using pre-release defects to build their model to predict
post-release failures. And the work done in [171] used change and failure burst
metrics collected pre-release to predict post-release bugs in Windows 8. The
authors in [29] used different static code and change metrics extracted from
data from a Legacy Telecommunication company and implemented withinrelease and across-release prediction.

3.2.3

Studies which used both learning approaches

There are some studies which used both learning approaches [161]. The
work done in [161] investigated within-project and release and across-project
predictions using several datasets from AEEEM [58] and ReLink [174]. The
AEEEM datasets are extracted from Eclipse Core, Equinox framework, Mylyn,
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and Apache Lucene and prediction done using these datasets are trained on
source code, and change metrics collected pre-release to predict post-release
bugs. And the prediction done when using ReLink is trained on change metrics
to predict bug-fixes within the release data. This study used both approaches
without paying attention to the learning approach followed by each.
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3.3

Data extraction and building feature vectors

Our goal is to study the effect of the learning approach on the performance
of software fault-proneness prediction. We extracted both static code and
change metrics from 64 releases of 12 open source projects. Using machine
learning we classify software files as fault-prone or not fault-prone using the
data collected for each learning approach (i.e., useAllPredictAll and usePrePredictPost). The main differences between the two learning approaches are: (i)
the dates considered when the change metrics were extracted for each approach, and subsequently, (ii) the way the training and testing of the machine
learning algorithm was done, in other words, what the machine learning algorithm use for training data and it was supposed to predict. To ensure that
change metrics are extracted properly, we followed the work done in [11]. As
shown in Figures 3.1 (A) and (B), that the development duration of any given
release n is the period between the two given dates d1 and d2 (the green and
the red lines respectively in Figures 3.1 A and B). Following the definition
in [145], d1 is the middle date between the release n-1 release date and the
release n release date, whereas d2 is the middle date between release n release
data and release n+1 release date.
useAllPredictAll

usePrePredictPost

n

time

d1

n
d2

Last version

n -1

time
n +1

d1

n -1

n +1

source code binaries

source code binaries

Change metrics

Change metrics

Bug fixes

Pre-release bugs

(A)
Release date

d2

Last version

Post-release bugs

(B)
Start and end dates of release n duration

Training

Testing

Figure 3.1: Metrics extraction dates for learning approaches
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3.3.1

Data extraction process for different learning approaches

useAllPredictAll : following the technique used with all NASA MDP
datasets, PROMISE datasets, the work done in [165, 166], and shown in Figure 3.1.A we extracted the static code metrics from the latest version of the
binaries on the release date. For each release, we extracted the static metrics
from the latest binaries published on each project’s web page. To extract the
change metrics, we followed the same method used in [11] in which change
metrics and bug-fixes for each release of Eclipse were extracted from the entire release duration of that release, six months before and after the release
date. Eclipse’s releases are normally released in June of their year, the release
duration pre-release is the six months period between January and June of
that year, whereas the release duration post-release is the six months period
between June and December.
Since releases in our study come from different projects, the duration of
each release varies as well. For example, the first two releases of Apache Ant
were released only 5 months apart, while the first two releases of Apache
Derby were released almost 10 months apart.
When using this learning approach, no distinction is made between pre-release
and post-release bugs; they both are grouped into one metric called bug-fix.
In other words, a software file has a bug-fix and consequently was labeled
as fault-prone if (i) it was changed by at least one commit which was used
to fix a bug, and (ii) if that commit was made during the duration of that
release (i.e., the period between d1 and d2 in Figure 3.1 A) . All software
fault-proneness prediction models using this learning approach are trained
on all static code metrics extracted from the release binaries, and all change
metrics extracted from the release duration to predict the bug-fixes during
the entire release duration. When building the prediction models using this
approach, all static code and change metrics are used as independent variables
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and the bug-fixes are used as dependent (i.e., response) variables.

usePrePredictPost: following the technique used with many Eclipse
datasets, shown in Figure 3.1 B, and the work done in [11, 64, 72, 144, 145], we
extracted change metrics and pre-release bugs from the pre-release duration
only. To define the duration for each release, we followed the same method used
when extracting change metrics for the useAllPredictAll learning approach
(i.e., the period between d1 and d2 in 3.1 B).
To extract static code metrics, we followed the same method we used for the
useAllPredictAll learning approach. That is, static code metrics were extracted
from the last version of the releases’ binaries at the release date.
When using the usePrePredictPost learning approach we distinguish between
the bugs based on the time they were detected and fixed. Thus, pre-release
bugs are those which were detected and fixed during the release duration before
the release date, whereas post-release bugs are those which were detected and
fixed during the release duration after the release date.
In other words, a software file has a pre-release bug if (i) it was changed by
at least one commit to fix a bug, and (ii) if that commit was made during the
pre-release duration (i.e., the period between d1 and n in Figure 3.1 B). And
a software file has post-release bug and consequently labeled as fault-prone if
(i) it was changed by at least one commit to fix a bug, and (ii) that commit
wad made during the release duration after the release date (i.e., the period
between n and d2 in Figure 3.1 B).
All software fault-proneness prediction models using the usePrePredictPost
learning approach are trained on all static code metrics extracted from the
release binaries, the change metrics extracted pre-release including pre-release
bugs to predict the post-release bugs.
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3.3.2

Open source projects used to extract datasets

We mined through the Apache Open Source repository [175] looking for
open source projects for this study. We initially started with 23 Apache open
source projects, but eleven out of the 23 projects did not satisfy one or more
of our selection criteria discussed in section 3.3.3 and were excluded from this
study. As a result, the datasets used in this study were extracted from twelve
Apache Open Source projects listed in Table 3.2.
As defined in [30] we report the five key elements: the source of data, the
programming language used for development, size in LOC, project maturity,
and application domain. All projects included in this study came from the
Apache open source repository [175] and were written in Java. The size (i.e.,
number of lines of code), the maturity in year, and the number of of developers,
and application domains for each project are provided in Table 3.2. The
total number of files and the percentages of fault-prone files for all releases
in all projects are provided in Table 3.3. As can be seen, the percentages
of bug-fixes are overwhelmingly higher than the percentages of post-release
bugs in all releases. In some cases, the percentage of bug-fixes was twice the
percentage of post-release bugs (e.g., MyFaces 2.2.4), and in other cases it
was 24 times higher (e.g., Wicket 1.5.0). The lower percentages of post-release
bugs were expected, since these were collected during a shorter period (i.e., the
duration between n and d2 in Figures 3.1.(B)), compared to bug-fixes which
were collected from the entire release duration (i.e., the duration between d1
and d2 in Figures 3.1.(A)).

3.3.3

Exclusion criteria

All the 23 Apache Open Source projects considered initially already fit into
the reporting criteria defined in [30], but we faced many obstacles extracting
the required metrics. For example, some projects had no clear releases dates,
and others had no central repository for the source code. To work around
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Table 3.2: Included projects and their details

Project
No.
1

Name
Ant

No.

Size

No.

Maturity

releases

(LOC)

developer

(years)

7

376,250

47

+ 10

Domain

command-line tool for
java application
building

2

Axis2

5

409,432

29

+ 10

web services creating
and usage

3

Derby

9

1,759,271

34

+9

relational Database

4

Geronimo

5

581,083

49

+8

libraries for
JavaEE/JakartaEE

5

Hadoop

6

1,500,351

72

+7

distributed computing
platform

6

Hive

6

3,255,810

43

+7

data warehousing

7

jEdit

4

346,197

40

+ 15

programmer text
editor

8

MyFaces

4

377,930

36

+9

sub-prjects for
JavaServer technology

9

Pivot

5

215,406

7

+6

platform for building
install-able Internet
Applications

10

Synapse

3

376,250

23

+ 10

11

Wicket

6

398,043

21

+8

Web Services
web-apps developing
environment

12

Xalan

4

398,183

32

+ 14

XSLT processor

these obstacles, we constructed inclusion and exclusion criteria which guarantee having unified sets of metrics for all considered projects. These criteria are
related to the availability of certain software artifacts needed to extract static
code and change metrics. For each project, the following six key criteria had
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Table 3.3: Numbers of files and percentages of fault-prone files for all releases
included in this study. The percentage of bug-fixes is the percentage of the
fault-prone files (i.e., files with bug-fixes) for the useAllPredictAll learning
approach dataset, whereas the the percentage of post-release bugs shows the
percentage of the fault-prone files (i.e., files with post-release bugs) for the
usePrePredictPost learning approach.
Project

Release

Name

No.

Ant

Axis2

Derby

Geronimo

No. files

% of files

% of files with

with bug

post-release

fixes

bugs

1.3

123

44.70

6.50

1.4

174

74.70

20.11

1.5

526

18.80

12.74

1.6

643

48.10

8.86

1.7

770

20.50

5.19

1.8

820

23.50

6.22

1.9

840

3.90

0.83

1.5.4

307

77.90

0.98

1.6.0

418

36.10

1.00

1.6.1

433

12.50

0.46

1.6.3

553

5.40

1.00

10.1.2.1

1,305

96.90

1.00

10.1.3.1

1,509

45.50

4.77

10.10.1.1

1,528

18.70

1.44

10.10.2.0

1,494

20.50

0.60

10.4.1.3

2,191

17.70

0.87

10.5.1.1

2,311

19.80

0.87

10.6.1.0

2,426

22.80

0.41

10.8.1.2

2,457

55.60

0.45

10.8.3.0

2,397

33.70

0.54

2.1.3

797

39.00

0.38

2.1.4

943

23.60

0.53

2.1.5

1,047

69.80

0.38

2.1.7

972

12.30

0.82

2.1.8

1,023

15.20

1.00

3.0.1

1,496

3.00

1.00
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% of files

% of files with

No. files

with bug

post-release

fixes

bugs

1.0.0

279

76.70

3.94

1.0.3

415

28.40

1.45

1.1.0

516

31.40

1.94

1.2.0

535

22.60

1.12

2.2.0

3,274

17.40

1.80

2.4.0

3,772

19.10

1.00

0.10.0

1,117

21.80

1.00

0.11.0

1,481

37.20

0.07

0.12.0

2,028

64.30

1.00

0.13.0

1,088

45.80

1.00

0.14.0

1,741

39.30

1.00

1.0.0

1,708

9.50

0.12

4

293

52.20

2.39

4.1

300

66.30

13.33

4.2

355

60.00

2.54

4.3

487

99.60

0.21

1.2.1

166

22.30

5.42

2

250

68.00

3.60

Project

Release

Name

No.

Hadoop

Hive

jEdit

MyFaces

2.2

427

8.90

0.23

1,090

0.60

0.28

1.5

247

70.40

21.46

2

389

20.80

3.08

2.0.1

407

64.10

7.86

2.0.3

473

24.10

1.00

2.0.4

569

12.80

1.00

1.2

271

91.10

16.61

2

622

49.70

1.77

2.1

720

26.80

2.22

1.3.0

205

21.50

14.63

1.3.5

147

81.00

1.00

1.3.6

155

16.10

0.65

1.4.3

184

31.50

3.26

1.4.9

189

65.10

10.58

1.5.0

483

64.60

1.66

2.4

770

52.50

2.21

2.5

786

25.70

10.43

2.6

905

51.90

2.32

2.7

954

49.20

1.00

2.2.4

Pivot

Synapse

Wicket

Xalan
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to be satisfied:
1. Access to project source code. This is essential to extract the source code
metrics. Source code repository or the binary distribution of each release
are sufficient.
2. Access to the version control system. Version control systems are used
to store, and track changes made to the source code. These changes
are also known as commits or revisions. Access to the version control
systems allows us to generate the commit log file which summarizes all
the commits made to a project and changes made for adding new features
and improvements. This commit log file was then used to extract the
change metrics.
3. Access to the bug tracking system. Bug tracking systems are used to store
and track the information related to fixing software bugs (i.e.,faults).
Access to bug tracking systems is necessary to identify the commits made
to fix software bugs.
4. The project has more than two releases. This is required in order to
build predictors across-releases as described in section 3.5. Data from
one release is used to train the model, and from the next release to test
it.
5. The project has clearly specified release dates. For each release considered, releases’ dates are crucial to be able to extract change metrics for
each release as described in section 3.4.2.
6. Release dates are within the commits log file dates. To extract metrics for
each release, the release dates and dates given in commit log file should
be consistent. Specifically, if a given release was released on a certain
date, then all commits made up to that date should be also available.
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Table 3.4: Excluded projects with exclusion criteria
Project Name

Exclusion criteria

Camell

2, 5

Cayenne

2, 5

CommonCodec

5

Ivy

5

Jexl

3, 4

Log4j

5

Lucene

5

OpenJpa

5

Solr

5

TomCat

1, 5

Velocity

1, 5

Table 3.4 presents the names of 11 Apache Open Source projects excluded
from this work, including the specific exclusion criteria.
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3.4

Extracted software metrics

This section defines the metrics used and describe of the extraction process.
For each dataset, we extracted 20 static code metrics and 14 change metrics
at file level in this study. Both sets of metrics were combined and used in our
models. Note that classes which are interfaces were excluded from this study
as their metrics had all zero values and were bugs free.

3.4.1

Static Code Metrics

Static code metrics have been widely used for evaluating and predicting
of software fault-proneness (e.g., ( [60, 71, 81, 89, 139, 163]). In this study we
extracted twenty different static code metrics that are widely used at file level.
The static code metrics are listed in Table 3.5 and the full definition of each
metric can be found in [165]. The extracted metrics belong to six different metrics suites: C&K metrics [176], Henderson-Sellers [177], Martin [178],
QMOOD [179], Tang [180], and McCabe [181].
For all projects used in this study, we used the Chidamber and Kemerer
Java Metrics (CKJM) tool, which was originally reported by [166], to extract
the static code metrics from the binary of each of the included releases. This
tool has been used by other works [166, 182]. We obtained the most recent
binaries of each release on the release date from the Apache Archive Server
[175].
The CKJM tool computes the metrics for each release by analyzing the
jar files in each binary. For each class found in the binaries, the tool then
generates the output metrics in XML files. We wrote a Java code to extract
the metrics from the XML files. For each class, the CKJM tool provides the
complexity for all methods. Using these values, we calculated both average
method complexity and max McCabe’s cyclomatic complexity in a file.
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Table 3.5: Static code metrics used in this study
Metric
Metric

Metric name Description

suite
acronym
WMC

Weighted

The WMC for a class is the sum of complexities of its methods. As a measure of

methods per

complexity, we can use the cyclomatic complexity, or we can arbitrarily assign a complexity

class

value of one to each method. The CKJM tool assigns a complexity value of one to each

C & K
method, and therefor the value of WMC is equal to the number of methods in the class.
DIT

Depth of

The DIT metric provides for each class a measure of the inheritance levels from the project

Inheritance

hierarchy top.

Tree
NOC

Number of

The NOC metric measures the number of immediate descendants of the class.

Children
CBO

Coupling

The CBO metric represents the number of classes coupled to a given class (efferent

between object couplings and afferent couplings). These couplings can occur through method calls, field
classes
RFC

accesses, inheritance, method arguments, return types, and exceptions.

Response for a The RFC metric measures the number of different methods that can be executed when an
Class

object of that class receives a message. Ideally, we would want to find, for each method of
the class, the methods that class will call, and repeat this for each called method,
calculating what is called the transitive closure of the method call graph. This process can
however be both expensive and quite inaccurate. CKJM calculates a rough approximation
to the response set by simply inspecting method calls within the class method bodies. The
value of RFC is the sum of number of methods called within the class method bodies and
the number of class methods. This simplification was also used in the original description of
the metric.

LCOM

Lack of

The LCOM metric counts the sets of methods in a class that are not related through the

cohesion in

sharing of some of the class fields. The original definition of this metric (which is the one

methods

used in CKJM) considers all pairs of class methods. In some of these pairs both methods
access at least one common field of the class, while in other pairs the two methods do not
share any common field accesses. The lack of cohesion in methods is then calculated by
subtracting from the number of method pairs that do not share a field access the number of
method pairs that do.
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Metric
Metric

Metric name Description

suite
acronym


HendersonLCOM3
Sellers

1
a

Pa

j=1


µ(Aj ) −m

Lack of

LCOM3=

cohesion in

a is the number of attributes in a class

methods

µ (Aj )is the number of methods that access attributes A

( Henderson-

m is the number of methods in a class.

1−m

,where:

Sellers
version)
LOC

Lines of code

The LOC metric calculates the number of lines of code in the Java binary code of the class
under investigation.

Ca

Afferent

The Ca of a class is a measure of how many other classes use the specific class.

Martin
couplings
Ce

Efferent

The Ce metric represents the number of classes that the measured class is depended upon.

couplings
NPM

QMOO

Number of

The NPM metric simply counts all the methods in a class that are declared as public. The

Public

metric is also known as Class Interface Size (CIS).

Methods
DAM

MOA

Data Access

The DAM is the ratio of the number of private (protected) attributes to the total number

Metric

of attributes declared in the class.

Measure of

The MOA metric measures the extent of the part-whole relationship, realized by using

Aggregation

attributes. The metric is a count of the number of class fields whose types are user defined
classes.

MFA

CAM

Measure of

The MFA is the ratio of the number of methods inherited by a class to the total number of

Functional

methods accessible by the member methods of the class. The constructors and the

Abstraction

Java.lang.Object (as parent) are ignored.

Cohesion

The CAM metric computes the relatedness among methods of a class based upon the

Among

parameter list of the methods. The metric is computed using the summation of number of

Methods of

different types of method parameters in every method divided by a multiplication of

Class

number of different method parameter types in whole class and number of methods.
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Metric
Metric

Metric name Description

suite
acronym
IC
Tang

Inheritance

The IC metric provides the number of parent classes to which a given class is coupled. A

Coupling

class is coupled to its parent class if one of its inherited methods is functionally dependent
on the new or redefined methods in the class. A class is coupled to its parent class if one of
the following conditions is satisfied. One of its inherited methods uses an attribute that is
defined in a new/redefined method; One of its inherited methods calls a redefined method:
One of its inherited methods is called by a redefined method and uses a parameter that is
defined in the redefined method.

CBM

AMC

Coupling

The CBM measures the total number of new/redefined methods to which all the inherited

Between

methods are coupled. There is a coupling when at least one of the conditions given in the

Methods

IC metric is held.

Average

The AMC measures the average method size for each class. Size of a method is equal to the

Method

number of Java binary codes in the method.

Complexity
CC

McCabe’s

McCabe
Cyclomatic
Complexity

CC is equal to the arithmetic mean of number of different paths in a method (function)
plus one. The cyclomatic complexity is defined as: CC = E − N + P ;
where : E is the number of edges of the graph N is the number of nodes of the graph P is
the number of connected components.

MCC

Max McCabe’s The MCC refers to the greatest value of CC among methods of investigated class.
Cyclomatic
Complexity
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3.4.2

Change metrics

In this study, we collected fourteen different change metrics at file level
following [72, 105]. A list of these metrics along with their descriptions are
provided in Table 3.6. Change metrics were extracted by integrating the information from the development history (i.e., commit log) and the bug tracking
system of each project. The commit log is a textual file which stores information about all the commits made through the version control system. It
contains the commit date, description, and number. The bug tracking system
stores information related to the bugs found in the source code.
Eleven of the 12 projects used in this study used the SVN Version Control
System and JIRA bug tracking system [183]. The only exception was the
Ant project, which used the SVN Version Control System with Bugzilla bug
tracking system [184]. Change metrics for any given release were extracted
from all commits made between the dates shown in Table 3.2.
For the change metrics, we followed a multi-phase extraction process shown
in Figure 3.2. All commits’ information is textually summarized in the commit
log file. We converted commits’ log file into CSV and stored all commits
information into a SQL database. The commits used to fix software bugs were
marked as faulty (i.e., buggy). All files changed in faulty commits were labeled
as fault-prone files. To label the faulty commits in the database, we used
the bug tracking system and various bugs’ regular expressions to distinguish
commits made for fixing software bugs from other commits (i.e., adding new
features or improvements). Then, we queried the database to generate metrics
for each release. We wrote different Java codes to convert the commit log from
HTML to CSV and convert the extracted metrics into ARFF files to be used
in our models. More details about the collection and the grouping of relevant
commits are provided in Appendix 8.2. Additionally, more information about
the JIRA and Bugzilla bug tracking systems are provided in Appendix 8.2.
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Table 3.6: Change metrics used in this study
Acronym

Name

Description

LOC ADD

Number of lines of code added

Sum over all commits of the number of lines of code added to

M LOC ADD

Max number of lines of code added

Maximum number of lines of codes added for all commits.

LOC DEL

Number of lines of code deleted

Sum over all commits of the number of lines of code deleted

the file.

from the file
M LOC DEL

Max number of lines of code deleted

Maximum number of lines of codes deleted for all commits.

M CHGT

Max number of Change-set

Maximum number of files committed together to the repository.

REV

Revisions

Number of commits made to a file

CODE CHRN

Lines of code CHURN

Sum of added lines of code and deleted lines of code over all
commits [112]. Note that this definition is different from the
definition followed in [72].

M CODE CHRN

Max number of lines of code’s CHURN

F AGE

Age of a file

Maximum number of CODE CHURN for all commits made to a
file.
Age for a file in weeks (counting backwards from a specific
release to its first temperance in the code repository).

F RE

Refactoring

An indicator whether a file has ever been refactored or not.

Authors or developers participating in developing
AUTHORS

Number of distinct authors (i.e., developers) that made commits
projects
to the file.

BUGFIX

Bug-fixes

An indicator whether a file has ever been involved in fixing a
software fault or not. Note that this metric is only used for the
useAllPredictAll learning approach.

PREBUG

Pre-release bug

An indicator whether a file has ever been involved in fixing a
software fault or not before release date [145]. Note that this
metric is only used for the usePrePredictPost learning approach .

POSTBUG

Post release bug

An indicator whether a file has ever been involved in fixing a
software fault or not post release date [145]. Note that this
metric is only used for the usePrePredictPost learning approach .
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Figure 3.2: Change metrics extraction process

3.4.3

Building feature vectors

For each release in each project, after the static code and change metrics
were extracted separately, a matching criterion was necessary to combine these
metrics for each file, in each release and project. Our objective was to have all
metrics for as many files as possible for each project. We combined both static
code metric and change metrics for classes and file which had similar name and
directory. A feature vector consisting of all static code and change metrics was
created for each file. The full feature vector was used in building our machine
learning models. A software file was labeled as fault-prone if it had a bug-fix
or a post-release bug for the useAllPredictAll and usePrePredictPost learning
approaches, respectively. The algorithm used for combining all metrics is
provided in the Algorithm 1.
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Data: List of static code metrics per class c of release n by CKJM
Result: Unified set of static code and change metrics by file for
release n
access classes in static code metrics class list;
while class is not interface do
from commit log, identify commits made during release duration;
if file name in commit = class c name then
aggregate changes;
create change metrics;
else
set change metrics to 0 (file was not changed in this release);
end
concatenate static code and change metrics and create unified set
of metrics per file;
move to next class;
end
Algorithm 1: Steps used to match static code and change metrics for each
file in release n
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3.5

Machine learning approach

3.5.1

Training and testing the models

For our machine learning experiments, we used the well-known machine
learning algorithm J48 to build our models. We restrict our analysis to J48
because it was shown that the choice of classifier has no significant effect
on performance [80] and because it has been widely used in building and
assessing software fault-proneness prediction models [29,37,71,72,107,151,185].
We evaluated the models’ prediction performance using both the static code
metrics and change metrics in each release. For the useAllPredictAll learning
approach, our models classified the files that were fault-prone anytime in a
specific release, and in these cases the response variable was Bug Fix. For the
usePrePredictPost learning approach our models classified the files that were
fault-prone post release, and in these cases the response was variable postrelease bug.
We used two different types of software fault-prone prediction models: withinrelease and across-releases. For the within-release prediction style, we built
the model using two data splitting techniques. The first was 10-folds cross
validation where data was randomly divided into ten folds, and nine folds of
the data were used for training and the remaining fold was used for testing.
This splitting technique was widely used in this field [42, 55, 60]. The second
data splitting technique was based on 50/50 random splitting, where data was
split into two folds of 50% of the data in each. One fold is used to train
the model and the other is used to test it. To avoid bias, this technique was
then implemented 100 times and the average of the performance was reported,
following the work done in [73, 161]. We choose this splitting technique as its
similar in design to the across-release prediction. In both cases, the models
were trained and tested on data collected from the same release. For the
prediction across-releases, the entire data from a given release n was used for
training, and the entire data from release n+1 was used for testing [53,151,161].
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3.5.2

Experimental Design

In this study we conducted a Design of Experiment approach to answer our
research questions to statistically test the effect of the learning approach on
the performance of software fault-proneness prediction models, within-release,
and across-releases. Basically, in this study we control two factors:
• Factor A the learning approach with two levels:
– useAllPredictAll
– usePrePredictPost
• Factor B the prediction style with three levels:
– within-release using 10-fold cross validation
– within-release using 50/50 training and testing split
– and across-releases.
As shown in Table 3.7, the numbers of observation for each combination
of factors’ levels are different. In prediction within-release, the performance
metrics (i.e., observations) were collected from each model when using each
dataset of each of the 64 releases. Some observations were excluded because
the classification performance was not reliable (e.g., all files was classified
as fault-prone or vice-versa). In prediction across-releases, the number of
observations for each project equals the number of releases minus one, since
it takes two releases to generate one observation. Similarly, to when using
prediction within-releases, the unreliable observations were excluded. Note
that this is a nested design of experiment, because the number of the levels of
the Factor B (i.e., prediction style) depends on the levels of the Factor A (i.e.,
learning approach).
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Table 3.7: Factors of the experiment with the number of observations in each
combination of factors’ level. M1 and M2 refers to prediction within-release
using 10-fold cross and 50/50 split respectively, and M3 refers to across-release
prediction
Learning approach

3.5.3

useAllPredictAll

usePrePredictPost

Prediction style

Prediction style

M1

M2

M3

M1

M2

M3

63

64

52

58

59

46

Performance metrics used for evaluation

For the performance metrics, we need the confusion matrix shown in Table
3.8
Table 3.8: Confusion matrix
Predicted fault-prone
Positive

Negative

True

False

Positive

Negative

(TP)

(FN )

False

True

Positive

Negative

(FP)

(TN )

Actual
True
fault

prone

False

where True Positive (TP) represents the number of files that were faulty, and
were predicted to be faulty, False Negative (FN) represents the number of
files that were faulty, but were predicted to be not faulty, False Positive (FP)
represents the number of files that were not faulty, but were predicted to be
faulty, and True Negative (TN) represents the number of files that were not
faulty and were predicted to be not faulty.
Based on the confusion matrix, we computed the following performance
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metrics:
Recall (R)

=

TP/(TP + FN)

(3.1)

Precision (P)

=

TP/(TP + FP)

(3.2)

FPR = 1 − ( FP/(FP + TN))
2 · Recall · Precision
F-Score
=
Recall + Precision
2 · Recall · (1-FPR)
G-Score
=
Recall + (1-FPR)

(3.3)
(3.4)
(3.5)

Recall (R), given in equation (3.1) and known as probability of detection,
relates to the number of true positives to the number of all files that were
faulty. Precision (P), given in equation (3.2) relates to the number of true
positives to the number of all files that were predicted to be faulty. One
minus False Positive Ratio (1 - FPR), given in equation (3.3), relates to
one minus the number of false positives to the number of all files that were not
faulty. F-Score given in equation (3.4) is the harmonic mean of precision and
recall. G-Score given in equation 3.5 is defined as the the harmonic mean of
Recall and (1-FPR).
All performance metrics values are between zero and one. Good performance has higher Recall and Precision, and lower FPR, which results in higher
F-Score and G-Score.
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3.6

Results

Figure 3.3 shows the box plots of all performance metrics, for the two
learning approaches and the three prediction styles, and Figure 3.4 shows
the means of all performance metrics. Additionally, Table 3.9 presents the
basic statics for all performance metrics including: Mean, standard deviation
(Std.), Median, and Inter-quartile Range (IQR) (i.e., the measure of statistical
dispersion which equals the difference between 75th and 25th percentiles). We
used Figures 3.3 and Figure 3.4, and Table 3.9 to answer our research questions.

3.6.1

RQ1:

Does the learning approach affect the

classification performance of the software faultproneness prediction within-release and acrossreleases?

What is the magnitude of the effect

learning approaches have on the performance of
software fault-proneness prediction models?
As can be seen in Figure 3.3 and the basic statistics in Table 3.9, and the
means of all classification performance metrics in Figure 3.4, models based
on useAllPredictAll learning approach had significantly higher Recall, Precision, F-Score and G-Score than the same models based on the usePrePredictPost learning approach. However, regarding 1-FPR, the models based on the
usePrePredictPost learning approach slightly outperformed models based on
the useAllPredictAll learning approach.
As shown in Table 3.10 the variance in the respective distributions between
the models when using different learning approaches is statistically significant
in terms of Recall, Precision, F-Score and G-Score, as the reported p-values
were less than the significance level of 0.05. As a result, the null hypothesis
H0Approach is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis HaApproach that there
is a difference in the performance metrics distributions across all models. The
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3.3: Performance metrics for useAllPredictAll and usePrePredictPost
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Figure 3.4: Means of all performance metrics for the two learning approaches
and three prediction styles
learning approach factor was responsible for contributing the majority of variances by 76.4%, 72.99%, 67.57%, and 58.31% of Recall, Precision, F-Score, and
G-Score respectively. However, the differences in 1-FPR were not statistically
significantly different in all models when using different learning approaches.
In prediction within-release using 10-fold cross validation, the useAllPredictAll learning approach compared to the usePrePredictPost learning approach
had 53% higher mean Recall (i.e., 0.832 compared to 0.545), 39% higher mean
Precision (i.e., 0.826 compared to 0.595), 52% higher mean F-Score (i.e., 0.820
compared to 0.541), and 22% higher mean G-Score (i.e., 0.852 compare to
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Table 3.9: Descriptive statistic of performance metrics for the learning approaches and prediction style.
MetricStatistic

within-release 10-folds
useAll-

usePre-

G-Score

F-Score

1-FPR

Precision

Recall

PredictAll PredictPost

within-release 50/50 split
useAll-

usePre-

PredictAll PredictPost

across-releases
useAll-

usePre-

PredictAll PredictPost

Mean

0.83

0.54

0.81

0.46

0.66

0.31

Std.

0.14

0.15

0.16

0.19

0.28

0.20

Median

0.88

0.51

0.86

0.42

0.73

0.33

IQR

0.18

0.24

0.23

0.30

0.38

0.27

Mean

0.83

0.60

0.81

0.47

0.65

0.41

Std.

0.13

0.18

0.16

0.17

0.25

0.21

Median

0.86

0.57

0.85

0.44

0.71

0.36

IQR

0.21

0.25

0.23

0.28

0.37

0.25

Mean

0.91

0.93

0.91

0.93

0.79

0.87

Std.

0.09

0.06

0.10

0.06

0.25

0.15

Median

0.94

0.95

0.94

0.95

0.92

0.93

IQR

0.10

0.07

0.10

0.08

0.31

0.12

Mean

0.82

0.54

0.81

0.45

0.60

0.31

Std.

0.14

0.14

0.16

0.18

0.25

0.15

Median

0.86

0.52

0.85

0.42

0.61

0.31

IQR

0.20

0.21

0.23

0.30

0.39

0.24

Mean

0.85

0.70

0.84

0.59

0.64

0.51

Std.

0.11

0.14

0.12

0.15

0.23

0.18

Median

0.88

0.69

0.86

0.59

0.70

0.50

IQR

0.16

0.19

0.17

0.27

0.32

0.22

0.696). However, 1-FPR was 2% lower (i.e., means of 0.910 and 0.929, respectively).
In prediction within-release using 50/50 split the same pattern was observed, but the difference in performance was much higher. When the 50/50
split was used within-release the useAllPredictAll learning approach, compared
to the usePrePredictPost learning approach, had 78% higher Recall (i.e., 0.815
compared to 0.459), 73% higher Precision (i.e., 0.805 and 0.465), 80% higher
F-Score (i.e., 0.806 compared to 0.449), and 42% mean higher G-Score (i.e.,
0.839 compare to 0.589). However, in terms of 1-FPR it was 2% lower (i.e.,
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Table 3.10: Analysis of Variance for Learning Approach (A) and Nested Prediction Style (B|A)
Performance Factor

Metric

Wald-type p-value
BoxAdjusted
Rank
Statistic

H0A

Cont to Var
%

B|A

H0

Recall

A
B|A

39.65865 3.02E-10
7.86835 9.65E-02

Rej

Precision

A
B|A

32.51898 1.18E-08
8.86537 6.46E-02

Rej

1-FPR

A
B|A

0.20742 6.49E-01
3.35987 5.00E-01

DNR
DNR

5.97
94.03

F-Score

A
B|A

37.79243 7.87E-10
12.64919 1.31E-02

Rej
Rej

67.57
32.43

G-Score

A
B|A

24.77202 6.45E-07
15.80304 3.30E-03

Rej
Rej

58.31
41.69

DNR

DNR

76.40
23.60
72.99
27.01

mean 0.906 compared to 0.927, respectively).
And similarly, in prediction across-release, the useAllPredictAll learning
approach compared to the usePrePredictPost learning approach a 111% higher
mean Recall (i.e., 0.658 compared to 0.312), 57% higher mean Precision (i.e.,
0.650 and 0.414), 97% higher mean F-Score (i.e., 0.603 compared to 0.306),
and 26% higher mean G-Score (i.e., 0.643 compare to 0.510). Finally regarding
1-FPR, the models which used usePrePredictPost learning approach outperformed those which used the useAllPredictAll learning approach; it was 10%
lower (i.e., means of 0.786 and 0.870 respectively).
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3.6.2

RQ2: Given the learning approach, is there a difference in prediction performance between when
within-release and when across-releases prediction styles are used?

We aim to understand the behavior of the prediction performance in all
models for each of the learning approaches. To answer this question, we refer to the box plots in Figures 3.3, and 3.4, and the basic statistics in Table
3.9. First, we address the performance of the prediction models when the useAllPredictAll was used,and we address the same when the usePrePredictPost
learning approach was used.
When the useAllPredictAll learning approach was used within-release, the
models which used 10-fold cross validation slightly outperformed the same
models which used 50/50 split in terms of 1-FPR, Recall, Precision, F-Score,
and G-Score. Prediction models within-release using 10-folds cross validation
compared to the same models using 50/50 split, had 2.1% higher mean Recall
(i.e., 0.832 compared to 0.815), 2.5% higher mean Precision (i.e., 0.826 compared to 0.805), 1.7% higher mean F-Score (i.e., 0.820 compared to 0.806), and
1.5% higher mean G-Score (i.e., 0.852 compared to 0.839). The two withinrelease models which used the useAllPredictAll significantly outperformed the
model across-releases with respect to all performance metrics. Since the two
models within-release had comparatively similar performance, we restrict the
comparison to the model which used 50/50 split. When compared to prediction across-releases, the performance within-release using 50/50 split had
26.5% higher mean Recall (i.e., 0.815 compared to 0.658), 27% higher mean
Precision (i.e., 0.805 compared to 0.650), 15.8 higher mean 1-FPR (0.906 compared to 0.786), 36% higher mean F-Score (i.e., 0.806 compared to 0.603), and
32.48% higher mean G-Score (i.e., 0.839 compared to 0.643).
When the usePrePredictPost learning approach was used within-release,
the models which used 10-fold cross validation outperformed the models which
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used 50/50 split in regards of all performance metrics.
The models which used 10-fold cross validation within-release, compared to
the same models which used 50/50 split, had 18.68% higher mean Recall (i.e.,
0.545 compared to 0.459), 27.92% higher mean Precision (i.e., 0.595 compared
to 0.465), only 0.23 % higher mean 1-FPR (i.e., 0.292 compared to 0.927),
20.3% higher mean F-Score (i.e., 0.541 compared to 0.449), and 13.1% higher
mean G-Score (i.e., 0.696 compared to 0.589).
When using the usePrePredictPost learning approach, the two withinrelease models outperformed the model across-releases in terms of all performance metrics. The within-release models which used 10-fold cross validation,
compared to the model across-releases, had 74.7% higher mean Recall (i.e.,
0.459 compared to 0.312), 43.8% higher mean Precision (i.e., 0.465 compared
to 0.414), 6.8% higher 1-FPR (i.e., 0.927 compared to 0.870), 76.9% higher
F-Score (i.e., 0.589 compared to 0.51), and 36.5% higher mean G-Score (i.e.,
0.589 compared to 0.51).
Following the same pattern, the models within-release which used 50/50
split outperformed the models across-releases in terms of all performance metrics. Precisely, they had 47.25% higher mean Recall (i.e., 0.46 compared to
0.312), 12.4% higher mean Precision (i.e., 0.465 compared to 0.414), 6.6%
higher mean 1-FPR (i.e., 0.927 compared to 0.870), 47% higher mean F-Score
(i.e., 0.449 compared to 0.306), and 15.5% higher mean G-Score (i.e., 0.589
compared to 0.510).
To further investigate whether the differences in performance are due to
different prediction styles, we refer to Table 3.10, which addresses the second
Style|Approach

hypothesis H0

. Primarily we are investigating whether the predic-

tion style given the learning approach is what causes the differences in the
predictions performances. The variance in the respective distributions among
different prediction styles is statistically significantly different in terms of FScore and G-Score only. The reported p-values were less than the significance
Style|Approach

level 0.05. As a result, the null hypothesis H0

is rejected for those
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Table 3.11: p-values of Wilcoxon when comparing the performance of useAllPredictAll and usePrePredictPost learning approaches for each prediction
style
within-

within-

across-

release

release

releases

10-folds

50/50 split

Recall

2.18E-14

1.41E-15

2.70E-08

Precision

1.18E-10

1.60E-15

8.41E-06

1-FPR

8.30E-01

6.76E-01

3.41E-01

F-Score

1.58E-14

1.53E-15

5.82E-09

G-Score

5.24E-09

4.56E-14

9.87E-04

Reject H0. Difference is statistically significantly different
Do not reject H0. Difference is not statistically significantly different
Style|Approach

performance metrics. However, the H0

can not be rejected for Re-

call, Precision, and 1-FPR as the p-values were greater than the significance
level 0.05.
Lastly, to conclude this question we use the Wilcoxon rank sum text to test
whether the differences were statistically significantly different in the classification performance between when using the useAllPredictAll and usePrePredictPost in each prediction style. We report the p-values of the Wilcoxon test
in Table 3.11. The null hypothesis that the difference in the performance is
not significant between the two learning approaches, is rejected when the reported p-value is less than the significance level of 0.05. As shown in Table
3.11, the p-values were less than 0.05 for all performance metrics and across
all prediction styles, expect for 1-FPR. This means that the differences in the
classification performances (i.e., Recall, Precision, F-Score and G-Score) were
statistically significantly different.
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3.7

Discussion

Our results showed that software fault-proneness models are affected differently when using different learning approaches, within-release, and acrossreleases. The prediction models which used useAllPredictAll significantly outperformed models which used usePrePredictPost in terms of Recall, Precision,
F-Score and G-Score, but had slightly worse 1-FPR. This indicates that more
false positives were observed when using useAllPredictAll, in other words more
files were wrongfully classified as fault-prone. Since The 1-FPR relates to the
classification of the majority class, the classifier has more observations to learn
from compared to when using usePrePredictPost. This may cause more files
to be classified as fault-prone, especially if those with similar characteristics
of the non fault-prone files.
As a closer look, this might be explained by the fact the datasets used when
using the useAllPredictAll are less imbalanced than the datasets used when
using the usePrePredictPost learning approach as provided in Table 3.3. The
bug fixes (i.e., the response variable) when using the useAllPredictAll was collected from the entire duration of the release however, the post-release bug
(i.e., the response variable)
The effect of imbalanced datasets on the performance of software faultproneness prediction models is still an active area of research, and many studies
explored different sampling techniques to overcome the imbalanced datasets
issues (e.g., [86, 147, 158]). To further investigate and understand the effect
of the learning approach on the performance of our models, we re-evaluate
our models using the Synthetic Minority Over-sampling Technique (SMOTE)
which has been used by many studies [86, 186]. SMOTE works by selecting
random data points in minority class in the dataset (i.e., bug-fixes when using
useAllPredictAll and post-release bugs when using usePrePredictPost) and
mimics similar data points to over represent the minority class, with a goal to
enhance the classification performance for the machine learning algorithm.
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Table 3.12: Analysis of Variance for Learning Approach (A) and Nested Prediction Style (B|A) when SMOTE is applied
Performance Factor

Metric

Wald-type p-value
BoxAdjusted
Rank
Statistic

H0A

Cont to Var
%

B|A

H0

Recall

A
B|A

2.864469 9.06E-02
38.57545 8.52E-08

DNR
Rej

10.55
89.45

Precision

A
B|A

0.1863529 6.66E-01
42.73856 1.17E-08

DNR
Rej

0.76
99.24

1-FPR

A
B|A

0.7205299 3.95E-01
2.089948 7.19E-01

DNR
DNR

25.87
74.13

F-Score

A
B|A

0.7934577 3.73E-01
47.81298 1.03E-09

DNR
Rej

3.15
96.85

G-Score

A
B|A

0.518229 4.72E-01
44.453 5.17E-09

DNR
Rej

2.08
97.92

When using SMOTE in our models, the oversampling was applied to the
minority class in the training set only and was configured to match the same
majority class distribution in the training set. This eliminates over-fitting
bias and yields more reliable results. For example, when applying SMOTE for
the useAllPredictAll learning approach with release Ant 1.3, the percentage
of bug-fixes in the training sets was increased from 44.7% to 50%. And when
applying SMOTE for the usePrePredictPost learning approach, the percentage
of post-release bugs was increased from 6.5% to 50% and so on.
We re-ran the same experiments presented in Section 3.5 using SMOTE. The
box plots of models’ performance metrics when applying SMOTE with both
learning approaches and the three prediction styles are shown in Figure 3.5.
The means of all performance metrics are shown in Figure 3.6, and the basic
statistics for all performance metrics are shown in Table 3.13, and lastly, the
Wald-type test statistics are shown in Table 3.12.
Applying SMOTE with the useAllPredictAll learning approach enhanced
the prediction performance in both models within-releases in terms of all performance metrics. Moreover, using SMOTE across-releases slightly enhanced
Recall and 1-FPR, but it slightly negatively affected Precision, F-Score and G-
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Figure 3.6: Means of all performance metrics for the two learning approaches
and three prediction styles when SMOTE was applied
Score. Applying SMOTE with the usePrePredictPost learning approach significantly enhanced the prediction performance in both within-releases models in
terms of Recall, Precision, F-Score, and G-Score. However, it slightly lowered
the 1-FPR. Lastly, using SMOTE across-releases enhanced Recall, Precision,
F-Score, and G-Score But it slightly negatively affected 1-FPR.
In Figure 3.7 we report the differences in the performances of all performance metrics when SMOTE was applied in all models, compared to when
SMOTE was not applied, using both learning approaches. The green arrows
indicate a positive effect on the performance metric when SMOTE was ap-
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Table 3.13: Descriptive statistic of performance metrics for the different learning approaches and prediction styles when SMOTE is applied.
MetricStatistic

within-release 10-folds
useAll-

usePre-

G-Score

F-Score

1-FPR

Precision

Recall

PredictAll PredictPost

within-release 50/50 split
useAll-

usePre-

PredictAll PredictPost

across-releases
useAll-

usePre-

PredictAll PredictPost

Mean

0.93

0.92

0.92

0.91

0.68

0.32

Std.

0.07

0.06

0.08

0.07

0.28

0.18

Median

0.95

0.94

0.94

0.93

0.75

0.29

IQR

0.08

0.09

0.10

0.10

0.28

0.20

Mean

0.92

0.94

0.92

0.92

0.63

0.44

Std.

0.07

0.06

0.08

0.07

0.26

0.20

Median

0.95

0.96

0.94

0.95

0.66

0.43

IQR

0.08

0.07

0.10

0.09

0.41

0.27

Mean

0.92

0.92

0.92

0.90

0.81

0.86

Std.

0.07

0.06

0.08

0.07

0.25

0.15

Median

0.95

0.94

0.94

0.93

0.93

0.92

IQR

0.08

0.10

0.10

0.11

0.23

0.12

Mean

0.92

0.93

0.92

0.91

0.59

0.32

Std.

0.07

0.06

0.08

0.07

0.26

0.13

Median

0.95

0.95

0.95

0.94

0.64

0.34

IQR

0.08

0.08

0.10

0.10

0.40

0.17

Mean

0.92

0.93

0.92

0.91

0.64

0.54

Std.

0.08

0.06

0.08

0.07

0.25

0.16

Median

0.95

0.95

0.95

0.93

0.70

0.55

IQR

0.09

0.09

0.10

0.10

0.33

0.23

plied, whereas the red arrows indicate a negative effect on that performance
metric.
For example, applying SMOTE within-release using 10-folds cross validation with the useAllPredictAll learning approach yielded 11.2% higher mean
Recall (i.e., 0.816 compared to 0.925), 12% higher mean Precision (i.e., 0.826
compared to 0.925), 1.4% higher mean 1-FPR, 12.5% higher mean F-Score,
and 8.2% higher mean of G-Score. And following the same pattern, using
SMOTE in the same model when the usePrePredictPost learning approach
was used had much higher positive effect of all performance metrics, except
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for 1-FPR. Precisely, applying SMOTE yielded 69.1% higher Recall (i.e., 0.545
compared to 0.921), 57.5% higher Precision (i.e., 0.595 compared to 0.937),
1.3% lower 1-FPR (i.e., 0.906 compared to 0.917), 71.7% higher F-Score (i.e.,
0.449 compared to 0.914), and finally 33% higher G-Score (i.e., 0.589 compared
to 0.913).
Additionally, applying SMOTE within-releases using 50/50 split with the
useAllPredictAll learning approach had similar impact in regards to all performance metrics except 1-FPR. And using SMOTE across-releases had a limited
positive effect on Recall, Precision, F-Score, and G-Score, and a limited negative effect on 1-FPR. The impact of using SMOTE with the usePrePredictPost
learning approach is much higher. Please refer to Figure Figure 3.7 for more
details.
As shown in Table 3.12, the variance in the respective distributions between when using different learning approaches with SMOTE is not statistically significantly different with respect to all performance metrics. The
p-values were greater than the significance level 0.05, as a result, the null hypothesise H0Approach can not be rejected for those metrics. Moreover, the second
Style|Approach

null hypothesis H0

is rejected for all performance metrics except for

1-FPR.
Lastly, we carried out the same Wilcoxon test to verify whether the differences in the classification performances after applying SMOTE were statistically significant different when using both learning approaches in the same
prediction style. As can see in Table 3.14, the differences in the classification
performances were not statistically significantly different within-release only,
however, they were across-releases in regards of performance metrics, except
for 1-FPR.
In summary, as results showed that using SMOTE enhanced the prediction
models with-release for both learning approaches. Furthermore, the positive
effect on the performance when the usePrePredictPost learning approach was
used was much higher than in case of the useAllPredictAll learning approach.
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Table 3.14: p-values of Wilcoxon when comparing the performance of useAllPredictAll and usePrePredictPost learning approaches for each prediction
style - SMOTE applied
within-

within-

across-

release

release

releases

10-folds

50/50 split

Recall

3.73E-01

1.65E-01

7.90E-09

Precision

3.62E-01

8.49E-01

7.93E-05

1-FPR

3.51E-01

1.37E-01

9.41E-01

F-Score

9.67E-01

5.15E-01

1.30E-07

G-Score

9.43E-01

4.65E-01

3.89E-03

Reject H0. Difference is statistically significantly different
Do not reject H0. Difference is not statistically significantly different

However, using SMOTE across-releases had a minimal effect on the prediction
performance. The prediction across-releases has always been more challenging
than prediction within-releases. It is more challenging for machine learning
algorithms to learn effectively if the data sources of training and testing are
different. This problem is an active area of research and may studies applied
the concept of transfer learning in the fault-proneness prediction field [161,
187–189]. While this issue is out of the scope of this work, but it will be
considered for future work.
within-release using 10-folds
useAllPredictAll
usePrePredictPost
Recall
Precision
1-FPR
F-Score
G-Score

11.2%
12.0%
1.4%
12.6%
8.2%

69.1%
57.5%
-1.3%
71.7%
33.0%

within-release using 50/50 split
useAllPredictAll
usePrePredictPost

12.6%
13.9%
1.2%
13.7%
9.1%

97.5%
98.5%
-2.5%
103.5%
54.9%

across-releases
useAllPredictAll
usePrePredictPost

3.5%
-2.7%
3.3%
-1.5%
-0.2%

1.7%
5.3%
-0.7%
5.3%
5.8%

Figure 3.7: Differences in performance metrics when SMOTE was applied
compared to when SMOTE was not applied.
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3.8

Recommendations

The factors affecting the performance of fault-proneness prediction models
have been extensively studied and compared. In this study, we bring to the
attention of the research community the learning approach factor which, with
exception of the initial work presented in [11], nether have been observed nor
explored in the related works. The results presented in this work show that
learning approach has significant effect on the performance of the software fault
prediction approaches. Based on our findings we recommend the following:
• In addition to the criteria for reporting suggested by [30], research works
on software fault-proneness prediction should explicitly specify the learning approach used.
• To avoid comparing ‘apples to oranges’ care should be taken when
comparing the performance of software fault-proneness prediction approaches, as part of related works and especially when conducting metaanalysis. Specifically, the comparison should be done among software
fault-proneness prediction approaches using the same learning approach.
• The datasets used for software software fault-proneness are usually imbalanced. The SMOTE treatment of imbalance significantly improves
the classification performance of software fault-proneness prediction
models.
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3.9

Threats to validity

The threats to validity are grouped into four categories: construct, internal
,conclusion, and external validity.
Construct validity is concerned whether we are measuring what we are
claiming to measure or not. One threat to construct validity comes from the
commits made to each bug tracking system, which are used to extract the
software metrics. Many commits had some data missing. Commits with no
revision numbers were given an auto-generated unique ID number when extracted, while commits with no lines of code added or lines of code deleted
reported were omitted and not considered in this study. This represented less
than 3% of all commits made to all projects combined. Another threat to the
construct validity comes from the static code metrics used in this study. The
static code metrics used are the same for both approaches. The only way for
us to acquire static metrics was through extracting them from the available
binaries for each release. We assumed that the latest binaries were released on
the release day. Thought the change metrics indeed change, but static metrics
do not, and the effect of such factor is not studied in this study. The number
of files in the static metrics list is higher than the number of files in the change
metrics list, because the binary distributions of each release has also other files
from external software libraries. Our results are based on the matched static
code and change metrics for the same files. Our evaluation was based on 64
releases of twelve different open source projects. For the statistical tests, we
treated all releases as if they were independent, and the effect of the project’s
choice is not studied.
Internal validity is concerned with the effects of unknown impacts that might
affect the independent variables and the dependent variables. To ensure that
we obtained data quality we extracted our own data from the Apache repository online. We wanted to have a unified set of static code and change metrics
for all projects and releases considered. Upon extracting the data, we im-
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plemented manual and automated sanity checks to guarantee the quality of
the extracted measures. For each projected included, we randomly selected
around 100 files’ metrics and compared them with the actual development history commits and the Java source code files.
Conclusion validity is concerned with the possible threats which may affect
our ability to draw correct and reliable conclusions. We choose to conduct
design of experiment approach and considered 64 releases of 12 different open
source projects from the Apache Open Source foundation. We choose nonparametric tests because the datasets used were very skewed.
External validity is concerned with our ability to generalize our conclusions.
This work considered 64 releases from 12 open source projects which provides
some generalizability. However, this work considered only open source Software found on the Apache Projects web server and were written in Java. We
are unable to generalize those results on other projects or software.
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3.10

Conclusion

This study showed that learning approaches significantly affect the performance of software fault-proneness prediction models. Therefor, we encourage
researchers to consider this factor, and always explicitly state which learning
approach is being used.
Through empirical results and statistical tests, we showed that the learning
approach significantly affects the performance of software fault-prone prediction. Our findings were based on using two different learning approaches in
building three type prediction styles. The approach, useAllPredictAll significantly performed the approach usePrePredictPost.
Prediction within-release was always better compared to prediction acrossreleases for all approaches. Using SMOTE enhanced the prediction’s performance significantly for both learning approaches in the three prediction styles.
Our future work aims to extend the scope of this work with different datasets,
and more projects. Additionally, we would like to explore the effect of the
learning approach on the classification performance at different software units
granularities, and when using different machine learning algorithms. Lastly,
we would like to explore using multimodal machine learning approaches to
in the are of software fault-proneness prediction, especially for across-project
prediction and transfer learning.
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Chapter 4
On effects of the treatment for
imbalanced data and datasets
used on the software fault
proneness predication
performance
4.1

Introduction

This chapter addresses the use of the Group Lasso Regression machine
learning algorithm (i.e., G-Lasso) in the prediction of software fault proneness,
and explores the effect of two factors on the classification performance using
G-Lasso and six other machine learning algorithms: (i) the use of imbalance
treatment and (ii) the use of different datasets. This work was explored by
Alshehri in his PhD dissertation [190] and was published in our recent work
[86].
Since we compare multiple machine learning algorithms, use multiple
datasets and multiple evaluation criteria, while at the same time address the
data imbalance problem, it follows that the ranking study of software fault
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proneness prediction in this paper extends the earlier studies [11, 80, 83] and
satisfies all criteria for good ranking study listed in and followed by [186]. As
concluded in [186], out of 22 highly cited software fault proneness prediction
ranking studies only one [147] followed all these criteria
My main contributions to that work were: extracting the Apache open
source datastes, and conduction the statistical tests and providing the analysis
to the research questions. As a result, only the results of our research questions
will be presented in this chapter. Please refer to the published study [86].
Using change metrics extracted from four open source projects, we used GLasso and six other widely used machine learning algorithms to predict which
files are fault prone post-release by using features extracted from pre-release
data. The data from Eclipse was extracted in previous work [11,105], whereas
the data from Ant, Derby, and Xalan was extracted by the work in Chapter 3.
Note that the change metrics used are similar to the metrics used in Chapter 3,
and all machine learning algorithms in this study used the usePrePredictPost
learning approach.
In our work, we addressed the following research questions:
RQ1: How does G-Lasso perform compared to other learners on the original,
imbalanced datasets?
RQ2: How does the imbalanced data treatment affect the performance of GLasso and the other learners?
RQ3: Does the choice of datasets affect the prediction performance of G-Lasso
and the other learners?
Our main findings can be summarized as follows:
• For imbalanced datasets, if the Recall and G-Score are of interest, GLasso is the algorithm of choice because it significantly outperformed the
other learners.
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• Applying SMOTE to achieve balanced datasets improved the performance of all learners.
– For G-Lasso, using SMOTE improved the Precision, F-Score, and
AUC, but did not affect the Recall, FPR, and G-Score values.
– For the other six learners, the use of SMOTE led to significant
increase of Recall, Precision, and F-Score, moderate increase of GScore and AUC, and only slight increase of the FPR.
– RF was in the group of the top performing learners for all performance metrics, with the highest median values for all metrics but
AUC. G-Lasso was among top performing learners only for Precision and FPR, while NB performed the worst of all learners.
• When using the same change metrics as features, the choice of the dataset
(i.e., Apache vs. Eclipse) had no effect on the performance of G-Lasso
and most of the other learners, both for the imbalanced and balanced
datasets. NB was the most sensitive to the choice of the dataset, especially when balanced datasets were used.
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4.2

Machine Learning approach

Using G-Lasso and six other machine learning algorithms, we built models
to predict post-release fault-prone files using change metrics extracted prerelease. We built the models with the original, imbalanced datastes and with
a treatment for imbalance using Synthetic Minority Over-sampling Technique
(SMOTE). Additionally, we studied the effect of the dataset choice on the prediction performance. For the experiment evaluation, we used multiple performance metrics, since no single performance metric nor subset of performance
metrics fully represent the predictor’s performance. We used statistical tests
to formally test the difference in the machine learning algorithm’s performance
and effects of the imbalance treatment and datasets.

4.2.1

Machine Learning algorithms

Lasso stands for Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator, it was
initially developed to solve prediction problems and large variance associated
with ordinary least squared (OLS) [191]. The algorithm shrinks some coefficients and turns some others into 0, which helps to gain an optimal fit for a
model by leaving important features in the model and eliminating insignificant
features which results in reducing the variance and improving the accuracy.
G-Lasso is an extension of Lasso to do variable selection on groups of variables in linear regression models, and was later extended to logistic regression
models [192]. In this study, we used G-Lasso [192] and six other supervised
machine learning algorithms: decision tree algorithms J48 and Random Forest (RF), Naive Bayes (NB), Logistic Regression (LR), Multilayer Perceptron
Neural Networks (NN), and the hybrid rule-and-tree learner PART. These
learners belong to different classes and were widely used for software fault
proneness prediction. Furthermore, these learners were among the best performers in the benchmarking study [80], were included in a more recent benchmarking study [83] and were used for comparison in numerous related works
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(e.g., [11, 37, 150, 186, 193]). For the experimental evaluation we used 10-folds
cross validation (i.e., trained on 9 folds for training and the 10th fold for testing, repeating the process 10 times, each time using different fold for testing).
To assess the classification performance of the prediction models we used
four the performance metrics defined and used in Chapter 3 (i.e., Recall, Precision, F-Score anf G-Score). Additionally, we used the value of False Positive
Rate instead of 1-FPR.

4.2.2

Treatment of the datasets imbalance problem

The datasets used in this study are imbalanced in terms of the distributions
of the two classes (i.e., fault prone and not-fault prone files), which is typical
in this area. For some datasets (e.g., Derby releases 10.5.1.1, 10.6.1.0, 10.8.1.2
and Eclipse release Helios) the fault prone classes were extremely small (i.e.,
less than 6%). Therefore, we explored if the treatment for the class imbalance
problem would improve the performance of the fault proneness prediction.
Specifically, we used SMOTE [194] because it makes small perturbations in
the re-sampled values, which softens the decision boundary and avoids overfitting. Additionally, to avoid over-fitting, we applied SMOTE only on the
training folds by over-sampling the fault prone files to achieve 50% of the
overall sample size; the testing fold consisted of the original (imbalanced)
data.

4.2.3

Statistical comparisons of the results

We used Friedman test, which is the non-parametric one-way ANOVA with
repeated measures, to test if there are significant differences among multiple
algorithms’ performance [195]. In cases when the Friedman test rejected the
null hypothesis, the Nemenyi post-hoc test was used to determine where the
differences were located [195].
The Wilcoxon rank-sum test is a non-parametric test which was used to
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Figure 4.1: Box plots of performance metrics for all learners
compare two groups with repeated measure (e.g., compare the performances
of G-Lasso with and without using SMOTE).

4.3

Results

We ran machine learning experiments with G-Lasso and the other six learners, first using the original, imbalanced datasets and then the datasets treated
with SMOTE. The box plots of performance metrics, Friedman’s test p-values,
and Nemenyi’s post hoc test p-values, for all learners and both scenarios are
shown in Figure 4.1, and Tables 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. They were used to
answer RQ1 and RQ2.

Table 4.1: Friedman’s test p-values

NN

PART
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Table 4.2: Nemenyi’s post hoc test p-values between pair of algorithms, for all
performance metrics

4.3.1

RQ1:

How does G-Lasso perform compared

to other learners on the original, imbalanced
datasets?
As shown in Figure 4.1(a) G-Lasso outperformed all the other learners
with respect to Recall and G-Score. G-Lasso’s median Recall and G-Score
values (i.e., 0.7847 and 0.8184, respectively) were significantly higher than the
corresponding values of the other learners (i.e., the second best learner RF had
Recall of 0.57147 and G-Score of 0.6996). For the other performance metrics
G-Lasso performed similarly or worse than the other learners.
Friedman test results (see Table 4.1) rejected the null hypotheses that
there is no statistically significant difference among learners’ performance, for
all performance metrics (p-value < 0.05 marked in green color). We used the
Nemenyi post hoc test to identify which pairs of learners have statistically
different performance (see Table 4.2). As shown in Table 4.2 there was a
statistically significant difference between G-Lasso and all the other learners for
the Recall and G-Score performance metrics. All the other learners performed
similarly, with no statistical difference among themselves. On the other side,
G-Lasso’s performance with respect to Precision, FPR, F-Score, and AUC was
among the worst performing learners. Based on these results, it follows that
when the dataset is imbalanced, and the Recall and G-Score are the
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metrics of interest, G-Lasso is the algorithm of choice for software
fault proneness prediction. Note that models that result in high recall
and low precision (as G-Lasso) are acceptable and useful in cases of mission
critical or cybersecurity applications, which require high Recall regardless of
the Precision because the cost of false negatives is much higher than the cost
of false positives [196].
It is important to emphasize that the median Recall values of all
other machine learning algorithms were below or slightly above 0.5,
which is worse than or comparable performance to random guessing.
Therefore, using such machine learning algorithms with imbalanced data is not
practically useful.

4.3.2

RQ2: How does the imbalanced data treatment
affect the performance of G-Lasso and the other
learners?

We first discuss the effect of the imbalanced treatment on G-Lasso performance. As can be seen in Figure 4.1(b), using SMOTE slightly increased
the median Recall, but it also increased the median FPR, which together
led to a slight decrease of the median G-Score (from 0.8184 to 0.8004). We
used the Wilcoxon rank-sum test to explore if statistically significant differences exist between G-Lasso performance metrics when using the imbalanced
and balanced datasets. As can be seen from Table 4.3, using SMOTE did
not make statistically significant difference on the Recall, FPR, and
G-Score values of G-Lasso. On the other side, using SMOTE led to
statistically significant increase of the AUC, Precision, and F-Score
of G-Lasso. Specifically, SMOTE significantly increased the median AUC
(from 0.5700 to 0.8087), and the median Precision (from 0.1506 to 0.8079,
which then led to significant increase of the median F-Score (from 0.2517 to
0.8071).
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Table 4.3: Wilcoxon rank-sum test results for the effect of the imbalance
treatment on G-Lasso performance

For the other six learners, as shown in Figure 4.1(b)), the use
of SMOTE led to significant increase of the Recall, Precision, and
F-Score, and moderate increase of G-Score and AUC. However, using
SMOTE also increased the FPR of all learners.
The results of the Friedman test (see Table 4.1), for each performance
metric, confirmed that the learners did not have the same performance. The
results of the Nemenyi post-hoc test, shown in Table 4.2, identified the pairs
for which the differences were statistically significant. These results indicate
less statistically significant differences than in the case when the imbalanced
datasets were used. That is, for each performance metric there was a group
of learners that performed equally well. Specifically, RF was in the top
performing group for all performance metrics, with the highest median
values for all metrics but AUC. J48 was also among the best performing
learners for all performance metrics except for AUC. Although using
SMOTE improved the NB performance, it performed the worst of
all learners, with the lowest median values for all metrics except Recall.
G-Lasso was among top performing learners only for Precision and
FPR, but had lower median Precision and higher median FPR than RF and
J48.
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4.3.3

RQ3: Does the choice of datasets affect the prediction performance of G-Lasso and the other
learners?

Motivated by related works (e.g., [28,30,83,91,148,196,197]).To reflect the
two different open source communities and different project sizes, we created
two datasets (one with 7 Eclipse releases and another with 15 releases from
the three Apache projects).
The box plots of the G-Lasso’s performance metrics, for the imbalanced
and balanced (using SMOTE) Apache and Eclipse datasets are shown in Figures 4.2(a) and 4.2(b), respectively. The results showed that when using the
imbalanced datasets, the median values of all performance metrics, except GScore, were slightly higher for the Eclipse than for the Apache dataset. On
the other side, when SMOTE was applied, all performance metrics, except
FPR, were slightly higher when using the Apache than when using the Eclipse
dataset. However, these slight differences in the performance metrics were
not statistically significant, as shown by the results of the Wilcoxon rank-sum
test in Table 4.4. It follows that the choice of the dataset had no effect
on the performance of G-Lasso, both for imbalanced and balanced
datasets.
In Table 4.4 we report the results of the Wilcoxon rank sum test for all
learners, when using the two different dataset. (The box plots of the other
learners’ performance metrics are not shown due to space limitation.) These
results showed that for most learners and most metrics, the choice
of the dataset did not affect the prediction performance. The only
exceptions were Recall for RF, Precision and FPR for NB, and Recall and
G-Score for LR in case of using imbalanced Apache and Eclipse datasets,
and all metrics except Recall for NB when using the balanced Apache and
Eclipse datasets. In summary, when using the same change metrics as
features, in spite of the significantly different sizes of Eclipse and
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Apache releases, the effect of the dataset (i.e., Eclipse vs. Apache)
on the learners’ performance metrics was barely noticeable. NB
was the most sensitive to the choice of the dataset, especially when
balanced datasets were used.
Unlike our result, some related works reported that learners’ performance
was sensitive to the dataset used (e.g., [28, 30, 83, 91, 148, 196, 197]) We argue
that those results in the previous works (at least partially) were due to the
facts that they compared the effect of datasets that had different features,
and were from different domains (e.g., mission critical software, embedded
software, open source software). Therefore, when making claims about the
effect of the datasets on the prediction performance, these factors should be

1.0

1.0

0.9

0.9

0.8

0.8

0.7

0.7

Performance Metrics

Performance Metrics

specified and taken into account.

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.3

0.2

0.2

0.1

0.1

0.0

0.0

Recall

Precision

FPR

F-Score

G-Score

(a) SMOTE not applied

AUC

Apache

Recall

Precision

Eclipse

FPR

F-Score

G-Score

(b) SMOTE applied

Figure 4.2: Box plots of G-Lasso’s performance metrics for Apache and Eclipse
datasets

4.4

Threats to Validity

Construct validity is concerned with whether we are testing what we
intended to test. Our study is based on 22 releases (i.e., datasets) from four
open source projects. We used the same features (i.e., change metrics) for all
datasets to avoid the threat to validity due to the effect of different features on

AUC
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Table 4.4: The p-values of Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the effect of the dataset
on the learners’ performance

Table 4.5: Summary of all research questions addressed in this work
RQ

Description

Findings

Section

RQ1 Comparison of G-Lasso with

If the recall and G-Score are the metrics of interest, G-

Section

other machine learning algo-

Lasso is the algorithm of choice for software fault prone-

4.3.1

rithms on the original, imbal-

ness prediction because it significantly outperformed all

anced datasets

six algorithms.

RQ2 Effect of using SMOTE on G-

For G-Lasso, using SMOTE improved the Precision, F-

Section

Lasso and other machine learning

Score, and AUC, but did not make statistically signifi-

4.3.2

algorithms

cant difference on the Recall, FPR, and G-Score values.
For the other six learners, the use of SMOTE led to significant increase of Recall, Precision, and F-Score, and
moderate increase of G-Score and AUC, but also slight
increased the FPR. Specifically, RF was in the top performing group of learners for all performance metrics.
G-Lasso was among top performing learners only for the
Precision and FPR, while NB performed the worst of all
learners for all performance metrics but Recall.

RQ3 Effect of using different datasets

The choice of the dataset (i.e., Apache vs. Eclipse) had

Section

no effect on the performance of G-Lasso and most of the

4.3.3

other learners, both for the imbalanced and balanced
datasets. NB was the most sensitive to the choice of the
dataset, especially when balanced datasets were used.

the prediction performance. We carried on the machine learning experiments
using 10-fold cross validation. To avoid over-fitting, we applied SMOTE only
to the nine folds in the training set, and tested the models on the 10th fold
of original, imbalanced data. For testing the effect of the datasets, we created
two datasets (i.e., Eclipse and Apache) to reflect the two different open source
communities and different project sizes.
Internal validity threats are related to influences that can affect the
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independent variables and measurements without researchers’ knowledge. To
address the internal validity we ensured that the data are of high quality. For
the extracted change metrics (i.e., features) we used sanity checks. In addition,
for a random sample of each project, we manually compared the values of the
extracted change metrics with their actual values in the commit and source
code files.
Conclusion validity is related to the ability to draw correct conclusions.
For evaluation of the prediction performance, we used multiple performance
metrics. This is important because, as our results showed, an algorithm can
have good performance with respect to one metric (e.g., G-Score), but bad
performance on another metric (e.g., F-Score). In cases when one or more
algorithms failed to provide meaningful classification (i.e., all instances were
classified in one class) that specific release was excluded from the analysis, as
done in some related works (e.g., [198], [199]) and the excluded releases were
Ant 1.3, Ant 1.7, Ant 1.9, Derby 10.8.3.0 and Xalan 2.7. Last but not least,
for performance comparison we used non-parametric statistical tests.
External validity is related to the ability to generalize the results. We
used a total of 22 datasets from four different open source projects, which provides some level of generalizability. Some of the research questions considered
in the paper were considered earlier using other datasets, which adds to the
generalizability. Even though our work allows some degree of external validity, the results may not be valid for other software applications, from different
domains. However, we provided detailed information to allow reproducability,
so future studies can explore the external validity of the findings reported in
this paper.
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4.5

Conclusion

This Chapter we explored the effects of the treatment for imbalanced
data, and datasets on the prediction performance when using GLasso and
six other machine learning algorithms. The use of G-Lasso in the software
fault-proneness prediction was explored in [190]. The lessons learned with
practical importance include: (1) For imbalanced datasets and if the Recall
and G-Score are the metrics of interest, use G-Lasso. It significantly outperformed the six other learners, whose performance was comparable or worse
than random guessing and thus not of practical value. (2) Producing balanced
datasets (by using SMOTE) is worth doing because it significantly improved
learners’ performance. On balanced datasets use RF, which outperformed the
other learners (including G-Lasso). (3) NB had the worst performance and
was the most affected by the dataset used.
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Chapter 5
Replicated study for Open
Source Operating Systems
Vulnerability profiles
5.1

Introduction

Some of the most serious software bugs are those that could lead to private
information leakage, unprivileged access, or financial loss, which are known
as software security vulnerabilities. To describe the most common types of
software vulnerabilities in systems, software security vulnerability profiles were
introduced as an empirical view of different aspects of those vulnerabilities
[1]. A security vulnerability profile is defined as a set of data that described
where and when the security vulnerability was introduced and what were the
dominant vulnerability class [1]. Understanding the characteristics of software
vulnerabilities and security-related bug reports is an active research area, and
is essential for developers to prioritize their efforts and developing high quality,
and secure systems.
This chapter employs the information collected from two bug tracking systems to analyze security-related bug reports, and presents the most common
software vulnerabilities of three open source operating systems. Furthermore,
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this study outlines the similarities among the software vulnerabilities, and compares several aspects of security-related bug reports and non-security-related
bug reports across the studied systems. This chapter is a conceptual replication of different studies which explored some of the questions addressed in this
work (i.e., [1,12–27]). Replicated studies are important and necessary to grasp
more generalized understandings of findings. The results presented in this work
are based on bug reports collected from Bugzilla [184] and Launchpad [200] for
these open source operating systems Fedora, Red Hat Linux Enterprise (RHL),
and Ubuntu. For each bug report, we identified security-related bug reports by
looking for the reported Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE), and
we created software vulnerability profiles using the Common Weakness and
Enumeration (CWE) linked to each CVE. We present and compare the most
common software vulnerabilities across the studied systems, analyze the main
characteristics of the security-related bug reports (e.g., severity, priority, time
to fix, developers’ initial response time, numbers of comments, and developers
involved), and compared them to non-security-related bug reports across the
three studied projects.
The research questions explored in this work can be considered as conceptual replication of similar research questions conducted by other studies [1, 15, 18, 22, 26, 27]. Specifically, questions RQ1-RQ4 are replicated from
the previous study [1], and RQ5-RQ6 were explored in other related works
[15, 18, 22, 26, 27].
RQ1. Where are the security-related bug reports located?
RQ2. What are the dominant classes of security-related bug reports?
RQ3. Are the dominant classes of security-related bug reports consistent
across different operating systems?
RQ4. What are the severity levels of the security-related bug reports?
RQ5. What are the priority levels of the security-related bug reports?

Chapter 5. Replicated study for Open Source Operating Systems Vulnerability profiles91

RQ6. How are security-related bug reports different from non-security-related
bug reports in terms of:
(a) time to fix
(b) initial response time of developers
(c) number of comments made during the fixing process
(d) and number of developers involved in fixing the bug.
Our main findings include:
• Security-related bug reports appeared in a small number of software
source code packages. Precisely, all security-related bug reports appeared
in only 34%, 9%, and 7% of the software code packages in RHL, Fedora,
and Ubuntu respectively.
• The severity and priority levels of most security-related bug reports were
medium across the three operating systems.
• Security-related bug reports had somewhat similar trends among the
three studied projects, with variations in some cases. The three operating systems shared the top eight most dominant CWE. Five of those
classes dominated and contained 76%, 91%, and 83% of the software
vulnerabilities in Fedora, RHL, and Ubuntu, respectively. All operating
systems had the same most dominant primary class (i.e., Memory Access) of their security-related bug reports as it contained 31%, 29%, and
20% of all vulnerabilities.
• Security-related bug reports were fixed 1.34 - 2.82 times faster than nonsecurity-related bug reports.
• Security-related bug reports got developers attention 1.4 - 3 times faster
than non-security-related bug reports.
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• Security-related bug reports had more comments on average for Fedora
and Ubuntu than non-security-related bug reports. However, securityrelated bug reports had less less comments on average for RHL.
• Security-related bug reports involved fewer developers than non-securityrelated bug reports in Fedora and RHL. However more developers were
involved in fixing security-related than non-security-related bug reports
in Ubuntu.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides a
background on bug reports and their corresponding CVE and CWE, section
5.3 describes the collected data and the methods used to extract and label the
data, section 5.4 presents our results, section 5.6 represents the conclusions,
and section 5.5 presents the threats to validity.
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5.2

Background

In this section we briefly describe the process of reporting software bugs
and how we utilized this process to answer the research questions. When a
software bug is discovered, a bug report is initialized by the software developers
or users. A bug report is used to describe the nature of the bug and inform the
community of developers of the bug’s nature and other related characteristics
(e.g., possible causes and effects, severity levels, etc.). These bug reports are
reported, tracked, and maintained by software developers using specialized
Bug Tracking Systems.
Software developers analyze the bugs and could exchange comments with
other developers to underline the issue and research a solution. In some cases,
when the bug threatens the privacy and the security policies of that software,
developers could assign one or more indicator to whether this bug is a securityrelated bug report. In Bugzilla and Launchpad, once a bug is labeled as
security-related, a CVE number is assigned to that bug indicating it can cause
a security vulnerability, and it can be exploited in that system. Throughout the
bug fixing process, several developers might get involved, and other indicators
could be assigned to those bug reports to better describe their severity and
prioritizes the efforts tackling them. Developers collaborate by commenting
on those bugs until a resolution is reached and the bugs are fixed.
Software vulnerabilities, their descriptions, and impact metrics are documented by the U.S. government in the National Vulnerability Database
(NVD) [201]. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) are used
to describe certain software vulnerabilities within a specific product or system
(e.g., Fedora or Ubuntu). The root cause of each software vulnerability is assigned a Common Weakness Enumeration number (CWE), which serves as a
common unified language to describe the software weaknesses in architecture,
design, or code. All CWEs are maintained by the MITRE corporation [202]
with the support of the National Cyber Security division (NCS). The CWE
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taxonomy serves as classification schema for software vulnerabilities, and currently has 1,226 CWE reported. All CWEs are adhered in a hierarchical structure to allow several levels of abstraction, and each can have many children
CWEs. The higher the CWE in the structure the broader the vulnerability
type it describes. The deeper the CWE in the structure, the finer granularity
it provides [203].
The NVD uses CWE as a classification schema that differentiates each
CVE based on the type of vulnerability it represents. One or more CVEs
could be mapped to one or more CWE. For example, the vulnerabilities CVE2019-1010245 (The Linux Foundation ONOS SDN Controller 1.15 and earlier
versions are affected by: Improper Input Validation. The impact is: A remote
attacker can execute arbitrary commands on the controller), and CVE-20191020018 (Discourse before 2.3.0 and 2.4.x before 2.4.0.beta3 lacks a confirmation screen when logging in via an email link) are mapped to the CWE-20
(Improper Input Validation).
There are several CWE views created to group similar CWEs together
and simplify the complex structure of the CWE. Examples of those views
are CWE-699 (Software development view) [204], CWE-700 (Seven Precision
Kingdoms view) [205], CWE-888 (Software Fault Pattern view) [206], CWE999 (Weaknesses without Software Fault Patterns view) [207], and CWE-1000
(research Concept view) [208].
In this work, we utilize the collected bug reports and the CVEs from the
reported security-related bug reports to identify the most common security
vulnerabilities, their locations, and number of severity and priority levels. We
also use the collected comments, the developers who were involved in fixing the
bugs, and the times in which these actions took place to better understand
different key features (e.g., time to fix, time of initial response time, and
numbers of comments and developers involved while fixing the bugs).
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5.3

Data

For this study, we collected a total number of 414,369 bug reports from
Bugzilla for Fedora and RHL, and from Ubuntu Launchpad for Ubuntu. We
chose those bug tracking systems because: (a) they are publicly available, (b)
many open source projects use them, and (c) report CVEs for security-related
bug reports.

1

In Table 5.1, we provide details about each of the studied open source
projects, such as, the total number of extracted bugs reports and the percentage of security-related bug reports. We provide details on the data extraction
and labeling methods in sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 respectively. Of the total bugs,
26,802 were reported for Fedora, 44,978 for RHL and 343,102 for Ubuntu. The
numbers of security-related bug reports in each of the projects varied; Fedora
had 6,835 security-related bug reports (i.e., 25.5% of all bugs), RHL had 504
security-related bug reports (i.e., 1.14% of all bugs), and Ubuntu had 6,960
security-related bug reports (i.e., 2% of all bugs).
Table 5.1: Included projects with the total number of bugs and security-related
bug reports and other related information about each project
Project name

# bug reports

% security-related bug reports

size in LOC

Earliest bug date

Most recent bug date

Age in years

# developers

# comments

Fedora

26,802

25.5

204 million

Jan - 2009

Jan - 2015

6

1,062

226,351

Red Hat

43,978

1.1

30 million

Jan - 1999

Apr - 2019

20

1,197

304,151

Ubuntu

343,309

2.0

50 million

Jun - 2004

Jun - 2019

15

10,424

541,342

1
Note that we did not collect any personal information related to developers’ or users’
names or electronic mail addresses.
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5.3.1

Data extraction

To collect data, we used the online query tool provided by Bugzilla [184]
to search for Fedora and RHL bug reports and used the online query tool
Launchpad [209] to search for Ubuntu bug reports. Both tools display bugs
with related information as HTML web pages and provide several fields from
which to select searching criteria. Our aim was to collect the same data and
fields for all projects from the two bug tracking systems. For that purpose, we
mapped the Bugzilla fields to their similar fields in Launchpad. As shown in
Table 8.1 of Appendix 8.3, we collected 18 fields related to the characteristics
of each bug and the interactions and comments made among developers to
fix that bug. Some fields do not have the same name in both bug tracking
systems but have the same description. For example, in Bugzilla each bug is
identified by a unique ID and is given a priority, whereas in Launchpad, bugs
are identified by their numbers and assigned an importance. Also, the bug
severity in Bugzilla has similar meaning to bug heat in Launchpad. We used
Python scripts to scrape and parse all the bugs reports’ pages and stored all the
extracted data to a local SQL database. Upon extraction, data prepossessing
and cleaning were necessary to obtain high quality representative data. We
filtered unnecessary bugs in Bugzilla by including bug reports for Fedora and
RHL only, and in Launchpad by including all bug reports for Ubuntu only. We
only considered bugs with a status of “Closed“ because we wanted to include
bugs that were verified and fixed.
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select bug
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CVE
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Update
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CWE888

CWE699

Figure 5.1: Diagram of the steps followed to label security-related bug reports
and their corresponding CWE from the CVE

5.3.2

Data labeling

To create vulnerability profiles for the included projects, we needed to
label bug reports as security-related or non-security-related and designate a
CWE for each security-related bug report. In the previous work all securityrelated bug reports were manually labeled and assigned one CWE from the
CWE-888 view, and then security profiles were presented [1]. In this work we
automated the labeling process to identify security-related bug reports, their
corresponding CWE, and the CWE view. The method to label bug reports is
shown in Figure 5.1.
After collecting bugs’ information from Bugzilla and Launchpad, we mined
through bugs’ aliases and summaries searching for CVE reported by any of the
developers working on those bugs. If a CVE was reported with a bug report, we
verified the CVE via the NVD [210] and CVE details [211]. Next, we searched
through each of the reported CVEs description looking for its corresponding
CWE [212]. If the CVE was mapped to CWE, the bug report was labeled
as security-related bug report and was assigned the CWE, which reflected the
nature of that security-related bug report. The reported CWE could belong
to any of the several CWE views (i.e., CWE-888 and CWE-699 views). Bugs
with non-verified CVE, and non-linked CWE were excluded from this study.
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Some bugs in Fedora and Ubuntu had more than one CVE reported, and
each of the reported CVEs was linked to one CWE. As shown in Table 5.2,
there were 8,925 CVEs reported for 6,835 security-related bug reports for Fedora, 504 CVEs reported for 504 security-related bug reports for RHL, and
in Ubuntu there were 26,279 CVEs reported for 6,960 security-related bug
reports reported. The overwhelming majority of the CWEs belonged to two
CWE views: CWE-888 and CWE-699. Of the 8,925 CWEs reported in Fedora
73.2% were CWE-888 view, and 26.1% were CWE-699 view. Of the 504 CWEs
reported in RHL, 55.5% were CWE-888 view, and 31.7% were CWE-699 view.
And of the 26,279 CWEs reported in Ubuntu, 67.6% were CWE-888 view,
29.5% were CWE-699 view, and only 11.9% belonged to other views.
Table 5.2: Breakdown of the included CWE numbers’ views
Operating
system

Total No.

Total No.

Total No.

CWE-

CWE-

other

#

#

#

security-

CWE

CWE

888

699

CWE

distinct

distinct

distinct

No.

CWE-

CWE-

other

distinct

related
bugs
Fedora
RHL
Ubuntu

Total.

888

699

CWE

CWE

6,835

8,925

8,925

6,534

2,330

61

88

29

5

122

504

504

504

280

215

9

18

10

1

29

6,960

26,279

26,279

17,767

8,335

177

77

28

2

107

The CWE-888 view is the Software Fault Pattern (SFP) which serves as a
classification scheme for the software vulnerabilities [9], and it clusters CWEs
into related weakness categories [213]. The CWE-888 view has a three-level
hierarchical structure: the Primary Class, the Secondary Class, and the actual
CWE. In Table 5.3 we provide the names and numbers of the eight primary
clusters, their descriptions, and corresponding secondary clusters. 2 . For the
full list and definitions please refer to the work in [1] and the CWE-888 list
web page [207].
The CWE-699 is the Development Concepts view which serves as an organizing scheme for weaknesses that are frequently encountered during the software development [9]. This view has 418 (CWE) weaknesses and 40 (CWE)
categories. To be able to compare our findings with the previous work [1],
2
The CWE-888 view contains 705 CWEs organized in 21 primary classes and 62 secondary classes
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Table 5.3: Primary classes, their definitions, and their corresponding secondary
classes [1]

Memory Access

(890)

Tainted Input

(896)

Other

(907)

Corresponding secondary classes names and numbers
Faulty Buffer Access (970), Faulty Pointer Use (971), Faulty String Expansion
(972), Improper NULL Termination (973), and Incorrect Buffer Length
Computation (974).
Relateds to injection of user controlled Tainted Input to Command (990),Tainted Input to Environment (991), Faulty
data into various destination commands. Input Transformation (992), Incorrect Input Handling (993), and Tainted Input
Relates to miscellaneous architecture, Architecture (975), Compiler (976), Design (977), and Implementation (978)
design, and implementation issues.

Information Leak

(895)

Relates to the export of sensitive
information from an application.

Primary Class Name and

Description
Relates to faulty memory buffers.

Exposed Data (963), Exposure Temporary File (964), Insecure Session
Management (965), Other Exposures (966), and State Disclosure (967)

Resource Manageme (892)

Relates to the management of memory Faulty Memory Release (969)
buffers
Relates to management of resources
Failure to Release Resource (982), Faulty Resource Use (983), Life Cycle (984),
(i.e., dynamic entities).
and Unrestricted Consumption (985)

Risky Values

(885)

Relates to the basic uses of numerical
values in software systems.

Glitch in Computation (998)

Cryptography

(903)

Relates to cryptography issues

Broken Cryptography (958) and Weak Cryptography (959)

Memory Managemen(891)

we used only the CWE-888 view to create the vulnerability profiles for the
security-related bug reports in each operating system. Furthermore, the CWE888 view is well organized, and it overcomes the problem of combining different
CWEs with different attributes.Any security-related bug report which had a
CWE from the CWE-888 was automatically assigned the primary and secondary class. For example, the security-related bug reports which had the
CWE-118 reported, were assigned the primary class Memory Access (890),
and the secondary class Faulty Buffer Access (970). As shown in Figure 5.2,
CWE-888 and CWE-699 views have 276 CWEs in common, leaving 142 CWE
solely in the CWE-699 view. We decided to integrate and map each of the
CWE-699 view’s and other CWEs into the CWE-888 view’s primary and secondary classes to simplify the creation of vulnerability profiles and compare
thee results with the previous study [1]. To integrate the CWEs into CWE888, we followed the same procedure used in [214] in which CWEs which are
descendent of each other were classified under the same CWE. In this study we
used the same CWE reported, but mapped it into the primary and secondary
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CW E888

Figure 5.2: Venn diagram of the numbers of the CWEs in each of the CWE88
and CWE-699 views and the common CWEs among both views
classes. For example, CWE-119 (Improper Restriction of Operations within
the Bounds of a Memory Buffer) appears only in CWE-699 view. However it is
related to CWE-118 (Incorrect Access of Indexable Resource (’Range Error’)),
which is a member of the primary class Memory Access (890) and secondary
class Faulty Buffer Access (970). Appearing only in CWE-699, the CWE125 (Out-of-bounds Read) is related to the CWE-119 which is integrated into
CWE-888. The CWE-126 (Buffer Over-read) which is a member of primary
class Memory Access (890) and secondary class Faulty Buffer Access (970).
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5.4

Analysis of results

In this section, we present our results related to the research questions.

5.4.1

RQ1. Where are the security-related bug reports
located?

To answer this question, we considered the Bugzilla field component for
RHL and Fedora, and the Launchpad field package for Ubuntu. In this work we
use the term package to refer to the source code location from the bug report.
Table 5.4 shows the total numbers of packages for each of the three projects,
the numbers of packages which were fixed in the security-related bug reports,
and more details on the distribution of security-related bug reports across the
source code packages. Fedora had a total number of 4,322 packages reported
in all bug reports, however only 1,471 packages (e.g., 33.96% of all packages)
were fixed in the 6,835 reported security-related bug reports. RHL had a total
number of 1,175 packages fixed in all bug reports, but only 162 packages (i.e.,
13.78% of all packages) were fixed in the 504 security-related bug reports.
And Ubuntu had 19,371 packages fixed in all bug reports, however only 1,426
packages (i.e., 7.36% of all packages) were fixed in the 6,690 security-related
bug reports. In all three projects, the locations security-related bugs followed
the Pareto principle, showing a very skewed distribution of security-related bug
reports, and indicating that all security-related bug reports appear in a small
percentage (i.e., 7.36%-33.96%) of source code packages. This observation
is consistent with related works, for example the study in [1] reported that
86%-88% of security-related bug reports were reported in only two of the four
considered subsystems. And other studies [12,14,16] reported that most of the
software bugs appeared in a smaller percentage of the source code packages.
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Table 5.4: The total numbers of packages, packages with security-related bug
reports, and the percentages of packages with security-related bug reports in
the audited projects
Project
Name
Fedora
RHL
Ubuntu

5.4.2

Total No.
packages

Total No. packages % of packages Highest % of security- % of security-related % of security-related
with all securitywith all security- related bugs in one
bugs in the top 5% bugs in the top 20%
related bugs
related bugs
package
packages
packages
4,332
1,471
33.96
9.88
66.83
91.13
1,175
162
13.78
30.48
81.12
100.00
19,371
1,426
7.36
32.61
94.18
100.00

RQ.2 What are the dominant classes of securityrelated bug reports?

In this question we focus on the distribution of the security-related bug reports in all projects. We use the CWE numbers reported in the security-related
bug reports to show the most dominant security classes. Since all CWEs reported with the security-related bug reports were mapped and integrated into
the CWE-888 view, we use the CWE-888 primary classes to analyze most
common security classes.
The distributions of the security-related bug reports’ CWEs across the
primary classes for Fedora, RHL, and Ubuntu are shown in Figures 5.3, 5.4,
and 5.5, receptively. For each CWE, we provide the primary class name
followed the primary class number in parentheses, the percentage of the
security-related bug reports in that primary class, and the total number of
security-related bug reports which appeared in that primary class. Due to
space limitations, we only show the distributions across the top eight primary
classes, which included 89.47%-95.24% of all security-related bug reports
CWEs. As shown in Figures 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5, the top four primary classes
(i.e., Memory Access, Tainted Input, Other, and Information Leak) were the
same across all projects. Furthermore, and they were in the same order for
Fedora and RHL, but different order in Ubuntu.
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For Fedora, the security-related bug reports belonged to 18 primary classes;
however 89.4% of security-related bug reports belonged to only eight primary
classes, 76.2% of security-related bug reports belonged to five primary classes,
and 63% of all security-related bug reports belonged to only three primary
classes of the CWE-888 view. As shown in Figure 5.3, the primary class Memory Access (890) dominated, including almost one third of all security-related
bug reports in Fedora. The Tainted Input (986) was the second dominant primary class including almost one fifth of security-related bug reports in Fedora.
For RHL, the security-related bug reports belonged to 13 primary classes,
however 87.47% of security-related bug reports belonged to only four primary
classes. As shown in Figure 5.4, the three primary classes Memory Access
(890), Tainted Input (896), and Other (907) dominated, containing 28.57%
(i.e., 144), 23.41% (i.e., 118 bugs), and 20.83% (i.e., 105 bugs) respectively.
For Ubuntu, the security-related bug reports belonged to 19 primary classes
total, however 82.39% of security-related bug reports CWEs belonged to only
five primary classes, and 71.47% of security-related bug reports belonged to
only four primary classes. As shown in Figure 5.5, the primary class Memory
Access (890) and Information Leak (895) contained 20.42% and 18.71% of the
security-related bug reports CWEs. Our observations are consistent with the
related work [1] for NASA datasets. This is a very important observation, as
the same pattern is noticed across different types of datasets, which came from
different source. In NASA datasets, 79%-90% of security-related bug reports
appeared in five primary classes. Furthermore, the primary class Memory
Access was the most dominant in the Ground Mission (i.e., 54.6% of securityrelated bug reports), however it was the third most dominant class in the Flight
Mission issues and developers issues (i.e., 18.3% and 12.8% respectively). In
addition, the primary class Other, the third most dominant primary class in
all projects of this study, was the fifth most dominant in the Ground mission
and Flight mission issues (i.e., 1.5% and 7.1% receptively), but it was the most
dominant primary class in the Ground mission’s issues (i.e., 24.5%).
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Figure 5.3: CWE-888 profiles for Fedora bugs
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Figure 5.4: CWE-888 profiles for RHL bugs
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Figure 5.5: CWE-888 profiles for Ubuntu bugs
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5.4.3

RQ3. Are the dominant classes of security-related
bug reports consistent across different projects?

Next, we focus on the dominant classes across all the projects by comparing
the distribution of the CWEs of the security-related bug reports across the
CWE-888 view’s primary and secondary classes. We start by comparing the
distribution of security-related bug reports’ CWEs across the primary classes.
As mentioned in Section 5.4.2, the top eight dominant primary classes across
all projects were the same. Both Fedora and RHL had the same four dominant
primary classes in the same order. And Ubuntu shared the same top dominant
primary class, and the bottom four dominant primary classes with Fedora and
RHL, however, the second, third, and fourth most dominant primary classes
had a different order.
Table 5.5 shows all the primary classes which had nonzero security-related
bug reports for at least one project, the numbers of security-related bug reports
CWEs, and their percentage distributions for all security-related bug reports’
CWE in all projects. The five dominant primary classes highlighted in gray
contained 76.36%, 91.47%, and 82.59% of security-related bug reports’ CWEs
in Fedora, RHL, and Ubuntu respectively.
In all projects, the primary class Memory Access (890) was the most dominant primary class as it included 30.91%, 28.57%, and 20.42% of all securityrelated bug reports’ CWEs in Fedora, RHL and Ubuntu, respectively. The
primary class Tainted Input (896) was the second most dominant class for
Fedora and RHL and it contained 19.9% and 23.41% of their security-related
bug reports’ CWEs respectively, however; it was the fourth most dominant
primary class in Ubuntu having 15.63% of its security-related bug reports’
CWEs. Furthermore, the primary class Information Leak (895) was the second most dominant primary class for Ubuntu as it contained 18.71% of all
security-related bug reports’ CWEs. All the three projects had the same third
dominant primary class; Other (907), which contained 12.47%, 20.83%, and
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Table 5.5: Comparison of primary classes across the three projects. The five
dominant classes are shared gray
Primary Class Name and
Number
Memory Access
(890)
Tainted Input
(896)
Other
(907)
Information Leak
(895)
Memory Management
(891)
Resource Management (892)
Risky Values
(885)
Cryptography
(903)
Path Resolution
(893)
Authentication
(898)
Access Control
(899)
Synchronization
(894)
API
(887)
Exception Management (889)
Predictability
(905)
Privilege
(901)
Channel
(902)
Malware
(904)
UI
(906)
Total

Fedora
RHL
Ubuntu
# CWE
%
# CWE
%
# CWE
%
2,759 30.91%
144 28.57%
5,365 20.42%
1,776 19.90%
118 23.41%
4,107 15.63%
1,113 12.47%
105 20.83%
4,437 16.88%
603
6.76%
19 3.77%
4,918 18.71%
564
6.32%
75 14.88%
2,851 10.85%
561
6.29%
1 0.20%
1,396 5.31%
335
3.75%
1,078 4.10%
--274
3.07%
18 3.57%
490 1.86%
258
2.89%
8 1.59%
394 1.50%
245
2.75%
8 1.59%
378 1.44%
173
1.94%
1 0.20%
336 1.28%
137
1.54%
5 0.99%
168 0.64%
40
0.45%
149 0.57%
--28
0.31%
92 0.35%
--22
0.25%
1 0.20%
77 0.29%
20
0.22%
1 0.20%
33 0.13%
11
0.12%
5 0.02%
--6
0.07%
3 0.01%
--2 0.01%
----8,925
504
26,279

16.88% of all security-related bug reports in Fedora, RHL, and Ubuntu respectively. The primary class Information Leak (895) was the fourth dominant class
in Fedora and RHL as it had 6.76% and 14.88% of their security-related bug
reports respectively. Of the eight top dominant primary classes, all projects
the same order of the bottom four primary classes.
We extend our analysis by comparing the most dominant secondary classes
and their most dominant CWEs in all projects. Table 5.6 shows the top five
dominant primary classes (highlighted in yellow), their corresponding dominant secondary classes (highlighted in grey), the most dominant CWEs in each
secondary class, and the percentage of the security-related bug reports each
represents in each project. The percentages in red reflect the percentage of
security-related bug reports’ actual CWE of the secondary class.
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Table 5.6: Comparison of the file dominant classes, broken down to the secondary classes and CWEs across the three projects.
Primary Class
name & number
Memory Access
(890)

Secondary Class Name and Number

Faulty Buffer Access (970)
CWE-119 : Improper Restriction of Operations within
the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
CWE-125 : Out-of-bounds Read
Faulty Pointer Use (971)
CWE-476 : NULL Pointer Dereference
Tainted Input
Tainted Input to Variable (994)
(896)
CWE-20 : Improper Input Validation
CWE-502 : Deserialization of Untrusted Data
Tainted Input to Command (990)
CWE-79 : Improper Neutralization of Input During
Web Page Generation (Cross-site Scripting)
Tainted Input to Environment (991)
CWE-94 : Improper Control of Generation of Code
(Code Injection)
Other (907)
Architecture (975)
CWE-749 : Exposed Dangerous Method or Function
Design (977)
CWE-682 : Incorrect Calculation
Information Leak
Exposed Data (963)
(895)
CWE-200 : Information Exposure
Faulty Memory Release (969)
Memory
Management
CWE-763 : Release of Invalid Pointer or Reference
(891)

Fedora

RHL

Ubuntu

27.36% 28.37% 18.06%
20.74%
6.50%
3.54%
3.54%
11.08%
10.62%
0.46%
7.23%

27.98%

16.57%

0.40%
1.35%
0.20% 2.36%
0.20%
2.36%
9.72% 12.50%
9.72% 12.46%
0.00%
0.03%
9.52% 2.10%

4.48%

6.75%

1.43%

1.55%

4.17%

1.02%

1.01%

3.77%

0.74%

7.41% 9.33% 8.97%
6.59%
8.53%
8.44%
5.00% 11.51% 7.88%
4.81% 11.51%
7.82%
6.73% 3.77% 18.71%
6.08%
1.98% 18.33%
6.32% 14.88% 10.85%
5.64%

14.88%

10.23%

The secondary classes under the Memory Access (890) are: Faulty Buffer
Access (970) and Faulty Pointer (971). The Faulty Buffer Access (970) dominated the security-related bug reports CWEs in Fedora and RHL (i.e., 27.36%
and 28.37% respectively), but it was the second most dominant secondary class
in Ubuntu (i.e., 18.06%). Furthermore, the CWEs reported under the Faulty
Buffer Access (970) were CWE-119, and CWE-125. The CWE-119 (Improper
Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer) was the
most dominant CWE in RHL and Fedora as it included 20.74% and 27.98%
of security-related bug reports CWEs, respectively. However, CWE-119 was
the second most dominant CWE in Ubuntu having 16.57% of the bug report
s. Note that the CWE-119 was the most dominant CWE reported in four
of the studied projects in [22] (i.e., Ubuntu, Red Hat, Novell, MacOS, and
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Solaries), but it was second in Windows. Similar findings were reported in
other studies [20, 26] which reported that the CWE-119 was the most dominant CWE in the considered systems. Furthermore, the CWE-119 was among
the top four most frequent CWEs in [24]. The second most dominant secondary class in RHL was Tainted Input to Variable (994), of the primary class
Tainted Input (894), and it included 11.08% of security-related bug reports in
RHL. And its CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation) was second most dominant CWE in RHL, with 10.62% of the security-related bug reports in RHL.
Note that CWE-20 was the second dominant CWE in Windows in [22]. The
second most dominant secondary class for RHL was Faulty Memory Release
(969), of the primary class Memory Management (891). Its only CWE-763
(Release of Invalid Pointer Reference) included 14.88% of security-related bug
reports in RHL. The second most dominant class for Ubuntu was Exposed
Data (963), of the primary class Information Leak (895), and its CWE-200
(Information Exposure) included 18.33% of the security-related bug reports
in Ubuntu. Interestingly, it is clear that dominant classes among the projects
vary in almost cases. Note that [1] reported that the Memory Access (890)
was the most dominant secondary class in only in the IV&V Ground Mission
dataset. Furthermore their work and this work reported the same secondary
classes for the primary classes which appeared in both works. These findings
show that a very similar pattern of primary and secondary classes exists, even
across different type of projects.

5.4.4

RQ.4: What are the severity levels of the securityrelated bug reports?

To answer this question for Fedora and RHL, we considered the Bugzilla
field severity. According to the definition [215], the severity of a bug in Bugzilla
reflects the external weighting of the bug’s importance and can have the following values: urgent, high, medium, low, or unspecified. To assess the severity
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of bugs for Ubuntu in Launchpad, we used the mapped field bug heat which is
a numerical value assigned to each bug to help developers appraising the bug’s
significance. For Ubuntu, bug heats varied between 0-449, so we divided the
bug heats into five bins, each with 100 points. We report the severity of the
security-related bug reports for Fedora, RHL, and Ubuntu in Figures 5.6, 5.7,
and 5.8, respectively. In all figures, the y-axis represents the severity category,
the x-axis represents the percentage of the bugs; and the numbers shown in
each bar represent the total number of bugs for that severity category. For
instance, Fedora had 145 security-related bug reports with an urgent severity,
which represents 2% of the total number of security-related bug reports in
Fedora.
For Fedora and RHL, we substituted each severity level with a numerical
value to better summarize the severity levels as follows: Unspecified severity
levels were given a severity level of zero, Low severity levels were given a
severity level of one, Medium severity levels were given a severity of two, High
severity levels were given the value three, and Urgent severity levels were given
the value four. And similarly, for Ubuntu security-related bug reports with
bug heat between 0-99 were given a severity level of zero, between 100-199
were given a severity of one, between 200-299 were given a severity of two, bug
heat between 300-399 were given a severity of three, and lastly security-related
bug reports with bug heat between 400-499 were given a severity level four.
As shown in Figure 5.6 for Fedora, only 26% of all bugs were assigned
a severity level. All non-security-related bug reports had no severity levels
assigned to them. On the other hand 99% of the 6,835 security-related bug
reports had a severity level assigned to them, with only 48 bugs with an
unspecified severity level. Precisely, 52% of security-related bug reports in
Fedora had a medium severity level, whereas 27% had a low severity level.
As shown in Figure 5.7 for RHL, 98% of all bugs were assigned a severity level, and 95% of the 504 security-related bug reports had severity levels
assigned to them; and only 2 security-related bug reports had unspecified
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Figure 5.6: Severity of Fedora bugs. Median severity of security-related bug
reports = 2 and IQR = 1
severity level. 48% of security-related bug reports had medium severity level,
and between 20-21% had low or high severity levels, respectively.
Lastly for Ubuntu, 65% of security-related bug reports had a bug heat
between 0-99, whereas 34% of all security-related bug reports had a bug heat
between 200-299.
security-related bug reports of both Fedora and RHL had median severity
medium (i.e., two). However, the median severity level of Ubuntu was zero.
Our observation for RHL and Fedora are in line with the findings of other
work, in which [1] reported that the medium severity was dominant in two of
three studied systems, and [21, 25] reported that 52% of vulnerabilities had
medium severity level.
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Figure 5.7: Severity of RHL bugs. Median severity of security-related bug
reports = 2 and IQR = 1
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Figure 5.8: Severity of Ubuntu bugs. Median severity of security-related bug
reports = 0 and IQR = 3

5.4.5

RQ.5: What are the priority levels of securityrelated bug reports?

To answer this question for Fedora and RHL, we used the field priority
which indicates the internal weighting of that bug’s importance and can have
one of the following values: urgent, high, medium, low, or unspecified. For
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Ubuntu, we used the field importance, which signifies the priority that it should
be given by developers [216], and could have the following values: critical,
high, medium, low, undecided, or wish-list. Note that the importance wish-list
means that the developers handling the bugs fixed wish to assign an importance level to the bug. In this study we combined bugs with importance of
wish-list and undecided together.
To assess the priority levels of security-related bug reports, we followed the
same technique followed in assessing the severity levels in section 5.4.2. The
priorities of the security-related bug reports for Fedora, RHL, and Ubuntu are
given in Figures 5.9, 5.10, and 5.11, respectively.
In Fedora, 98.8% of security-related bug reports were assigned a priority.
However, all non-security-related bug reports had unspecified priority. And
53.5% of security-related bug reports had a medium priority level (i.e., severity
level two), whereas 27.7% of security-related bug reports had low priority.
For RHL, 98% of all security-related bug reports were assigned a priority,
and 84% of all non-security-related bug reports were assigned priority. Similarly to Fedora, most of the security-related bug reports had medium severity
(i.e., 82%) and only 7% had an urgent priority level.
Lastly for Ubuntu, only 56% of all security-related bug reports were assigned priority level, and only 44% of non-security-related were assigned priority level. Precisely, 27% of the security-related bug reports had medium
priority, and 18% had high priority. Since the priority reported in both bug
tracking systems are solely for those operating systems, no comparisons with
similar work are provided.

Bug Priority
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Figure 5.9: Priority of Fedora bugs
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Figure 5.10: Priority of RHL bugs
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Figure 5.11: Priority of Ubuntu bugs

5.4.6

RQ6. How are security-related bug reports different from non-security-related bug reports in
terms of (a) time to fix, (b) initial response time,
(c) number of comments made, (d) and number
of developers involved in fixing the bug?

To answer this research question we provide box plots and the general
statistics (i.e., mean, median, standard deviation, and IQR) for securityrelated and non-security-related bug reports.

For each project, we check

whether the observations are normally distributed by providing distributions
histograms and using the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality. Then we randomly
selected 80% of security-related and non-security-related bug reports in each
project to test whether the differences of time to fix, first response time, and
number of comments and developers are statistically significantly different. If
the Mann-Whitney test’s p-value is less than the significance level of 0.05, the
null hypothesis, that the observations are not different, is rejected in favor of
the alternative hypothesis that the differences are statistically significantly different. We report the p-values for the Mann-Whitney tests, for all comparisons
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in all projects in Table 5.7.

5.4.7

Time to fix security-related bug reports

We start by comparing the time to fix security-related bug reports (in days)
to the time to fix the non-security-related bug reports. The box plots of the
times to fix for all bugs are provided in Figure 5.12, and the general statistics
are presented in Table 5.8. The time to fix security-related bug reports was
significantly lower than the time to fix non-security-related bug reports for all
projects. In other words, security-related bug reports get fixed faster than
non-security-related bug reports.
Precisely, in Fedora security-related bug reports took 2.82 less time to fix
compared to non-security-related bug reports (i.e., on average of 89.1 days
compared to 251.5 days respectively). For RHL, security-related bug reports
took 2.37 less time to fix (i.e., on average 153.2 days compared 363.6 days
respectively). And for Ubuntu, the security-related bug reports took 1.34 less
time to fix than non-security-related bug reports (i.e., on average 257.1 days
compared to 345.2 days).
The histograms of the times to fix for security-related bug reports and
non-security-related bug reports are shown in Figures 5.15 (a), (b), and (c),
respectively. Using the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality, the p-value reported
for all projects were less than the significance level of 0.05, indicating nonnormality. As shown, the distributions are skewed, which is also evident from
the much smaller medians compared to means.
We randomly selected 80% of security-related and non-security-related bug reports on each project to verify whether the differences in times to fix each are
statistically different. As shown in Table 5.7, the p-values for the MannWhitney test were all less than the significance level 0.05 in all projects.
The difference between the time to fix security-related bug reports and nonsecurity-related bug reports is statistically significantly different. Our find-
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Table 5.7: P-values for the Mann-Whitney test
Time to fix

Response Time

No. comments

No. developers

0.00E+00

7.22E-76

1.48E-132

1.64E-93

RHL

2.50E-03

2.50E-03

3.99E-32

3.01E-25

Ubuntu

2.22E-18

7.75E-115

0.00E+00

8.57E-241

Fedora

Table 5.8: Basic statistics of times to fix security-related and non-securityrelated bug reports (in days) for included projects
Project Name

Fedora

RHL

Ubuntu

Statistic

Security-related

Non-security-related

Mean

89.1

251.5

Median

23.8

201.5

156.9

255.3

IQR

80.5

412.9

Mean

153.2

363.6

46.7

193.1

Std. dev.

305.7

495.5

IQR

137.2

336.1

Mean

257.1

345.2

60.7

100.8

Std. dev.

454.1

577.8

IQR

235.4

382.6

Std. dev.

Median

Median

ings are consistent with results reported by other studies which reported that
security-related bug reports take less time to fix [18, 23, 27]. For example
security-related bug reports in Firefox were fixed 2.8 times faster than performance bugs [18], vulnerabilities in Firefox were resolved 33% faster than other
bugs [23], and security-related bug reports had significantly lower time to fix
in 6 open source projects from Launchpad [27].
Additionally, security-related bugs needed 20% time to fix compared to
other types of bugs Mozilla [15].
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Figure 5.12: The time to fix security-related and non-security-related bug
reports in days for all projects included in this study

5.4.8

Initial response time

Next, we explored whether security-related bug reports get the developers’ attention faster than non-security-related bug reports. We calculated the
Initial Response Time, which is the time period between the bug report is reported and the time of developers’ first comment. The box plots of times of initial response time for security-related bug reports and non-security-related bug
reports in each project are reported in Figure 5.13 and the general statistics
are given in Table 5.9. The mean initial response time for security-related bug
reports is significantly shorter than the initial response time for non-securityrelated bug reports in all projects. Precisely, in Fedora, it took developers
an average of 13.514 days to respond to security-related bug reports, which
is three times less than the time developers took to respond to non-security-
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Figure 5.13: Initial response time in days for security-related and non-securityrelated bug reports in all projects
related bug reports (e.g., average of 43.221 days). In RHL, the difference was
a lot shorter as it took RHL developers 57.56 days on average to respond to
security-related bug reports, whereas it took developers 82.031 days to respond
to a non-security-related bug reports. And in Ubuntu it took developers 15.84
days on average to respond to security-related bug reports, which almost three
times less than the average time spent to respond to non-security-related bug
reports (e., g., average of 42.11 days). Following the same techniques in Section
5.4.7, we report the histograms for the initial response time for security-related
bug reports in Fedora, RHL, and Ubuntu in Figures 5.14 (a), (b), and (c), respectively. The p-values of Shapiro-Wilk test for normality for all times of
responses for all projects were less than the significance level of 0.05, indicating the absence of normality. The distributions are skewed which is indicated
by the difference between the smaller median and higher mean.
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Figure 5.14: Histograms of Times to fix security-related bug reports in all
projects
Since our data had very skewed distribution, we randomly selected 80% of
security-related and non-security-related bug reports on each project to verify
whether the differences in the initial response times of security-related and
non-security-related bug reports are statistically different. As shown in Table
5.7, the p-values for the Mann-Whitney test were all less than the significance
level 0.05 in all projects. The difference between the initial response time
for security-related bug reports is statistically significantly different from the
initial response time for non-security-related bug reports. Similar findings have
been reported by related studies. For example security-related bug reports for
Google-Apps and Mozilla had lower first comment time (i.e., initial response
time) [15], and security-related bug reports were the ones with the smallest
initial response time in Apache, Eclipse, and Mozilla [17].
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Table 5.9: Basic statistics of developers first response time (in days) in included
projects
Project Name

Statistic

Security-related

non-security-related

13.5

43.2

9.26e-06

125.30

61.3

0.01

2.43e-04

5.9

57.6

82.0

4.9

1.8

194.0

254.4

IQR

27.7

39.5

Mean

15.84

42.1

Median

0.03

0.01

Std. dev

90.7

208.5

3.3

2.7

Mean
Fedora

Median
Std. dev
IQR
Mean
Median

RHL

Std. dev

Ubuntu

IQR

5.4.9

Number of developers’ comments to fix securityrelated bug reports

Next, we focus on the number of comments developers made during bugs’
fixing. We check whether security-related bug reports had more comments
compared to the non-security-related bug reports. More comments could indicate that more efforts and resources were needed to fix a given bug. For each
bug we calculated the total number of comments made by the developers from
the day the bug report was reported until the day it was closed. The box plots
for the numbers of comments made for all bugs in all projects are shown in
Figure5.16 and the general statistics are provided in Table 5.10. In general, the
security-related bug reports had more comments than non-security-related bug
reports in all projects. For Fedora, security-related bug reports had a slightly
higher number of comments than non-security-related bug reports (i.e., average of 7.4 compared to 7.1 comments respectively). For RHL, security-related
bug reports had on average 4.4 comments compared to 6.9 comments for non-
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Figure 5.15: Histograms of security-related bugs reports’ initial response time
in all projects
security-related bug report. And for Ubuntu, security-related bug reports had
on average of 12.6 comments, whereas non-security-related bug reports had
only 7.2 comments on average. The histograms of the numbers of comments’
distributions are shown in Figures 5.17 (a), (b), and (c), respectively. The
p-values reported from Shapiro-Wilk test for normality for the numbers of
comments in each project were less than the significance level of 0.05, indicating the absence of normality. The distribution of the data was skewed, we
selected 80% of the security-related and non-security-related bug reports in
each project to test whether the differences in the the numbers of developers’
comments is statistically significantly different. The reported Mann-Whitney
p-values (i.e., Table 5.7) in all projects were also less than the significance level
of 0.05, indicating that the differences in the numbers of comments between
security-related and non-security-related bug reports are statistically significantly different. Some of our findings were similar to findings reported by
some of the related work. security-related bug reports in Google-Apps and
Mozilla had more comments than non-security-related bug reports [15], and
security-related-bugs had between2-3 time more comments in six projects in
Launchpad [27].
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Figure 5.16: Number of comments made to security-related bug reports compared to non-security-related bug reports in all included projects

5.4.10

Number of developers involved in fixing securityrelated bug reports

Lastly, we focus on the number of distinct developers involved in fixing
security-related bug reports and compare it with the numbers of developers
involved in fixing non-security-related bug reports. For each bug, we counted
the number of distinct developers who contributed to fixing that bug from the
date it was reported until the day it was closed. The box-plots of the numbers
of developers involved in fixing security-related and non-security-related bug
reports are shown in Figure 5.18 and the general statistics are provided in
Table 5.11.
For Fedora and RHL, there were fewer developers involved in fixing
security-related bug reports than non-security-related bug reports. However
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Table 5.10: Basic statistics of bugs’ numbers of comments in included projects
Project Name

Fedora

RHL

Ubuntu

Statistic

Security-related

Non-security-related

Mean

7.4

7.1

Median

7.0

5.1

Std. dev.

4.3

9.6

IQR

6.0

5.0

Mean

4.4

6.9

Median

4.0

5.0

Std. dev.

3.4

7.3

IQR

2.0

5.0

Mean

12.6

7.2

7.0

4.0

Std. dev.

21.8

12.9

IQR

10.0

5.0

Median

Table 5.11: Basic statistics for the number of distinct developers involved in
bug fixing for security-related and non-security-related bug reports in included
projects
Project Name

Fedora

RHL

Ubuntu

Statistic

Security-related

Non-security-related

Mean

2.4

3.1

Median

2.0

2.0

Std. dev.

0.9

3.3

IQR

1.0

1.0

Mean

3.0

3.7

Median

3.0

3.0

Std. dev.

1.4

2

IQR

2.0

3.0

Mean

5.2

3.9

Median

4.0

3.0

Std. dev.

7.1

5.0

IQR

2.0

3.0
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Figure 5.17: Histograms of security-related bug reports’ numbers of comments
in all projects
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Figure 5.18: Numbers of distinct developers involved to fix bug reports in the
included projects
for Ubuntu, the security-related bug reports involved more developers than
non-security-related bug reports. On average, security-related bug reports in
Fedora involved 2.4 developers compared to 3.1 developers for non-securityrelated bug reports, and in RHL security-related bug reports involved an av-
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Figure 5.19: Histograms of bugs’ distinct numbers of developers in all projects
erage of 3 developers compared to 3.7 developers for non-security-related bug
reports. And in Ubuntu, an average of 5.2 developers were involved in fixing
security-related bug reports and non-security-related bug reports involved 3.9
developers on average to fix non-security-related issues. The histograms of
the developers’ distribution are shown in Figures 5.19 (a), (b), and (c), respectively. In all projects, the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality return p-values
less than the significance level indicating the absence of normality. Since the
distribution of the data was skewed, we selected 80% of security-related and
non-security-related bug reports for each project to test whether the difference in the the numbers of developers is statistically significantly different.
And the p-values from the Mann-Whitney test (i.e., provided in Table 5.7)
were all less than the significance level of 0.05, indicating that the differences
in the numbers of distinct developers involved in fixing security-related bug
reports are statistically significantly different from the numbers of developers
involved in fixing non-security-related bug reports. Our findings are somewhat consistent to a certain degree with other related studies. For instance
the number of developers involved in fixing security-related-bugs was higher
(i.e. 1 - 4 times) than the number of developers involved in fixing performance
bugs for Firefox [18] and other Launchpad projects [27].
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5.5

Threats to validity

Construct validity Construct validity relates to whether we are testing
what we are supposed to test. This study is based on bug reports collected
from three open source project. Some bug reports had more than one CVE
reported with them, all unverified CVEs were excluded, even if they belonged
to a bug with a different verified CVE. This study does not consider releases
in the studied projects, instead it examines all bugs reported for each project
regardless of their release. More details and definitions of the provided fields
and their uses for Fedora and RHL are provided online at the Red Hat Bugzilla
- bug fields web page [215]. Details about Ubuntu’s fields are available at the
Ubuntu Launchpad bugs help web-page [217].
Internal validity
Internal validity is concerned with the hidden or unknown effects. Our
data was acquired from two different bug tracking systems, we extracted similar fields for all projects and mapped those which were not the same. Doing
so allowed us to have unified features across the three projects for comparisons. The security-profiles created for each project were drawn by mapping
the security-related bug reports to their corresponding CWE from the CWE888 view only. We integrated the security-related CWEs which belonged to
other CWE views in the CWEs in the CWE-888 view. By integrating the
CWEs into one unified CWE view, we were able to draw proper comparisons
across the three projects.
Conclusion validity The distributions of the datasets used in this study
were not normally distributed, and the distribution of security-related bug
reports were very skewed. To verify normality we used Shapiro-Wilk test and
reported the histograms of the data. We carried out Mann-Whitney test by
randomly selecting 80% of the instances to test whether the differences between
the security-related and non-security-related bugs were significant.
External validity External validity concerns whether our results can be
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generalized for other projects or fields. We do not assume that these results
are global, but we show that some similarities are present. The results are
consistent with other works which used dataset of different nature [1].
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5.6

Conclusion

This work represented a conceptual replication of different studies which
addressed the same research questions. This work provides analysis of the
characteristics of security-related bug reports in three open source operating
systems, Fedora, RHL, and Ubuntu. The empirical analysis presented in this
work are based on 414,369 bug reports collected from Bugzilla and Launchpad bug tracking systems. Using the extracted bug reports, we showed the
security-related bug reports’ characteristic and compared them with the nonsecurity-related bug reports, regarding the locations, the severity and priority
levels, time to fix, developers’ initial response time, and number of comments
and developers involved in bugs’ fixing. We also provided comparison of the
security-related dominant classes across the three projects.
The main findings of this work indicate that most security-related bug reports appear in a small portion of the source code and have medium severity
and priority levels. Furthermore, the dominant primary CWE classes of the
security-related bug reports in all project were the same, with different variations. We believe these findings are helpful in better understanding the trends
of the software vulnerabilities. We summarize the findings of this study and
compare them to relevant related works in Table 5.12.
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Table 5.12: Main findings
Research

Topic

Findings

Related studies

Locations

The security-related bug

of

reports are concentrated in

security-

a small percentage of the

which reported that 86% - 88% of all

related

source code packages. All

security-related bug reports were located in two

bug

security-related bugs

of the four considered subsystems.

reports

appeared in only 34%, 9%,

Section

Question
RQ1

and 7% of Fedora, RHL,
and Ubuntu packages,
respectively.
RQ2-3

5.4.1
• Findings are consistent with the work in [1]

• Also consistent with results for [12, 14, 16] which
reported that software faults occurred in a
smaller percentage of source code units.

Dominant In all Fedora, RHL, and

5.4.2 and

classes of

Ubuntu, the Memory

security-

Access (890) was the most

reported varying trends in regards of the

related

dominant primary class, as

dominant primary classes in the studied projects.

bug

it included 30.91%, 28.57%,

The top five primary classes contained 90%, 87%,

reports

and 20.42% of

and 79% in all NASA datasets.

• Findings are somewhat consistent with [1]

security-related bug reports
respectively. Additionally,
the top five primary classes
included 76%, 92% and,
82% of security-related bug

• Findings are in line with [20] which reported that
CWE-119 was among the topmost frequent
vulnerabilities in OpenSSL and Linux Kernel.
• Results are somewhat consistent with [24] which

reports Fedora, RHL, and

reported that CWE-119 and CWE-20 were

Ubuntu respectively.

among the top five most dominant CWEs,
however, the most dominant CWE was
CWE-264.
• The studies which reported that CWE-119 was
the most dominant or among the top five
dominant CWEs in the reported security-related
bug reports [22, 26] which reported that
CWE-119 was the most dominant CWE in all
studied operating systems.

5.4.3
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Research

Topic

Findings

Related studies

Severity

In Fedora and RHL, between 87-99% of security-related

of

bug reports were assigned a severity levels. In Fedora,

security-

52% of which had medium severity (i.e., 2), and 48% of

study [1] which

related

RHL’s had also medium severity level.

reported that

bug

In Ubuntu, 65% of the bug report s had a severity

medium level (i.e., 2)

reports

(heat) between 0-99.

severity was

Section

Question
RQ4

5.4.4
• Consistent with the

dominant in two of
three considered
data-sets.
• Consistent with the
work [21, 25] reported
that 52 - 54.6 % of
vulnerabilities had
medium severity level
RQ5

Priority

The majority of all security-related bug reports in

of

Fedora and RHL had medium priority: 52% in Fedora,

security-

82% for RHL. In Ubuntu, only 27% were medium, and

related

17% had high priority

bug
reports

not explored

5.4.5
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Research

Topic

Findings

Related studies

Time to

In all projects,

fix

security-related bug reports

security-

were fixed faster: 2.82

who reported reported that security-related bug

related

times faster in Fedora, 2.37

reports were fixed 2.8 times faster than

bug

times faster in RHL, and

performance bugs in Firefox.

reports

1.34 times faster in Ubuntu

Section

Question

RQ6

5.4.7
• Similar to results reported by the authors of [18]

• Inline with Morrison et al., [23] which reported
that security-related bug reports were resolved
33% faster than other bugs in Firefox.
• Somewhat consistent with the results reported in
the study [15] which reported Mozilla
security-related bug reports needed less time to
fix. However, security-related and
non-security-related bug reports in Google
Code-based apps needed the same median time
to fix.
• Consistent with [27], in which security-related
were fixed significantly faster than
non-security-related bugs.
Initial

security-related bug reports

response

had significantly shorter

time to

first response time. On

reported that the first-comment response to fix

security-

average, the first response

security-related bug reports was lower than it

related

to fix security-related in

was for non-security-related bug reports.

bug

Fedora needed almost 3.1

reports

times less time, RHL
needed 1.4 times less, and
Ubuntu needed 2.66 time

5.4.8
• Results reported by Bhattacharya et al., [15]

• [17] reported that security-related bugs had the
smallest first response time compared to other
bugs.

less time.
Number

security-related bug reports

5.4.9

of devel-

needed more comments to

opers’

fix. In Fedora they required

reported [15] reported that the security-related

com-

2.8 time less developers, In

bug reports had more comments to fix than

ments to

RHL required 2.3 less

non-security-related bug reports.

fix

times, and in Ubuntu they

security-

required 1.3 less times the

related

number of comments to fix.

• Findings are consistent with the results

• Consistent with [27] which reported that
security-related bug reports had more developers
involved compared to non-security-related bug

bug

reports

reports
Number

Fixing security-related bug

of

reports required slightly

5.4.10

distinct

lower number of developers.

security-related bug reports involved 1-4 times

develop-

Fedora and RHL needed

more developers than other bugs.

ers to fix

1.2 less times the number

security-

of developers on average.

related

On the other hand, Ubuntu

bug

required 1.3 more times the

reports

number of developers to fix.

• Reported by the authors of [18] reported that

• Somewhat comparable with Canfora et al., [27]
which reported that security-related bug reports
involved more developers, had higher numbers of
comments, and took longer time to fix.
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Chapter 6
Classification of Security-related
bug reports
6.1

Introduction and background

Bug tracking systems are used to organize and track the process of software
bug reporting and fixing. These systems hold massive amounts of information
useful in designing and developing computer models to help developers design high-quality and secure software. For example, bug information collected
from bug tracking systems have been used used for the classification of faultprone software units and issues(e.g., [11, 84–86, 131, 135, 218]), classification
of bug reports to a specific type (i.e., fix, performance, adding new features)
(e.g., [122, 219]), detection and classification of duplicated or mislabeled bug
reports (e.g., [220, 221]), bug triaging (i.e., [77]), predicting the priority and
severity of bug reports (e.g., [31, 121, 222–224]), and classification and detection of software vulnerabilities (i.e., [225]). However, a limited number of
works focused solely on the classification of bug reports to security-related or
not security-related [124, 127, 132, 133, 137, 226, 227]
The classification of security-related bug reports improves the ways developers build and fix software, with the emphasis on addressing security concerns. The models which classify bug reports into different categories (e.g.,
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security-related, enhancement, or performance) contribute to the creation of
safe and secure computer systems. However, as cyber threats evolve, so too
must the security-related bug report classification models. New ways of hacking and authorized access emerge almost on daily basis, and new methods and
techniques are needed to create and maintain secure systems.
In this chapter, we focus on classifying the bug reports collected and analyzed in Chapter 5 to security-related or not security-related bug reports.
For this purpose we used two types types of metrics (i.e., modalities) to build
security-related bug report classification model and propose a multimodal machine learning approach using deep neural networks.
Given a bug report, software developers use their expertise to tell whether
it is security-related or not. Software developers evaluate different criteria
to reach that conclusion, including the description of the bug, the comments
made by other developers, the source code changes which may have triggered
the issue, and the history of similar instances. Furthermore, the descriptions
of the software vulnerabilities are well documented and maintained and can
be used to evaluate whether a given bug report’s description and behavior are
similar to any of the software vulnerabilities documented and maintained by
the NVD [201]. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) are used
to describe certain software vulnerabilities within a specific product or system
(e.g., Fedora or Ubuntu) [228]. Additionally, the root cause of each software
vulnerability is assigned a Common Weakness Enumeration number (CWE),
which serves as a common unified language to describe the software weaknesses in architecture, design, or code [202]. Given this context we mimic this
logic by proposing a hybrid multimodal machine learning approach to classify
security-related bug reports and compare the performance of our proposed
method with the performance of classical supervised machine learning models.
Our multimodal approach uses two different modalities: the textual modality,
which reflects feature representations of the comments and the textual details
of bug reports as presented in Section 6.4.1, and the bug tracking system (BTS)
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modality extracted and analyzed in Chapter 5 (i.e., but reports priority, time
to fix, initial response time, number of comments made, number of developers
involved in bug report fix). We consider the two modalities only because they
are publicly available and obtainable. Additionally, we had no access to other
modalities such as the source code or the source code repositories.
For our proposed approach, we use Deep Learning Neural Networks with
the extracted modalities by implementing two fusion strategies: (1) featurelevel fusion for the textual modalities collected from bug reports, and (2)
decision-level fusion done by considering the weighted average score of all
modalities’ neural networks. We chose the implementation of Deep Neural
Networks because they are widely used and because of their availability to
handle large amounts of data, and their flexibility in creating multimodal machine learning models [229]. We compared our approach to: (a) classification
baseline models using each of the modalities separately with three supervised
machine learning algorithms and one deep neural network, and (b) classification model which used both modalities (i.e., feature-level fusion) with deep
neural network. We classified security-related bug reports in the datasets collected from the three open source operating systems used in Chapter 5.
In this Chapter we explore the following research questions:
• RQ1: Can text and bug tracking system modalities individually be used
to successfully classify software bug reports to security-related and not
security-related?
In this question as explore the feasibility of using each of the collected
modalities alone to classify security-related and not-security related bug
reports in the three projects studied in Chapter 5. We use each of the
modalities with three machine learning algorithms and one deep neural
network and assess their classification performance.
• RQ2: Can multimodal feature-level fusion and the proposed multimodal
approach, with textual and bug tracking system modalities, be used
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to successfully classify security-related and not-security related bug reports? This question focuses on exploring the feasibility of using the two
modalities in classifying security-related and not-security related bug reports. We used two different multimodal approaches: feature-level fusion
in which all modalities are combined in one feature space, and the proposed hybrid multimodal approach which uses two multimodal fusion
strategies, feature-level fusion, and decision-level fusion.
• RQ3: Does the proposed multimodal approach outperform other classification models which used individual modalities and the feature-level
fusion method?
The contributions of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
• We proposed a hybrid multimodal machine learning approach to classify bug reports to security-related and non-security-related bug reports, by combining feature-level and decision-level fusion with the collected modalities. The feature-level fusion is implemented on the textual modality collected from the bug reports textual descriptions and
developers comments. And the decision-level fusion is done by considering the weighted average scores of the different modalities’ weights to
achieve security-related bug reports classification. The proposed hybrid
multimodal approach has not been explored by any of the related work.
• We compare the proposed approach with: (a) classification models which
used each of the modalities individually, and (b) classification models which used feature-level fusion of all modalities together to classify
security-related bug reports.
The main findings of this Chapter can be summarized as follows:
• Using the proposed hybrid multimodal machine learning approach with
the text and bug tracking system modalities outperformed all other ap-
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proaches significantly in RHL and Ubuntu, but slightly less significantly
for Fedora.
• Using text modality alone produced stable performances for Fedora only
in regarding to all performance metrics as all results were between 0.712
and 0.816. Additionally, using the text modality alone for RHL had very
high 1-FPR and a satisfactory Precision of 0.895 for RF. However, the
same does not remain true for the other metrics for RHL nor any of
Ubuntu; they under-perform.
• Using the bug tracking system modality alone, produced some satisfactory Recall of 0.862 when used with NB for Fedora only. Additionally,
using the bug tracking system modality achieved higher 1-FPR for RHL
and Ubuntu except for NB with Ubuntu, which achieved a low 1-FPR.
Using the bug tracking system modality alone is not satisfactory for RHL
or Ubuntu, however, it achieved higher Recall (i.e.,greater than 0.961).
• Using feature-level fusion performs very well for Fedora Fedora (i.e., FScore and G-Score greater than 0.967), but it does not perform well for
RHL nor Ubuntu. However, they all still achieve a satisfactory 1-FPR
no less than 0.994.
• Using the multimodal approach provided some improvements in terms of
Recall, Precision, F-Score, and G-Score. Addition ally, using the featurelevel fusion only had significant improvement for RHL and Ubuntu.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: in Section 6.2 we present an
introduction on Artificial Neural Network. Section 6.3 presents an introduction
on multimodal machine learning. Section 6.4 presents the modalities used to
classify bug reports (i.e., bug tracking system features in Section 6.4.2, and
text features in Section 6.4.1). Section 6.5 presents the proposed approach and
contribution of this chapter. Section 6.6 presents the results and the answers

Chapter 6. Classification of Security-related bug reports

137

to the research questions of this chapter. Threats to validity are provide in
Section 6.7. And the conclusion and future work are presented in Section 6.8.
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Background on Artificial and Deep Neural
Networks

Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) are computer programs biologically inspired by the human brain’s way of processing information; they are also known
as multi-layer Universal Function Approximators [230]. These programs can
detect and analyzing patterns in large amounts of data to “learn“ something
about the data [231]. These systems can be used for different computational
tasks such as classification and regression. Just like a humans’ neuron system, ANN are composed of large number of interconnected neurons working
together in unison to solve a specific problem [232]. Due to the overwhelming increase of data around us, we need machine learning algorithms capable
of modeling complex and nonlinear relationships [233]. The power of ANN
comes from their design which allows connecting many neurons and layers in
the network to formulate a decision based on the provided data. The ANN
requires no knowledge whatsoever about the provided data; however, since
each neuron in the works has a given weight, lots of data is required to train
and test these networks. At their core design, ANN have three building blocks
also known as layers: input layers, processing (i.e., hidden) layers, and output layers as shown in Figure 6.1. Each has a specific task. The input layer
is the first layer in the network which accepts the data input. The output
layer is the last layer which generates the final decision of the network. Input
and output layers are connected through hidden layers, whose outputs remain
hidden within the network. Upon initializing the network, each input neuron
is assigned a random weight and bias reflecting its contribution to the final
decision and as these weights move through the network, they are re-evaluated
and readjusted.
When using ANN, the assumption is that we want to learn a classification
task G with x inputs and y outputs, where,
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Feed‐forward

Back‐propagation
Input layer

Hidden layer

Output layer

Figure 6.1: Overview of ANN

y = G(x),
x = [x1 , x2 , x3 , ..., xn ]

and

(6.1)
y = [y1 , y2 , y3 , ..., yn ]

(6.2)

Examples of ANN include Modular Neural Networks (MNN) [234, 235],
Feed-forward Neural Network (FNN) [?], Radial basis function Neural Network
(RBF) [236], Kohonen Self Organizing Neural Network [237], Recurrent Neural
Network (RNN) [238], Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) [239], and Long
Short-Term Memory (LSTM) [240].
With the expansion on the applications of ANN, Deep Neural Network
arose to solve more complex problems and handle more data. Deep Neural
Networks (DNN) are ANN with more hidden and complex layers. An ANN
is considered a Deep Neural Network (DNN) if it has more than a hidden
layer [241]. In this work use utilize the use of Deep Neural Networks to classify security-related and non-security related bug reports by combining two
different neural networks working independently for each type of the modalities. We used two Deep Forward Neural Networks, one with the bug tracking
system modality and one with the textual modality.
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Deep Forward Neural Networks are commonly used networks in many computer applications. Their main design connects neurons in a non-circular way.
They are called feed forward because input are fed in a bidirectional manner
throughout the network, starting from inputs layers, through the hidden layers,
and finally to the final output layers. There are three general steps each deep
neural networks goes through, parameter initialization, feed-forward propagation, and back-propagation. In the parameter initialization stage inputs are
assigned random weights and biases, and once inputs are fed to the network,
they are identified as feed-forward and an association between the weights and
biases is established. Upon the initialization of the network, initial and invalid
associations are expected since weights and biases are initialized randomly. In
the feed-forward propagation stage, the input layers are propagated into the
hidden layers, also known as hidden blocks, which work as intermediate layers
between the input and out layers with the task of learning something about
the data. In the back propagation stage, the weights get reevaluated to reduce
the error in the conclusion by using global loss minimum functions. These get
carried out several times until a conclusion with minimum error is achieved.
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Multimodal Machine Learning

We are surrounded by different types of information and heterogeneous
representations of those information types. For example, we taste aromas, see
objects, smell odor, read texts, listen to noises, and feel temperatures. As
humans experience those different types of information, they learn to subconsciously integrate them to make certain decisions. Each representation of a
given entity (e.g., text, voice, temperature, and taste) is referred to as a modality [242]. Data is also multimodal since they come from different sources and
have different representations. Arguably, everything is multimodal. Multimodal learning involves relating information from multiple sources to achieve
a given goal [243] and is concerned with the original goals of artificial intelligence, which aim to combine and integrate different data modalities. Multimodal machine learning has been used in several research areas, including,
but not limited to- malware detection [244, 245], malware classification [246],
video classification [247], emotion recognition [248], speech, language, and vision integration [249], and classification of diseases [250].
Among the most recently published work in the multimodal learning field
is the survey and taxonomy introduced by Baltrusaiti et al. [242] in which
five technical challenges of multimodal learning were introduced: (1) representation which relates to summarizing the heterogeneous multimodal data, (2)
translation which relates to how to map data from one modality to another
and the relationships among modalities, (3) alignment which relates to finding
complex relationships among the modalities, (4) fusion which relates to combining features or decisions of modalities, and (5) co-learning which relates
to transferring knowledge among modalities. In this Chapter, We use multimodal data fusion strategies because they are applicable with the extracted
modalities, and they are also applicable when using Deep Neural Networks.
Multimodal data fusion in machine learning can be categorized into three categories: signal level data fusion, feature-level data fusion, and decision-level
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data fusion [251]. Signal level data fusion relates to the fusing of raw data of
low level sources, such as sensory data or pixels of images. feature-level data
fusion relates to fusing (i.e., concatenating) extracted features in one vector
space. And decision-level data fusion relates to a fusing higher level decisions
from different learning processes. In this Chapter, we use feature-level fusion
and decision-level fusion with the extracted modalities to classify bug reports
to security-related or not-security related. To the best of our knowledge, the
use of multimodal learning in the classification of security-related bug report is
very limited. Only two works used different modalities to classify bug report to
security-related and not-security related (i.e., [127, 137]). The authors in [127]
used data fusion strategy using text modalities (i.e., word2vec) from commits
and bug reports descriptions, and commits’ modalities reflecting number of
comments and attachments.
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Modalities for security-related bug reports classification

In this section we address the two modalities used in this chapter: the
textual modality and the bug tracking system modality. For each bug report in
each project two modalities were extracted and then used for different models.

6.4.1

Bug report text modality

The text features are extracted from: (1) the textual representation of
the bug reports’ summaries and, (2) related textual descriptions from each
bug report, and (3) developers’ commits and comments made during the bug
report fixing. We followed the shown in Figure 6.2 to extract the textual
modality. The textual modality extracted in this work were used in previous
similar work to classify security-related bug report in three datasets obtained
from NASA issues tracking system [126]. In that work, three text features were
extracted, Bag Of Word (BOW), Term Frequency (TF), and Term FrequencyInverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF). In this work we strict our textual
modality to TF-IDF because it has been widely used and in the classification
of security-related bug reports [132, 226].
A feature vector (i.e., text modality) of a bug report is the numerical
representation of that bug report, which consists of several numerical values.
Each numerical value in the feature vector reflects whether a term exists in
the vocabulary. The vocabulary in this case was obtained from the textual
descriptions of all CVEs and CWEs, and was when extracting the textual
features from the three projects.
The binary BOW is the simplest textual feature extracted for our data,
which consists of either 0 if the term does not exist in the vocabulary, or 1
if the term appeared in the vocabulary. The TF captures the frequency (i.e.,
number of appearance) of terms rather than just capturing their presence (i.e.,
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0 or 1) as in case of BOW.
The TF-IDF extends the TF representation by weighing the importance of
terms in the bug report textual description inversely to how often they appear
in other bug reports texts [9]. The TF-IDF vector consists of numerical values
between 0 and 1. We expanded the extraction method of features by including
three variation of N-gram ranges (i.e., 1, 2, and 3 N-gram). N-grams refers to
the combination of N-sequence number of words in each text. For example,
in the 1-gram variation, the numerical value in the feature vector reflects the
representation of a single term in the bug report’s text. Whereas the numerical
values in the feature vector when using 2-grams reflect the representation of
two consecutive words of the bug report’s text, so forth [252]. For each bug
report, three feature vectors were extracted (i.e., TFIDF 1-gram, 2-gram, and
3-gram), and combined as one feature vector.
To obtain the textual information of bug reports, we combined the textual
descriptions, summaries, and the developers’ comments made during the bug
report fixing. As stated in the previous Chapter 5, the security-related bug
reports had CVEs numbers reported in the bug summary, or description. We
removed the CVE indications from all bug reports’ text to avoid bias, and to
avoid having one single hot word which can be used solely to classify the bug
report to security-related.
Before extracting the text features, several steps of data cleaning and preprocessing were necessary to obtain high quality representations of bug reports.
In general, data preprocessing for text features extraction include tokenization, filtering, lemmatization, and stemming [253, 254]. Tokenization refers
to breaking down the sentences to words or phrases, each is referred to as a
token. Filtering concerns removing non necessary parts of the sentence such
as numbers, and special characters. Lemmatization refers to dealing with
words based on their root lexical category, and it is a sub-part of stemming.
In other words, lemmatization groups words with similar meanings together.
And finally, Stemming refers to extracting the base (i.e., root) of the words.

Text extraction
and combination
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Figure 6.2: Methodology used to extract text features

6.4.2

Bug tracking systems modality

The bug tracking system’s modality relates to some of the characteristics
of bug reports explored in Chapter 5.1 (i.e., bug report priority, number of
comments, number of developers, age in weeks, time to fix, and initial response
time in weeks). Note that we exclude bug report severity from this work as it
was not provided for the non-security-related bug reports in Fedora. Each of
those characteristics is represented as a numerical value greater than or equal
to zero, and all of them are used as a feature vector for each bug report. As
shown in Chapter 5, these features were significantly different for securityrelated bug reports and not-security related bug reports. As a result, they
could be used as indicators of security-related bug reports. Additionally, these
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measurements were obtainable from the public bug tracking system and were
used by other works in the same area of research [127, 137].

6.5

Proposed Approach

Multimodal machine learning using deep neural networks has not been
explored for the classification of security-related bug reports. While most
related works either used one modality (e.g., [124, 126, 133, 226]), two works
used two modalities from different sources [127, 137].
The authors in [127] used bug reports text and commits (i.e., number of
commits and attachments) modalities collected from JIRA, and Bugzilla and
commits from GitHub to identify security issues, by using two fusion strategies,
feature, and decision level fusions. All modalities were combined using featurelevel fusion strategy and fed to K-fold stacking model of six classifiers, which
uses logistic regression to find the best ensemble of the six basic classifiers,
which is considered as decision-level fusion. Note that this work follows the
traditional methods of ensemble learning, which is not considered in this work.
Additionally, the authors in [137] used text and bug tracking system modalities
with feature-level fusion only, where modalities were combined in a unified
feature vector before being fed to a SVM classifier.
The focus on the multimodal aspect and how the features were fused was
absent in all related works, and features from different modalities were simply
combined into the same feature vector before being fed to classifiers or neural
networks. In this work we proposed a hybrid multimodal machine learning
approach to classify bug reports to security-related or not-security related
bug reports. The proposed multimodal approach is provided in Figure 6.3.
The proposed approach implements two multimodal fusion strategies, featurelevel fusion done with the textual modality and decision-level fusion from the
textual and bug tracking system modalities [248]. Our approach consists of
the initial, middle, and fusion networks. In the initial network all modalities
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are fed to the network for data processing and feature-level fusion. For the
textual modality, the initial passes each of the three different TF-IDF n-gram
variation to one hidden layer and merges them into a joint representation layer
to achieve feature-level fusion. For the bug tracking system modality, the
initial network passes their input before populating each to two hidden layers
and then into the joint space representation. The middle network accepts the
joint representation generated from the first network, forwards each to two
hidden densely connected layers, and delivers it to the last fusion network.
Each of the passed representations has a weight to reflect its contribution to
the final decision. The fusion network accepts the different weights of the text
modality and the bug tracking system modality from the previous network and
outputs a weighted average score for decision-level fusion [248]. The weighted
average score for the decision-level fusion for text modality t, and bug tracking
system modality b is given by,

Score = wt ∗ Score(t) + wb ∗ Score(b)

(6.3)

where, wt , wb <= 1, and wt + wb =1. The wights and Scores are determined
based on the previous hidden layers from the middle network.
We used ReLU activation function with dropout regularization of 0.2 and
left these settings with no parameter tuning. For the final network, the final
decision is done using the Sigmoid activation function with the default Adam
optimizer algorithm, with 100 epochs and batch size of 32 and learning rate
of 0.001. The Sigmoid activation is desired when dealing with a binary classification. To create the multimodal approach using deep neural networks,
each modality was fed to an input layer before being processed by the next
set of layers. We implemented our network using Keras, the Python deep
neural network library [255]. The originality of this work lies in combining
feature-level fusion and decision-level fusion methods over deep learning based
multimodal security-related bug classification approach. To the best of our
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knowledge multimodal learning and hybrid fusion is very limited. The only
related works which used different modalities extracted from the bug reports,
bug tracking system, and commits to classify bug reports to security-related
or not security-related were [127, 137]. The authors in [127] used bug reports
text and commits (i.e., number of commits and attachments) modalities collected from JIRA, and Bugzilla and commits from GitHub to identify security
issues, by using two fusion strategies, feature, and decision level fusions. All
modalities were combined using feature-level fusion strategy and fed to K-fold
stacking model of six classifiers, which uses logistic regression to find the best
ensemble of the six basic classifiers, which is considered as decision-level fusion. Note that this work follows the traditional methods of ensemble learning,
which is not considered in this work. Additionally, the authors in [137] used
text and bug tracking system modalities with feature-level fusion only, where
modalities were combined in a unified feature vector before being fed to a SVM
classifier.
Lastly, we use the Deep Neural Network (DNN) for a feature level fusion
only of the two modalities. This network passes all modalities thorough the
initial network as shown in Figure 6.3, then combines them through a merging
layer and two hidden layers [244].
The performance of the proposed approach is compared with models which
used supervised machine learning using three machine learning algorithms with
each of the modalities. Additionally, we compared our results with the model
which used feature-level fusion via a neural network. Specifically, each of
the supervised machine learning algorithms, RandomForest (RF), Naive Bias
(NB), and J48, we built classification models using each of the modalities
individually. For each of the projects, we used the entire dataset to train
and test each of the models. For the experimental evaluation when using
the supervised machine learning algorithms, we used 10-folds cross validation
data split (i.e., 9 folds for training and 1 fold for testing) and repeated the
process ten times using different fold for testing each time. We followed the
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Figure 6.3: The proposed multimodal approach
same splitting technique when using the deep neural network as well. All bug
reports classifications were done within-project, meaning that all models were
trained and tested on the data from the same project.
Lastly, all models were assessed using the performance metrics described
in section 3.5.3 of Chapter 3: 1-FPR, Recall, Precision, F-Score, and G-Score.
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Results
RQ1: Can text and bug tracking system modalities individually be used to successfully classify
software bug reports to security-related and not
security-related?

In this section we present the classification performance results when using
each of the modalities (i.e., text or bug tracking system) individually with one
of the three widely used machine learning algorithms Random Forest (RF),
Naive Base (NB), and Decision Trees (J48), and the deep neural network
(DNN) created for each modality. RandomForest (RF) is an ensemble learner
which operates by combining the outputs of multiple decision trees to reach a
single conclusion [256], Naive Base (NB) is algorithm built after the Bayesian
theorem [257], and J48 is the java implementation of the C4.5 decision tree
learner [258].
For the text modality, we used the TF-IDF with the n-grams (i.e., n-gram
1-3) as feature vector for each bug report. The box plots of all performance
metrics when using text modality are shown in Figures 6.4, and the mean
values of performance metrics over the 10-fold cross validation of the results
are provided in Table 6.1.
Our results show that using the text modality only had stable performance
for Fedora but varying performances for RHL and Ubuntu. For Fedora, interestingly all performance metrics were between 0.71-0.81 when using the text
modality alone with the three learners and the DNN. Using the DNN had the
best performance in terms of 1-FPR (i.e., 0.806), Recall (i.e., 0.789), F-Score
(i.e., 0.763), and G-Score (i.e., 0.797).
For RHL, NB had the highest G-Score (0.630), and RF had the highest
Precision (i.e., 0.895) and F-Score (i.e., 0.472). For Ubuntu, using the DNN
had the highest F-Score (i.e., 0.750) and G-Score (i.e., 0.789) but a relatively
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Figure 6.4: Classification performance metrics for using text modality only
lower 1-FPR (i.e., 0.830), RF had the highest Recall (i.e., 0.704), and NB had
the highest Precision (i.e., 0.804).
The results show that there when using the text modality alone, there was
no specific superior learner across all projects. For example, for Fedora, the
DNN outperformed all learners in regards of all performance metrics, except
for Precision. For RHL, RF had the highest Precision, and F-Score, while J48
had the highest Recall and G-Score, and NB had the best 1-FPR. Lastly for
Ubuntu, RF had the highest Recall, F-Score, and G-Score, while NB had the
highest Precision, and the DNN had the highest 1-FPR.
The textual modality for Fedora achieve similar results across all learners,
which is not the case for RHL, but somewhat the case with Ubuntu when
using RF and J48. This might be expected since the instances of securityrelated bug reports are significantly higher in Fedora (i.e., 25.5%) than they

Chapter 6. Classification of Security-related bug reports

152

Table 6.1: Mean learners performance for using text modality only. Highest
values are highlighted.

Ubuntu

RHL

Fedora

Project

Learner
J48
NB
RF
DNN
J48
NB
RF
DNN
J48
NB
RF
DNN

1‐FPR
0.764
0.768
0.769
0.806
0.990
0.997
0.984
0.840
0.796
0.800
0.798
0.830

Performacne Metric
Recall
Precision F‐Score
0.754
0.756
0.755
0.712
0.765
0.737
0.755
0.767
0.761
0.789
0.741
0.763
0.465
0.148
0.323
0.370
0.680
0.156
0.704
0.543

0.460
0.503
0.895
0.461
0.670
0.804
0.803
0.684

G‐Score
0.759
0.739
0.762
0.797

0.461
0.218
0.472
0.409
0.675
0.257
0.750
0.604

0.630
0.252
0.486
0.522
0.773
0.262
0.789
0.689

are in RHL (i.e., 1.1%) and Ubuntu (i.e., 2.0%). Furthermore, the number of
security-related bug reports instances in Ubuntu (i.e., 6,960) is significantly
higher than they are in RHL (i.e., 504), giving the learners more instances
for training. 1 . (The issues of imbalance data treatment has been explored in
the previous Chapters 3 and 4). The effect of the imbalance datasets on the
performance of different classification models is evident. This could explain
the very stable performance for Fedora, and the relatively stable performance
for Ubuntu. To further investigate this observation, we explored the text and
the feature vectors for the textual modality of the bug reports. For each bug
report in each project, we counted the number of words in each bug report, and
we counted the number of non-zero feature values in the bug report’s feature
vector. In Figure 6.3 we provide the box plots of the number of words in each
bug report for all projects, and in Figure 6.2 we provide the box plots of the
numbers of the non-zero values of security-related and non-security-related bug
report for all projects. The mean numbers of words for the security-related
bug reports were higher than the mean numbers of words for the non-securityrelated bug reports for Fedora (i.e., 604 compared to 360 respectively) and
1

Please refer to Chapter5 Section 5.3 for more details about the data
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Table 6.2: Numbers of non-zero values in the textual modality vectors for the
included projects
F E D O R A

1 3 0

R H L

U b u n tu

1 2 0

N u m b e r o f n o n - z e r o v a lu e s

1 1 0
1 0 0
9 0
8 0
7 0
6 0
5 0
4 0
3 0
2 0
1 0
0

S e c u r ity - r e la te d

n o t s e c u r ity - r e la te d

RHL (i.e., 275 compared to 585). However, that was not the case for Ubuntu
(i.e., 1,346 compared to 621). The box plots in Figure 6.2 show that the
number of non-zero values for the security-related bug reports’ vector values
instances were higher in Fedora and in Ubuntu. This indicates that the textual
modality for the security-related bug reports for Fedora and Ubuntu is more
conclusive and hold more indicative features.
Our results are somewhat comparable with the previous work [126] in which
the TF-IDF text modality was used with six classifiers to classify bug reports
in three NASA flight missions (i.e., Ground, Flight, and Flight Developers).
Similarly, to this work, there was no dominant classifier when used with each
of the three NASA datasets, however each dataset had on dominant classifier.
Specifically, Bayesian Network (BN) dominated when used with the Ground
Missions issues with a mean F-Score of 0.531 and G-Score of 0.895. Additionally, Rf dominated when used with the Flight Mission with a mean F-Score
of 0.782 and G-Score of 0.812. And NB dominated when used with Flight
Missions Developers issues with mean F-Score of 0.700 and G-Score of 0.593
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Table 6.3: Numbers of words of the security-related and not-security related
bug reports in all projects of this study
F E D O R A

2 5 0 0

R H L

U b u n tu

2 2 5 0
2 0 0 0

N u m b e r o f w o rd s

1 7 5 0
1 5 0 0
1 2 5 0
1 0 0 0
7 5 0
5 0 0
2 5 0
0

S e c u r ity - r e la te d

n o t s e c u r ity - r e la te d

but a very high 1-FPR of 0.54.
Next, we focus on using the bug tracking system modality only with the
same three learners and the deep neural network. The box plots of all performance metrics when using the bug tracking system modality are given in
Figure 6.5, and the mean values of performance metrics are provided in Table
6.5. Using the bug tracking system modality alone had significantly worse performance when compared to using the text modality. Additionally, there was
not a dominant learner in all projects when the bug tracking system modality was used. The classification performances in Fedora were generally higher
when compared to RHL and Ubuntu. Furthermore, RF had the highest FScore (i.e., 0.587) and J48 had the highest G-Score (i.e., 0.617). The DNN
had the highest 1-FPR (i.e,m 0.844) and Precision (0.702).
Additionally, the performance metrics were not comparable for RHL
and Ubuntu. Notably, using the bug tracking system modality individually
achieved very comparable 1-FPR. For Fedora, using the Deep Neural Network
achieved the highest 1-FPR (i.e., 0.844) and precision (i.e., 0.702), NB had
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Figure 6.5: Classification performance metrics for the supervised models using
bug tracking system (BTS) modalities only
the highest Recall (i.e., 0.862), RF had the highest F-Score(0.587), and J48
had the highest G-Score (i.e., 0.617). For RHL, the only satisfactory performance metrics were 1-FPR, which were as high as 0.997 for RF, which had
also the highest Precision (i.e., 0.483). Lastly for Ubuntu, RF had the highest
1-FPR (i.e., 0.997), and NB had the highest Recall (i.e., 0.737) and highest
G-Score (i.e., 0.456), and the deep neural network had the highest Precision
(i.e., 550). F-Score results were not satisfactory. As noticed, using the bug
tracking system modality only achieved better performance results for Fedora,
with somewhat lower 1-FPR, but this was not applicable for RHL or Ubuntu.
As noticed, using the bug tracking system modality only achieves poor classification performance in general. This indicates that the bug tracking modality
alone is not sufficient for the successful classification of security-related bug
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Table 6.4: Mean learners performance for the bug tracking system modality
only

reports.

Fedora

J48
NB
RF
DNN

RHL

Performance Metric
Recall
Precision
F‐Score
0.546
0.542
0.544
0.345
0.493
0.862
0.549
0.631
0.587
0.507
0.702
0.557

1‐FPR
0.711
0.439
0.750
0.844

J48
NB
RF
DNN

0.985
0.821
0.997
0.781

0.205
0.194
0.157
0.253

0.193
0.019
0.483
0.333

0.199
0.035
0.236
0.273

0.338
0.311
0.270
0.389

Ubuntu

Project Learner

G‐Score
0.617
0.582
0.634
0.586

J48
NB
RF
DNN

0.980
0.330
0.997
0.855

0.139
0.737
0.089
0.182

0.128
0.023
0.359
0.550

0.133
0.044
0.142
0.261

0.243
0.456
0.163
0.301
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RQ2: Can multimodal feature-level fusion and the
proposed multimodal approach, with textual and
bug tracking system modalities, be used to successfully classify security-related and not-security
related bug reports?

This question addresses the ability of multimodal strategies (i.e., featurelevel and decision-level fusion) using deep neural networks in the classification
of bug reports to security-related or not security-related. First, we evaluate
the classification performance of the deep neural network using feature-level
fusion of the text and the bug tracking system modalities, then we evaluate the
hybrid proposed model. The fact that the number of text modality features
(i.e., 300) is significantly higher than the number of the bug tracking system
modality features (i.e., 6) could easily baffle the classifiers. Additionally, the
results from the RQ1 showed that the text modality features are superior when
compared to the bug tracking system modality features. Instead, we only apply
feature-level fusion by forwarding all modalities to two hidden layers before
fusing them into a unified feature vector. This feature vector is used by the
output layer of the network to classify each bug report.
The proposed hybrid multimodal approach uses two fusion strategies,
feature-level fusion of the textual modality, and decision-level fusion using
all modalities. Figure 6.6 shows the box plots of classification performance
metrics when feature-level fusion was used, and when using proposed hybrid
multimodal approach. The mean values of the classification performance metrics are given in Table 6.5.
Using the hybrid multimodal approach outperformed the feature-level fusion approach in all projects in terms of all performance metrics, it had comparable 1-FPR when the feature-level fusion was used. Specifically, for Fedora,
using the multimodal approach had slightly higher F-Score (i.e., 0.997 compared to 0.967) and G-Score (i.e., 0.997 compared to 0.972), however in RHL
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Figure 6.6: Performance metrics of the multimodal and feature-level fusion
when using all modalities
and Ubuntu, the hybrid multimodal approach significantly outperformed the
feature-level fusion, even though the performance was not as good as it was
for Fedora.
The results in Figure 6.6 show that using feature-level fusion with the
text and bug tracking system modalities had very good results for Fedora
in regards of all performance metrics, and satisfactory 1-FPR for RHL and
Ubuntu. However, using the feature-level fusion for RHL and Ubuntu had
significantly worse performances compared to Fedora. Precisely, using the
feature-level fusion in Fedora achieved mean F-Score of 0.967, and mean GScore of 0.972. And in RHL it had significantly worse F-Score and G-Score
(i.e., 0.479 and 0.583 respectively), and similarly in Ubuntu, it had lower FScore (i.e., 0.528) and lower G-Score (i.e., 0.599).
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Table 6.5: Performance metrics of feature-level Fusion (FLF) models compared
to the the proposed multimodal approach. Highest values are highlighted
Project

Modality
FLF
Fedora
MultiModal
FLF
RHL
MultiModal
FLF
Ubuntu
MultiModal

1‐FPR

Recall

Precision F‐Score

G‐Score

0.996
0.998

0.950
0.994

0.986
0.999

0.967
0.997

0.972
0.997

0.994
0.994

0.424
0.793

0.628
0.860

0.479
0.821

0.583
0.869

0.989
0.984

0.438
0.804

0.698
0.841

0.528
0.820

0.599
0.877

Using the feature-level fusion seems to have similar behavior for RHL and
Ubuntu where the data significantly imbalanced.
Next, we focus on using the proposed hybrid multimodal approach with
all modalities. The results in Figure 6.6 show that using the multimodal approach achieved very satisfactory results in regards of all performance metrics
for Fedora, and was dominant for RHL and Ubuntu, when compared to the
feature-level fusion strategy. The multimodal approach for Fedora achieved
the following performance: Recall of 0.998, Precision of 0.994, Precision of
0.999, and F-Score and G-Score of 0.997. The multimodal approach had lower
performance when used for RHL and Ubuntu in regards of Recall, Precision,
F-Score, and G-Score. Specifically, for RHL, the multimodal approach had a
very satisfactory 1-FPR (i.e., 0.994), but lower Recall (i.e., (0.793), Precision
(i.e., 0.860), F-Score (i.e., 0.821), and G-Score (i.e., 0.869). A very similar
pattern is noticed when using the multimodal approach with Ubuntu as it
achieved high 1-FPR (i.e., 0.984), but lower Recall (i.e., 0.804), Precision (i.e.,
0.841), F-Score (i.e., 0.820), and G-Score (i.e., 0.877).
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RQ3: Does the proposed multimodal approach
outperform other classification models which used
individual modalities and the feature-level fusion
method?

Last, we compare the performance of the hybrid multimodal approach with
models which used each of the modalities individually, and models which used
feature-level fusion using all modalities. Table 6.6 shows the differences in
percentages of all performance metrics when the proposed hybrid multimodal
approach was used, compared to all other models. The comparisons in Table 6.6 show that using the hybrid multimodal approach had improved the
classification performance in all projects. The improvement in Fedora was
limited when compared to the feature-level fusion model (i.e., 3.0% F-Score
and 2.5% G-Score improvement), given that both models achieved very satisfactory results in regards of all performance metrics (i.e., not less than 0.950).
The improvement in the classification performance was more significant for
RHL and Ubuntu, however the multimodal approach had lower performance
in both projects when compared to Fedora. In RHL the hybrid multimodal
approach had 71.0% higher F-Score compared to the best performing model
(i.e., feature-level fusion with the DNN), and 37.9% higher G-Score compared
to the best performing model (i.e., J48 with the text modality only). And for
Ubuntu, using the hybrid multimodal approach had 9.3% higher F-Score and
11.1% G-Score than the best performing model (i.e., RF with text modality
only). Using the proposed hybrid multimodal approach improved the classification performance in all projects and in terms of all performance metrics,
with three exceptions; its 1-FPR was 0.3% lower than when using NB with
text modality only, and it resulted in a 3.9% lower Precision when RF was
used for RHL. Lastly, using the hybrid multimodal approach had 0.5% worse
1-FPR compared to when using the deep neural network with all modalities
for Ubuntu.
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Table 6.6: Difference in % of the proposed hybrid multimodal approach performance compared with baseline approaches and feature-level fusion. (*BTS
refers to Bug Tracking System modality

FEDORA

Project

Learner Modality
Text
J48
BTS
Text
NB
BTS
Text
RF
BTS
Text
DNN
BTS
FLF(Text + BTS)
J48

RHL

NB
RF
DNN

Ubuntu

J48
NB
RF
DNN

Text
BTS
Text
BTS
Text
BTS
Text
BTS
FLF(Text + BTS)
Text
BTS
Text
BTS
Text
BTS
Text
BTS
FLF(Text + BTS)

1-FPR

30.6%
40.3%
30.0%
127.1%
29.8%
33.1%
23.8%
18.2%
0.2%
0.4%
1.0%
-0.3%
21.0%
1.0%
27.3%
18.3%
27.3%
0.0%
23.7%
0.4%
23.1%
198.3%
23.3%
15.1%
18.6%
15.1%
-0.5%

Recall

31.7%
82.1%
39.5%
15.3%
31.6%
81.0%
26.0%
95.9%
4.5%
70.6%
286.0%
437.2%
309.7%
145.6%
213.2%
114.1%
213.2%
87.0%
18.2%
477.7%
416.7%
9.1%
14.2%
342.1%
48.1%
342.1%
83.7%

Precision

32.3%
84.3%
30.7%
189.8%
30.3%
58.4%
35.0%
42.4%
1.4%
86.8%
345.2%
71.1%
4392.8%
-3.9%
158.0%
86.6%
158.0%
36.9%
25.5%
556.9%
4.6%
3631.5%
4.8%
53.1%
23.1%
53.1%
20.6%

F-Score

32.0%
83.3%
35.2%
102.3%
30.9%
69.8%
30.6%
78.8%
3.0%
78.0%
313.5%
276.1%
2257.1%
74.0%
200.3%
100.8%
200.3%
71.3%
21.5%
515.2%
219.5%
1774.7%
9.3%
214.3%
35.7%
214.3%
55.3%

G-Score

31.3%
61.4%
34.9%
71.3%
30.8%
57.3%
25.0%
70.1%
2.5%
37.9%
157.2%
244.4%
179.4%
79.0%
123.2%
66.4%
123.2%
49.2%
13.5%
260.2%
235.1%
92.4%
11.1%
191.4%
27.3%
191.4%
46.4%

The classification performance of the most related works and the proposed
multimodal approach are provided in Table 6.7. The multimodal approach
had Superior performance when used with Fedora, compared to both work in
Table 6.7. The proposed hybrid multimodal approach with RHL and Ubuntu
had comparable F-Score (i.e., 0.821 and 0.820) with the work [137] (i.e., 0.886).
However, our approach had significantly higher F-Score (i.e., 0.997) with Fedora. Lastly, the proposed approach had slightly Recall (i.e., 0.793) and significantly higher Precision (i.e., 0.860) with RHL compared to the Recall and
Precision in the work [127] (i.e., 0.770 and 0.280 respectively).
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Table 6.7: Classification Performance metrics of the most related works and
the proposed hybrid multimodal approach
Reference

Modality

Fusion Strategy

[127]

text, commits

feature-level

Dataset

1-FPR

Recall

Precision

F-Score

G-Score

N/A

0.770

0.280

N/A

N/A

Bugzilla

N/A

0.799

0.994

0.886

N/A

feature +

Fedora

0.998

0.994

0.999

0.997

0.997

decision (hybrid

RHL

0.994

0.793

0.860

0.821

0.968

fusion)

Ubuntu

0.984

0.804

0.820

0.820

0.877

JIRA
Bugzilla
GitHub

[137]

text, commits

feature + decision(ensemble
learning)

This
work

text, bug tracking system

Chapter 6. Classification of Security-related bug reports

6.6.4

163

Summary of main findings

The main findings of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
• Using the multimodal approach improved the classification performance
significantly for RHL and Ubuntu, and slightly for Fedora. Specifically, it
improved the classification performance’s F-Score and G-Score by 71.3%
and 37.9% respectively for RHL, and by 9.3% and 11.1% respectively for
Ubuntu. The improvement was least significant for Fedora, with F-Score
and G-Score being improved by 3.0% and 2.5% respectively.
• Using the feature-level fusion strategy of all modalities performed very
well for Fedora, however the same does not remain true for RHL and
Ubuntu. All models still achieved a satisfactory 1-FPR no less than
0.994.
• Using the text modality alone is more beneficial than using the bug
tracking system modality alone for all projects.
• Using text modality alone produced stable and performances for Fedora
only in regarding to all performance metrics as all results were between
0.712 and 0.816.
• Using the text modality alone for RHL had very high 1-FPR and a
satisfactory Precision of 0.895 for RF. However, the same does not remain
true for the other metrics for RHL nor any of Ubuntu; they underperform.
• Using the bug tracking system modality alone in general did not perform
well. It produced some satisfactory Recall of 0.862 when used with NB
for Fedora only. Additionally, using the bug tracking system modality
achieved higher 1-FPR for RHL and Ubuntu except for NB with Ubuntu,
which achieved a low 1-FPR.
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Threats to validity

Construct validity relates to the degree that we are measuring what
we intended to measure. The textual descriptions, summaries, and developers comments of bug report can hold informative details of how the bug was
detected, exploited, and fixed. While the average number of words for the
security-related bug reports was higher for Fedora and RHL, the feature vectors representing the text modality had more informative information (i.e.,
a smaller number of zero values). For Ubuntu, security-related bug reports
had a higher average of words, and more non-zero values in their text features
vectors. Since the text modality depend on the size of the vocabulary, we extended the vocabulary by including all the textual descriptions of the CVEs,
in addition to the descriptions of the CWEs as was followed in the previous
work [126]. We do not consider the weights of each individual CVE/ CWE,
and we do not explore the multi-class classification of security-related bug reports. To avoid bias, we used the entire datasets to evaluate all the models
without considering different sampling techniques. In RHL and Ubuntu, the
number of the security-related bugs is significantly lower than non-securityrelated bugs (i.e., 1.1% and 2.0% respectively), while in Fedora it was much
higher (i.e., 25.5%). Further investigation is necessary to evaluate the performance of the models considering different ratios of the security-related bug
reports to non-security-related bug reports.
Internal Validity relates to the hidden influences which may affect the
response variables, data quality in this matter is very crucial. While Fedora
seems to have very well documented bug reports, RHL and Ubuntu seem to
have less documentation. We collected as much textual description from the
bug reports as possible, the bug reports which had no text were excluded.
Upon the extraction of the text modality, all CVE’s references in the bug
report text were removed to guarantee that it will not be the only informative
feature, and thus being used as the only indicator of a security-related bug
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report. Furthermore, the severity of the bug report was excluded from the bug
tracking system modality since none of the non-security-related bug reports in
Fedora had a severity level assigned to them. Lastly, this work focuses on the
classification of bug reports to security-related or not security-related, without
considering the type of the security a bug report may represent.
Conclusion Validity relates to the capacity to draw the proper conclusions. We used five different performance metrics to evaluate the proposed
hybrid multimodal approach and compared it with other models, but we focused mainly on F-Score because it relates to Precision and Recall, and G-Score
because it relates to Recall and 1-FPR. Using different performance metrics
provides better conclusions and extends the comparison scope of this work
and other related works. We do not used statistical tests because we only used
three datasets, however we did report the mean statistic to answer all research
questions.
External Validity relates the degree of generalizability of our conclusions. In this work we tried to extract as many bug reports as possible for the
publicly available resources. The numbers of the security-related bug reports
were significantly lower than the number of non-security-related bug reports,
especially in RHL and Ubuntu. However, it is known that supervised machine
learning algorithms perform differently with different datasets and the effect
of the dataset choice as well as the imbalance treatment for the classification
of security-related bug reports remain to be explored in the future works. The
number of datasets used in this work are comparable to the previous related
work [126] however they are significantly bigger in size (i.e., number of collected bug reports). The studied projects are widely used operating systems;
thus, the bug tracking system have more bug reports for our projects. Lastly,
the generalizability of this work needs to be further explored on other dataset,
preferably from other domains.
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Conclusion

The classification and detection of software vulnerabilities is a very active
research area, and the focus on the classification of security-related bug reports
has become more active in the recent years. In this chapter we proposed a hybrid multimodal approach using deep neural networks to classify bug reports
to security-related or not-security-related bug reports, using the bug reports
textual modality extracted from the bug reports descriptions and developers’
comments, and bug tracking systems features extracted from each operating
system’s public bug tracking systems. Our hybrid multimodal machine learning approach using two fusion strategies, feature-level fusion to fuse the text
modality, and decision-level fusion using a fusion network which integrates the
weights of the features from the different modalities before classifying each
bug report. To evaluate the proposed approach, we compared it to using each
modality with three supervised machine learning algorithms and a deep neural
network. Our main findings show that using the proposed hybrid multimodal
approach had improved the classification performance significantly with RHL
and Ubuntu, and with a slightly less significance for Fedora. Additionally,
using the text modality alone is more beneficial than using the bug tracking
system modality alone for all projects.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future work
This dissertation addressed four topics in two major software engineering
areas: software fault-proneness prediction and the analysis and classification
of security-related bug reports. In the first topic we focused on the effect of the
software approaches learning (i.e., the way prediction models are trained and
tested) on the classification performance of software fault-proneness prediction models. To assess the effect of the learning approach on the classification
performance, we explored the effect of two learning approaches: useAllPredictAll and usePrePredictPost on the classification performance of software faultproneness prediction within-release and across-releases. Our results showed
that the performance is highly affected by the choice of the learning approach.
Specifically, the useAllPredictAll was superior both within-release and acrossreleases.
In the second topic we explored the effects of two factors on the software fault-proneness classification performance: (1) the choice of datasets
and, (2) the imbalance treatment using the Synthetic Minority Over-sampling
Technique (SMOTE). Specifically, we used the Group Lasso Regression machine learning algorithm (G-Lasso) and six other machine learning algorithms
to build prediction models with 22 datasets extracted different open source
project. Our main findings include: (1) SMOTE improved the classification
performance of all learners, but I did not have statistically significant effect on
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G-Lasso in terms of Recall and G-Score. (2) The choice of the dataset had no
effect on the classification performance of most learners, including G-Lasso.
The third topic is focused on the characteristics of security-related bug
reports and the differences between security-related and non-security-related
bug reports in three widely-used operating systems. This topic is a conceptual replication study, exploring multiple research questions from several prior
works. This analysis was based on 414,089 bug reports collected from the three
operating systems bug tracking systems. Our analysis showed that securityrelated bug reports: (1) appeared in a smaller number of software packages,
(2) were somewhat similar in the three studied projects. (i.e., all projects
shared the same eight top dominant vulnerability classes).
In the last topic we proposed a hybrid multimodal machine learning approach using deep neural networks which integrates text and bug tracking
system modalities to classify bug reports to security-related or non-securityrelated. The proposed model uses two multimodal fusion strategies, featurelevel fusion at the text modality level, and decision-level fusion using the
weighted average of the modalities weights’ in the fusion network. Our results showed that the proposed approach outperformed all other models using
each of the modalities individually using feature-level fusion of text and bug
tracking system modalities. The classification performance and improvements
of the proposed approach differed across datasets. When compared to the
best performing baselines, the proposed multimodal approach had 0.997 FScore and G-Score (i.e., 3.0% and 2.5% improvement respectively) for Fedora,
0.821 F-Score and 0.869 G-Score (i.e., 71.8% and 37.9% improvement respectively) for RHl, and 0.820 mean F-Score and 0.877 G-Score (i.e., 9.3% and
11.1% improvement respectively).
Out future work would be focused on the following:
• Exploring the effect of the learning approach on the classification performance of software fault-proneness prediction models: (1) at different
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software granularities (e.g., component or package level), (2) with different machine learning algorithms, and (3) using more datasets from
different domains.
• Exploring the use of multimodal machine learning approaches for software fault-proneness prediction, especially, for prediction across-releases
and for transfer learning.
• Exploring different modalities with different multimodal machine learning strategies for the classification of bug reports.
• Extending the classification of bug reports to multiple security-related
categories.
• Exploring the use the proposed hybrid multimodal machine learning approach for classification of bug reports across-projects and using transferlearning.
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Chapter 8
Appendices
8.1

Appendix A: Domains of the studied
projects for software fault-proneness prediction

In this appendix we provide details (i.e., web address and domain) on the
projects used to extract the datastes used in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 for
software fault-proneness prediction.
1. Apache Ant http://ant.apache.org is a Java library and commandline tool whose mission is to drive processes described in build files as
targets and extension points dependent upon each other. The main
known usage of Ant is the build of Java applications. Ant supplies a
number of built-in tasks allowing to compile, assemble, test and run
Java applications. Ant can also be used effectively to build non Java
applications, for instance C or C++ applications. More generally, Ant
can be used to pilot any type of process which can be described in terms
of targets and tasks.
2. Apache Axis2 http://axis.apache.org/axis2/java/core/ is a
toolkit for creating and using Web Services, including SOAP, MTOM,
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XML/HTTP and advanced WS-* standards such as WSRM and WSSecurity. Axis2 includes a very fast run-time engine, together with tooling support for WSDL and WS-Policy, and plugin support for WSAddressing, WS-Reliable-messaging, WS-Security, WS-Eventing, WSTransactions, WS-Trust and WS-Secure Conversation. Axis2 runs either
standalone or hosted in Tomcat or other servlet containers.
3. Apache Derby http://db.apache.org/derby/ is an open source relational database implemented entirely in Java. It has a small footprint
that makes it easy to embed in any Java-based application, but it also
supports the more familiar client/server mode. It is based on the Java,
JDBC, and SQL standards, making code developed more portable to
standards-compliant databases.
4. Apache Geronimo http://geronimo.apache.org/ is a server runtime that integrates OSS projects to create Java/OSGI server run-times
5. Apache Hadoophttp://hadoop.apache.org/ is a distributed computing platform, which also includes the Hadoop Distributed File System
(HDFS).
6. Apache Hive http://hive.apache.org/ is a data warehouse software
facilitates querying and managing large datasets residing in distributed
storage.
7. jEdit-X http://www.jedit.org/ is a mature programmer’s test editor.
8. Apache Pivot http://pivot.apache.org/ is a platform for building
installable Internet applications.
9. Apache Synapse http://synapse.apache.org/ is a simple and highly
effective Enterprise Service Bus ESB, Web Services intermediary and
(Service Oriented Architecture) SOA framework
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10. Apache Wicket http://wicket.apache.org/ is a web-apps developing environment.
11. Apache Xalan http://xalan.apache.org/xalan-j/ is an XSLT processor for transforming XML documents into HTML, text, or other XML
document types.
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B:

Commit

collection

and

grouping for software fault-proneness prediction
This section provides detailed description the process of change metrics
extraction shown in Figure 3.2 of Chapter 3. Commits made to the source
code throughout the development history were collected. For each project, we
obtained a local copy of the latest source code repository using the Apache
subversion (SVN) tool [259], and only used the main trunk. (The trunk is the
main line of development in SVN repositories, and its where the latest copy
of source code lives [167].) The commit log file encapsulates all commits (i.e.,
changes) made to the source code in a textual file, such as changes made to fix
bugs and add new features and enhancements. Each commit summary holds
details about the commit, the developer handling the commit, and the files
that were modified in that commit. We converted the commit log to HTML
files using the statsvn tool [260]. Statsvn transforms the commit log file into
user friendly HTML files which summarize all commits made to the source
code. An example of a commit summary is shown in Figure 8.1.

Figure 8.1: Summary of a commit made to the source code
Statsvn generates two different sets of HTML files; one summarizes commits by date, and the other summarizes commits by the component. In the
first set, all changes made to the repository are summarized historically, and
grouped by the changes made each month. This set shows all changes made
to all files (i.e., Java and non-Java). The second set shows only changes made
to the project’s Java files and is grouped for each Java file in each project.

Chapter 8. Appendices

174

In this study, we obtained change metrics from the first set of HTML files.
Specifically, we wrote Java script which parsed through the entire development history of each project, and for each commit we collected the following:
• Commit number, a unique number assigned to each commit made to the
source code.
• Name of the developer handling the commit.
• Date of the commit.
• Commit message description, which is a textual description of the issue
behind the commit.
• Names of file(s) changed, including the full path.
• Numbers of Lines of code added or deleted for each in each commit.
• Type of action made: Add, Delete, or Modify.
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Extracting bugs from the bug tracking systems

This section describes the detailed process of extracting the change metrics
from the projects included in this study. For each project, we integrated
commit information from the version control systems with information from
the bug tracking systems. The term issue is used to describe each buggy report
documented by the bug tracking system. By integrating information collected
from the Version Control System and commit logs, buggy commits and files
can be identified and labeled. The projects used in this study used either
JIRA [183] or Bugzilla [184] bug tracking systems.

8.2.2

JIRA Bug Tracking System

JIRA is an Atlassian trademark software widely used with the Apache open
source projects [183]. It provides issue and bug tracking as well as project
management functions. JIRA can hold up to eighty different fields for any
given issue. For each project we were interested in the following four fields:
issue number, issue type, issue status, and issue resolution.
• Issue Number is an auto generated unique ID number assigned to each
issue.
• Issue Type in JIRA can be Standard or Sub-Task. Since we are only
interested in the faulty issues, we only considered the standard issues
here, as they included all the faulty issues. Specifically, there are six
different standard issues: bug, improvement, new feature, task, test,
and wish. We used the JIRA search tool and queried issues that were
Bugs only and collected their ID numbers.
• Issue Status describes the status of a given issue. JIRA has six different statuses: open, in progress, resolved, closed, reopened, and patch
available. Open means the issue is pending and ready for a developer to
work on it. In Progress means the issue is currently active and is being
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worked on. Resolved means that the issue has a resolution taken place
and is waiting verification by reporter. Closed means that the issue was
resolved, and the resolution is correct. Reopened means the issue was
resolved in the past, but the resolution was deemed incorrect. Patch
Available means that a contributor has uploaded a patch to JIRA for
this issue.
We used JIRA’s search tool to extract faulty issues which have been
either Resolved or Closed. Both statuses indicate that the reported issue
has been fixed by a developer.
• Issue resolution is provided by the developer(s) handling the issue and
it describes the ways in which a given issue can be closed. This field has
more than 20 different options. We are only interested in the following
options: fixed, implemented, done, and delivered. All these options
indicate that the issue was fixed, and no further actions are required.

8.2.3

Bugzilla

Bugzilla is a bug tracking system, which allows developers to track software
bugs during the development, testing and deployment phases activity [261].
It provides bug and code change tracking ability and helps managing quality assurance in software development. It has more than 40 different fields for
handling a change. Similarly, to JIRA, we are only interested in two fields Status and Resolution to collect faulty changes’ ID numbers. We used Bugzilla’s
search engine tool to look for changes that were Bugs and have a status of
Resolved or Closed, as well as a Resolution with the value Fixed.

8.2.4

Identifying faulty commits

Once commits from the version control system were extracted and stored
into the SQL database, it was necessary to determine which of these commits
were made to fix bugs. We followed the approach commonly used in related
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works (e.g., [11, 46, 145, 262, 263]) to label faulty commits. First, we obtained
a list of all bug ID numbers, given in each project’s bug tracking system.
A commit was considered faulty if its textual description contains a bug ID
number or another indication that it is faulty. Since commits and bugs are
reported by developers and users, a faulty commit may not include a bug ID
number in its description. We overcame this issue by using a set of regular
expressions that contained expressions such as.(*.bug) or (fix.*) to find faulty
commits that did not have bug ID numbers. We mined through the textual
descriptions of all commits for either a bug ID number or a regular expression,
and if either was found, the commit was labeled as faulty. Files that were
changed in any faulty commit were marked as faulty files. Based on when
the bug-fix happened, all faulty files were classified into files with bug-fixes,
pre-release bugs, or post-release bugs.

8.3

Appendix C: Definitions of the collected
fields for software vulnerability analysis

In this appendix, we provide the full definitions of the bug tracking system
fields collected for the analysis of software vulnerabilities in Chapter 5. More
details and definitions of the provided fields and their uses for Fedora and
RHL are provided online at the Red Hat Bugzilla - bug fields web page [215].
Details about Ubuntu’s fields are available at the Ubuntu Launchpad bugs
help web-page [217].
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Table 8.1: Names and descriptions of collected fields for the included projects
in this study, with the names of mapped fields’ names and the applied criteria
for Bugzilla and Launchpad
Bugzilla
Field name

Launchpad

Field description
mapped

applied

mapped

applied

field

criteria(s)

field

criteria(s)

N/A

N/A

name of the software
classification

classification - Red Hat
under consideration
- Fedora
automatically uniquely
assigned ID for each

ID

bug id

ALL

bug number

ALL

summary

ALL

title

contains

bug in the bug tracking
system
textual summary
summary

description of the

*CVE-*

reported bug
additional textual
description

description

ALL

description

ALL

alias

contains

N/A

N/A

summary
optional text for
additional information
alias
about the issue such as
*CVE-*
a CVE number
date and time the bug
reported date

reported

ALL

reported date ALL

reported by

ALL

reporter

ALL

Date last

ALL

was reported
name of the developer
reported by
who reported the bug
date and time the bug
modified time

modified time ALL
was lastly changed

updated
name of the developer
assignee

assignee

ALL

assigned to

ALL

status

CLOSED

status

CLOSED

handling the issue
the current state of the
status
bug

Chapter 8. Appendices

179

Bugzilla
Field name

Launchpad

Field description
mapped

applied

mapped

applied

field

criteria(s)

field

criteria(s)

resolution

CURRENT

N/A

N/A

an indication of what
resolution
happened to this bug

RELEASE,
ERRATA,
NOTABUG,
WONTFIX,
DEFERRED,
NEXTRELE
ASE,
RAWHIDE,
UPSTREAM

indication of the
internal weighting of
priority

priority

ALL

importance

ALL

severity

ALL

Heat

ALL

component

ALL

package

ALL

OS

Linux

N/A

-N/A

the bug report’s
importance
indication of the
external weighting of
severity
the bug report’s
importance
name of the source
code component in
component
which the bug is
reported
name of the operating
OS

system of the source
code’s implementation
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Bugzilla
Field name

Launchpad

Field description
mapped

applied

mapped

applied

field

criteria(s)

field

criteria(s)

comment

ALL

date and time of
comment date exchanged comments

comment date ALL

for a particular bug

date

name of the developer
commenting on a
comment

comment

ALL

comment

ALL

particular bug’s
assignee

assignee

assignee

development
textual description of
comment

the exchanged

description

comment

description

ALL

description

ALL
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Appendix D: Publications and Contributions

• K. Goseva-Popstojanova, M. Ahmad, and Y. Alshehri. ”Software fault
proneness prediction with group lasso regression: on factors that affect
classification performance.” 2019 IEEE 43rd Annual Computer Software
and Applications Conference (COMPSAC) (Vol. 2, pp. 336-343). IEEE.
• M. Ahmad, K. Goseva-Popstojanova, and R. Lutz, “Comparison of
Learning Approaches for Software Fault-proneness Prediction”, in preparation, to be submitted
• M. Ahmad and K. Goseva-Popstojanova “Empirical analysis of security
related bug reports: A replicated study based on open-source operating
systems”, in preparation, to be submitted
• Data

contribution:

Classification
Learning”

using

(2019).

T.

Gantzer

Feature
M.S.

D,

Selection,
Thesis,

”Security

Bug

Clustering,

West

Virginia

and

Report
Deep

University.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd/4022
• Data contribution: Y. Alshehri, ”Explanatory and Causality Analysis in
Software Engineering” (2018). PhD. Dissertation, West Virginia University. https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd/3688
• J. Hernandez, M. Ahmad, and K. Goseva-Popstojanova, ”Software Vulnerabilities in Open Source Operating Systems” Summer Undergraduate
Research Symposium at West Virginia University, 2019.
• L. Darnell, M. Ahmad, and K. Goseva-Popstojanova ”Software FaultProneness in Open Source”- 2016 Summer Undergraduate Research Symposium West Virginia University, 2016.
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[249] L. P. Morency and T. Baltrušaitis, “Multimodal machine learning:
Integrating language, vision and speech,” in ACL 2017 - 55th Annual
Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics, Proceedings
of the Conference Tutorial Abstracts, 2017, pp. 3–5. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/P17-5002
[250] K. Xu, M. Lam, J. Pang, X. Gao, C. Band, P. M. MD, F. P. MD, A. K. K.
MD, J. B. C. MD, K. M. MD, P. Xie, and E. Xing, “Multimodal Machine
Learning for Automated ICD Coding,” arXiv, vol. 106, pp. 1–17, 10 2018.
[251] T. Meng, X. Jing, Z. Yan, and W. Pedrycz, “A survey on machine
learning for data fusion,” Information Fusion, vol. 57, pp. 115–129, 5
2020. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.inffus.2019.12.001
[252] O. Jormakka, “Approaches and challenges of automatic vulnerability
classification using natural language processing and machine learning
techniques,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Jyväskylä, 2019. [Online].
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